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Abstract 
Key words: Military, intervention, democracy and Nigerian politics 
A study of literature on civil-military relations in Nigeria reveals a question: why does the 
military intervene in the politics of some countries but remain under firm civilian control in 
others? This thesis delves into military intervention in Nigerian Politics and its general 
impact on democracy (1993-1999). The military exploits its unique and pivotal position by 
demanding greater institutional autonomy and involvement when the civilian leadership 
fails. The main purpose of this study is to discourage military intervention in Nigeria 
politics, and to encourage them to focus their primary assignment of lethal force, which 
includes use of weapons, in defending its country by combating actual or perceived threats 
against the state.  
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
*HQHUDO,QWURGXFWLRQ
7KHUH LV QR JDLQ LQ VD\LQJ WKDW DQ\ VWDWH¶V FODLP WR VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG WHUULWRULDO
LQWHJULW\ZRXOGEHPHDQLQJOHVVLQWKHDEVHQFHRIWKHPLOLWDU\LQVWLWXWLRQ7KHPLOLWDU\LVRQH
RI WKH HVVHQWLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV RI 1LJHULD DV HQVKULQHG LQ WKH 6HFWLRQ  RI WKH 
&RQVWLWXWLRQ RI WKH )HGHUDO 5HSXEOLF RI 1LJHULD ZKRVH VXEVHFWLRQV  DV WUDGLWLRQDOO\
HVWDEOLVKHG WRPDLQWDLQ LQWHUQDO VHFXULW\ DQG GHIHQFH DJDLQVW H[WHUQDO DJJUHVVLRQ ,Q OLQH
ZLWKWKLVWUDGLWLRQWKHFRORQLDOJRYHUQPHQWVHWXSWKH1LJHULDQPLOLWDU\IRUWKHSXUSRVHRI
LQWHUQDO VHFXULW\ DQG GHIHQFH RI WKH WHUULWRU\ 7KLV FRQVWLWXWHV D YHU\ LPSRUWDQW VHFWRU RI
HYHU\QDWLRQ¶V V\VWHP%HFDXVHRI WKH LPSRUWDQFHRI VHFXULW\ WR HYHU\QDWLRQ WKH$UPHG
)RUFHVRIWKH)HGHUDWLRQDUHRQHRIWKHPRVWUHVSHFWHGDQGQXUWXUHGERG\LQHYHU\SROLF\
7KHUHVKDOOEHDUPHGIRUFHVIRUWKHIHGHUDWLRQZKLFKVKDOOFRQVLVWRIDQ$UP\D1DY\DQ
$LU )RUFH DQG VXFK RWKHU EUDQFKHV RI WKH DUPHG IRUFH RI WKH IHGHUDWLRQ DV PD\ EH
HVWDEOLVKHGE\DQ$FWRI WKH1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\7KHIHGHUDWLRQVKDOOVXEMHFWWRDQ$FWRI
WKH 1DWLRQDO $VVHPEO\ HTXLS DQG PDLQWDLQ WKH DUPHG IRUFHV DV PD\ EH FRQVLGHUHG
DGHTXDWHDQGHIIHFWLYHIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRI
• 'HIHQGLQJ1LJHULDIURPH[WHUQDODJJUHVVLRQ
• 0DLQWDLQLQJLWVWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\DQGVHFXULQJLWVERUGHUVIURPYLRODWLRQRQODQG
VHDRUDLU
• 6XSSUHVVLQJLQVXUUHFWLRQDQGDFWLQJLQDLGRIFLYLODXWKRULWLHVWRUHVWRUHRUGHUZKHQ
FDOOHG XSRQ WR GR VR E\ WKH 3UHVLGHQW EXW VXEMHFW WR VXFK FRQGLWLRQV DVPD\ EH
SUHVFULEHGE\DQ$FWRIWKH1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\DQG


• 3HUIRUPLQJ VXFK RWKHU IXQFWLRQV DVPD\ EH SUHVFULEHG E\ DQ$FW RI WKH1DWLRQDO
$VVHPEO\
%DVHGRQ WKH IRUHJRLQJ5D\(NSX SRVLWHG WKDW³WKH$UPHG)RUFHVRI1LJHULD
OLNHDQ\RWKHUFRXQWU\¶VDUPHGIRUFHVFRQVWLWXWHDSODQNRIRXUGHIHQFHDUVHQDO1RFRXQWU\
FDQVXSSRUWLWVIRUHLJQSRVWXUHVRUHYHQLWVGRPHVWLFGHVLUHVZLWKRXWKDYLQJWKHDVVXUDQFHRI
DFRPEDWUHDG\ZHOOWUDLQHGZHOOPRWLYDWHGDQGZHOOHTXLSSHGDUPHGIRUFHV´
7KHPLOLWDU\KDV ORQJSOD\HGDSURPLQHQW UROH LQ1LJHULDQSROLWLFV ,Q IDFW VLQFH1LJHULD
DWWDLQHGLQGHSHQGHQFHLQ1LJHULDKDVVSHQWD ORQJHUSHULRGXQGHUPLOLWDU\UXOH WKDQ
XQGHUFLYLOLDQDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ7KHPLOLWDU\DEDQGRQHGLWVWUDGLWLRQDOUROHE\LQWHUYHQLQJLQ
JRYHUQPHQWWKURXJKWKHLUVHL]XUHRISRZHUIURPWKHFLYLOLDQUHJLPHXQGHUWKHKHDGVKLSRI
$OKDML 7DIDZD %DOHZD RQ -DQXDU\ WK  EDUHO\ VL[ \HDUV DIWHU LQGHSHQGHQFH DQG
GHPRFUDWLFH[SHULPHQWLQZKDWWKH\GHVFULEHGDVDFRUUHFWLYHPHDVXUHIRUWKHH[FHVVHVRU
ODFNRIFRPSHWHQFHRIWKHFLYLOLDQDGPLQLVWUDWRUV
+RZHYHU KDYLQJ DVVXPHG SRZHU WKH PLOLWDU\ UHIXVHG WR UHOLQTXLVK WKH UHLQV WR WKH
FLYLOLDQVSOXQJLQJWKHQDWLRQLQWRPDQ\\HDUVRIGLFWDWRUVKLSDQG
7KH1LJHULDQDUP\KDVUXOHGIRUQHDUO\\HDUVVLQFHLQGHSHQGHQFH$OWKRXJK
LWFDQQRWEHVDLG WKDW WKH\HDUVZHUHHQWLUHO\ZDVWHGE\ WKHPLOLWDU\DV WKH\PDGHFHUWDLQ
UHPDUNDEOH LPSURYHPHQWV RQ WKH QDWLRQ¶V ERG\ SROLWLF HVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH DUHDV RI D QHZ
SUHVLGHQWLDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDYHU\G\QDPLFIRUHLJQSROLF\WKDWPDGH$IULFDWKHFHQWHUSLHFHRI
1LJHULD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\WKHFUHDWLRQRIQHZVWDWHVDQGPRUHLQVWLWXWLRQVRIKLJKHUOHDUQLQJ
WKHUHIRUPRIWKHORFDOJRYHUQPHQWV\VWHPKXJHLQYHVWPHQWLQLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVXFKDVURDGV
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dams, industries etc. However, it remains a truism that the military succeeded in 
compounding the problems it hitherto came to solve (Idise, 1985). 
This thesis is divided into four chapters; the first chapter talks about “Nigeria-An 
overview”. This analyse the ways the country has experienced cycles of military and 
civilian rule, civil war, and peaceful reconstruction. The country experimented with 
different federal, state, and local government systems, learning more about its needs, 
resources, and constraints with each experiment. Despite the predominance of military 
regimes during the three postcolonial decades, Nigerian society has retained many of the 
fundamental building blocks of a democratic policy: vigorous entrepreneurial classes, a 
broad intelligentsia and numerous centres of higher education, a dynamic legal community 
and judiciary, diverse and often outspoken media, and, increasingly, courageous human 
rights organizations.  
Nigeria became politically independent on October 1, 1960, after about seven decades of 
colonial rule by the British. Prior to colonial rule, most of the groups that today make up 
the country were often distinguished by differences in history, culture, political 
development, and religion. 
Despite the differences in character and composition of the successive governments, it is 
still possible to identify the major threads of Nigeria's institutional evolution. As the nation 
finds itself once more on the threshold of transition from military to civilian rule, promised 
for 1992, examination of these threads is essential for understanding the Nigeria that will 
become the Third Republic. 
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The second chapter is “Literature review”. This explains democracy in Nigeria and the 
nature of electoral fraud and wholesome malpractices. In fact, Nigeria has never witnessed 
a truly free, fair and credible election since her independence in 1960 except the annulled 
June 12 1993 general elections. That election was adjudged by almost all Nigerians 
including both local and international poll observers as the freest ever conducted in Nigeria. 
Even recent elections conducted since this new dispensation in 1999, 2003 and 2007 were 
all fraught with monumental election malpractices. 
The third chapter is “Historical overview of military involvement in Nigerian politics”. 
This explained how the Military involved itself in Nigerian politics in order to checkmate 
the bad and corrupt leadership of politicians. They controlled the political parties and 
dictated the tunes to the government, the military has not only intervened in the political 
process and overthrew the constitutional civilian authority, but it also often has established 
its supremacy over elected politicians. Even in those countries where the military has 
become almost a permanent feature of politics, military rule is still considered an aberration 
and symptomatic of a malfunctioning political system. In Nigeria, which typifies the 
scenario just presented, military rule was usually seen as a "rescue" operation necessary to 
save the country from civilian ineptitude.  
Military rule was not expected to last long; once the rescue operation was complete, the 
military should return to the barracks where they belonged and leave the government to 
civilian politicians. The problem, however, was that although military officers accepted this 
rationale, military rule usually became self-sustaining. 
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While the last chapter which is “impacts of military rule on Nigerian Democracy” 
examined the factors that are responsible for military rules in Nigeria, their roles on 
democratic development, their achievements and their failures.  
Statement of problem 
From the onset of independent government in Nigeria in 1960 to the end of 1990, the 
military had ruled for twenty-one years. Altogether there were five coups d'état involving 
changes of government: those of January 15, 1966; July 29, 1966; July 29, 1975; December 
31, 1983; and August 27, 1985. There was also an unsuccessful coup in which the head of 
state, General Murtala Muhammad, was killed in February 1976, and another was nipped in 
the bud in December 1985. An attempt to overthrow General Ibrahim Babangida was made 
in April 1990. Of these coups, only those of January 1966 and December 1983 were against 
civilian governments. The military intervention has been attributed to several reasons aside 
the major reasons given by the coup plotters themselves. While the latter have cited 
economic mismanagement and corruption, other explanations have ranged from the 
continuation of ethno regional politics by military means to the personal ambitions of 
officers. 
The role of the military in a democratic setting unarguably should be restricted to the 
traditional role of preserving law and order and defending the sovereignty of the nation. 
This should not include direct takeover of the political process, as it has been the case with 
much of Nigeria’s post-independence history. Nigeria was born into democracy at 
independence, but the roots of democracy were yet to sprout when the military struck and 
seized the political system from civilian rule under the pretext of a salvage mission to 
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sanitize the polity of corruption, ethnic malaises and electoral somersaults. As Dent (1978, 
cited in Anugwom, 2001) argued, the military in Nigeria comes to power with the 
expressed intention of acting as a corrective regime.  
However, this claim has been clearly faulted, as only the military regime of 
Mohammed/Obasanjo can lay any claim to have performed this corrective function. In fact, 
Nigeria’s political history has shown that even when the military come to power as a 
corrective regime, there is always inherent danger of the corruption of military power. 
Hence, it is believed that the reason for the military’s involvement in politics is the fact 
that, the Nigerian army was politicized quite early in the country’s history as an 
independent nation (Ikpe, 2000). The years of military rule saw the gradual transformation 
of coup d’état into a political tradition that made entrenchment of democratic ideals into 
Nigeria’s political system an unrealizable goal. Obi Cyril (2004: 4) instructively noted that: 
It is perhaps paradoxical that all attempts at democratic transition in 
Nigeria since its independence in 1960 have been determined and 
implemented by the ruling faction of the military, the very managers of 
institutionalized violence. Indeed the promise of a return to democracy 
constituted an important platform for the legitimacy of military 
intervention in (Nigeria’s) political life. 
Similarly, Anugwom (2001: 99) submitted that: 
The military has dominated post-independent Nigeria in the political 
arena and is largely responsible for the present political, economic and 
social underdevelopment of the nation. Apart from the first republic 
ushered in by the British, the military has acted as both the midwife and 
the terminator of democracy in Nigeria. With the exception of the one 
properly supervised democratic exercise in 1979, the military has 
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displayed a markedly half-hearted attempt to usher in democracy in the 
1990s while terminating such steps in mid-stride in 1966, 1983 and 1993. 
These flaws affect Nigeria’s democratic development. Nigeria’s democracy is the most 
populous democracy in Africa with a population of over 160 million. Democracy in Nigeria 
has a chequered history. From the first republic through the prolonged autocratic military 
regimes and the truncated second and third republics to the present democratic 
dispensation, democracy has suffered debilitating experiences in the country. Chief among 
the factors responsible for the debilitating experiences of democracy in Nigeria is the 
incessant military intervention in politics. Although, the political game has changed from 
the rule of the gun to the rule of the vote, the long shadow of militarism continues to loom 
large over the political system generating concern for further democratization of the 
society. 
The return to formal democratic rule has not only created space for the civilianisation of the 
(retired) military elite, but has also introduced these “newly converted” democrats to civil 
politics, and ultimately a return to power by other means. While this has signalled the 
acceptance of the retired military by the civilian population as well as the acceptance of the 
military faction of the supremacy of civil and democratic authority, it has however exposed 
the political system to the risk of organised violence subversion of democratic ethos for 
selfish gain by the erstwhile practitioners of organised violence as experience of the fourth 
republic have shown. Such violence was present in the second republic between 1979 and 
1983, and it continued during military rule between 1984 and 1999, and has remained a 
feature of the present democratic phase. In the most recent manifestation violence has often 
taken the form of communal and ethnic or sectarian conflict like the Boko Haram. It is 


LQVWUXFWLYHWKDWWKHHOLWHLVKDUGO\HYHUGLUHFWO\LQYROYHGLQWKHVHFRQIOLFWVEXWKDVUHFUXLWHG
IRRW VROGLHUV IURP DPRQJ WKH PDVVHV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH \RXWK XVLQJ PRQH\ HWKQLFLW\
UHOLJLRQ DQG FRPPXQDO DVZHOO DV RWKHU VHFWLRQDO LGHQWLWLHV WR LQVWLJDWH YLROHQFH LQ WKHLU
TXHVW WR FDSWXUH FRQVROLGDWH DQG XWLOL]H SRZHU 7KH LPSOLFDWLRQ RI WKLV LV D VLWXDWLRQ
ZKHUHE\WKHSROLWLFDOHOLWHVHHVSRZHUPRUHDVDQHQGLWVHOIUDWKHUWKDQDPHDQVWRDQHQG
7KLV FUHDWHV SUREOHPV LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH FDSDFLW\ RI WKH UXOLQJ HOLWH WR WUXO\ UHSUHVHQW WKH
EURDG LQWHUHVWV RI WKH 1LJHULDQ SHRSOH DQG DGYDQFH WKH FDXVH RI GHPRFUDF\ (WLPDQG
8NSHUH  SRVLWHG WKDW WKH FXUUHQW EHKDYLRXU E\ SROLWLFDO OHDGHUV DQG WKDW RI WKH
IROORZHUVDWWKHQDWLRQDOVWDWHORFDOJRYHUQPHQWV¶OHYHOVUHVSHFWLYHO\DUHDFFRXQWHGIRUE\
WKHPLOLWDUL]DWLRQRIWKHFLYLFSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHWKURXJKSROLWLFDORVPRWLFSURFHVVHV
5HVHDUFK4XHVWLRQV
,QWKHOLJKWRIWKHDERYHWKLVVWXG\VHWVRXWWRSURIIHUDQVZHUVWRWKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQV
• :KDWIDFWRUVDFFRXQWIRUPLOLWDU\LQWHUYHQWLRQLQ1LJHULD¶VSROLWLFDOV\VWHP"
• :KDWLVWKHLPSDFWRIPLOLWDU\LQWHUYHQWLRQRQ1LJHULD¶VGHPRFUDWLFGHYHORSPHQW"
• :KDW LV WKH HIIHFW RI WKH DQQXOPHQW RI WKH -XQH   HOHFWLRQ RQ 1LJHULD¶V
GHPRFUDWLFGHYHORSPHQW"
• :LOODGKHUHQFHWRWKHQRUPVRIXQLYHUVDOO\DFFHSWHGSROLWLFDOFXOWXUHFKHFNPDWHWKH
PLOLWDU\LQWHUYHQWLRQ"
2EMHFWLYHVRIWKH6WXG\
7KHVSHFLILFREMHFWLYHVRIWKLVVWXG\DUHDVIROORZV


• 7R H[DPLQH WKH IDFWRUV UHVSRQVLEOH IRUPLOLWDU\ LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ1LJHULD¶V SROLWLFDO
V\VWHP
• 7R H[DPLQH WKH LPSDFW RI PLOLWDU\ LQWHUYHQWLRQ RQ 1LJHULD¶V GHPRFUDWLF
GHYHORSPHQW
• 7RKLJKOLJKWWKHHIIHFWVRIWKHDQQXOPHQWRIWKH-XQHHOHFWLRQRQ1LJHULD¶V
GHPRFUDWLFGHYHORSPHQW
• 7R ILQG D OHDG RQ KRZ WR FKHFNPDWH PLOLWDU\ QXLVDQFH LQ WKH 1LJHULD SROLWLFDO
V\VWHP
6LJQLILFDQFHRIWKHVWXG\
'HPRFUDF\ LQ 1LJHULD KDV KDG D FKHTXHUHG KLVWRU\ EHGHFNHG ZLWK FDVHV RI LQFHVVDQW
PLOLWDU\LQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP7KHUHIRUHWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKLVVWXG\FDQEH
YLHZHG IURP WKHPXOWLGLPHQVLRQDO HIIHFWV RI IDLOXUH RIPLOLWDU\ LQ JRYHUQDQFH LQ1LJHULD
DQG WKHPXOWLSOLHUHIIHFWV LWKDVRQ$IULFDHFRQRP\DV DZKROHEHLQJ WKDW1LJHULD LV WKH
PRVWSRSXORXVEODFNUDFH LQ$IULFDZLWK ODUJHVWPDUNHWRQHYHU\HFRQRPLFVHFWRU $OVR
ODFN RI JRRG SROLWLFDO FXOWXUH RQ WKH SDUW RI DQ\ QDWLRQ LV D WKUHDW WR WKH ZKROH ZRUOG
EHFDXVHVXFKQDWLRQZLOO HYHQWXDOO\EHFRPHDIDLOVWDWHZLWKDWWHQGDQWSUREOHPVVXFKDV
PDVV XQHPSOR\PHQW KLJK OHYHO RI SRYHUW\ FRUUXSWLRQ DQG JURVV KXPDQ ULJKWV YLRODWLRQ
WKHQDWLRQZLOOEHFRPHDYHULWDEOHSODFHWRJURRPWHUURULVWZKLFKKDVEHFRPHRUGHURIWKH
GD\ 0DQ\ H[DPSOHV DERXQG LQ $IULFD FRQWLQHQW WRGD\ VXFK DV 6RPDOLD 6RXWK 6XGDQ
DPRQJVWRWKHUV7KLVUHVHDUFKWKHUHIRUHLVDV\VWHPDWLFDWWHPSWWRSRLQWRXWWKHJUH\DUHDVLQ
1LJHULD¶VGHPRFUDF\DQGFKDUWWKHZD\IRUZDUGLQHQVXULQJVXVWDLQDEOHGHPRFUDF\IRUWKH
FRXQWU\ RQH WKDW ZLOO HQWDLO WKH UHSRVLWLRQLQJ RI LWV SROLWLFDO FXOWXUH E\ LGHQWLI\LQJ DQG
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purging all the undemocratic traits bequeathed on the political system by the military..The 
research will not only add to the existing knowledge in the literature of the military in 
Nigerian politics but will also serve as a veritable policy instrument for the nation’s policy 
makers.  
Research Methodology  
Methodology represents the principles, procedures, and strategies of research used in a 
study for gathering information, analyzing data, and drawing conclusions. There are broad 
category of methodology such as qualitative methods and quantitative methods; particular 
types of methodologies such as survey research, case study, and participant observation, 
among many others (Alexandra Hrituleac, 2010). Research Methodology is a way to find 
out the result of a given problem on a specific matter or problem that is also referred to as 
research problem. In Methodology, researchers use different criteria for solving and 
searching the given research problem. Different sources use different type of methods for 
solving the problem. It implies a collective term for the structured process of conducting 
research.  There are many different methodologies used in various types of research and the 
term is usually considered to include research design, data gathering and data analysis. 
Research methodologies are generally used in academic research to test hypotheses or 
theories.  A good design should ensure the research is valid, i.e. it clearly tests the 
hypothesis and not extraneous variables, and that the research is reliable, i.e. it yields 
consistent results every time. Part of the research methodology is concerned with the how 
the research is conducted.  This is called the study design and typically involves research 
conducted using questionnaires, interviews, observation and/or experiments. 
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The nature of this research work has called for the need to make use of descriptive survey 
analysis which will be mainly through library research. The data for this study are largely 
derived from empirical sources, relating to the history of military intervention in Nigeria 
dating from the 1960 to the dawn of the Fourth Republic, while the secondary source of 
data for this research work is mainly from libraries, published and unpublished journals, 
magazines, newspaper publications and the Internet. The anchoring of the study on 
qualitative data analysis basically means that the data collected were analyzed using logical 
argument and sequential presentation of points and facts.  
Scope of the Study 
The scope of the study covers a period of eight years, that is, the period between 1993 and 
1999 in which the military orchestrated the worst assault on Nigeria’s democratic 
structures. The voice of this period is arises from the fact that it is markedly the era where 
the “ethnicisation’’ of politics both within and outside the military” became pronounced 
culminating in the annulment of the June 12 Presidential elections (Adebisi, 1998: 141). 
This period of military rule crafted modern Nigerian society, and effected cataclysmic 
changes in Nigeria’s political, economic and religious character that nearly tore the country 
apart on several occasions. Although, the study derives its data largely from empirical 
sources relating to the history of military intervention in Nigeria dating from the 1966 to 
1999, it however highlight the implications of the annulment of June 12 elections on the 
nation’s democratic effort.  
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Limitations of the Study 
First, the relatively short period of time allotted for this study meant that the researcher had 
to work very assiduously in the midst of material constraints to meet with the schedule. 
Secondly, although the significance of this study was largely derived from the fact that 
modern Nigeria cannot be understood without reference to its era of military rule, however, 
there is little objective literature on these years of military rule, especially the years that 
preceded the current civilian government. The small body of literature on the era of military 
rule consists largely of hagiographic biographies by, or about, some of the key personalities 
of the era. In fact, most works on military rule in Nigeria lack objectivity and accurate 
reportage of events by their authors who presumably fear intimidation or instigating 
instability in the polity. Most powerful actors and personalities behind Nigeria’s military 
governments are still active and influential in political positions, even if they have removed 
their uniforms and transformed themselves into civilian rulers. Most significant portion of 
the political elite of the country are made up of retired military personnel, therefore, certain 
information on the military’s role in the polity are strictly guarded. This leads to limited 
available information and materials in this area of study and thus constitutes a major 
challenge.  However, these limitations did not necessarily hinder the outcome of the study, 
as the study utilizes personal opinions and account of Nigerians who witnessed and/or 
experienced different military regimes in Nigeria.  
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Chapter One: An Overview of Nigeria  
1.0 Background of the Study 
The name Nigeria was said to have been coined by the British colonialists to describe the 
vast land around the River Niger and its basin. It was then called Niger-area, after a long 
usage it was shortened to Nigeria (Yesufu,). Mungo Park was exploring the River Niger 
when he stumbled into this vast area along the River. 
 The contacts with the colonial masters started around 1849; from this period, they did not 
stop until the whole country was finally colonised (Yesufu, 1982). The traders could be said 
to have been the fore-runners of the British Government. Though, the first trip of Mungo 
Park was sponsored by private initiatives, as soon as his report was made public, the British 
Government took over since there were now enough economic reasons to be involved in the 
Niger River areas. The fact remains that, the inhabitants of the Northern parts are Muslims 
and very conservative because they were influenced by the jihad war of Uthman Dan Fodio 
(Yesufu, 1982). 
Nigeria is an artificial State because it was created according to colonial exigencies rather 
than ethnic coherence. There are three main nationalities: the mostly Christian Yoruba’s in 
the South West, the predominantly Christians Ibos in the South East and the Muslim Hausa 
Fulani’s in the North. Between these three main nationalities they constitute 65% of the 
population while the remaining 35% are the minorities (Butts and Metz, 1996). Lord 
Lugard with the expansionist agenda for the benefits of the British and British economy 
brought these ‘two strange bed fellows’ together through the Amalgamation of Nigeria Act 
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of 1914 (Nicolson, 1969). These sets of people do not have anything in common, the 
southerners were and still are modernists while the Northerners were and still are 
conservatives and extremists. From this period, the British increased their activities in the 
Niger River area, which eventually led to the political, economic, judicial and military 
rights that were vested in the Royal Niger Company in 1885 all through to 1900. In 1900, 
the Protectorate of Northern and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were proclaimed with 
two distinct administrations, the Colony of Lagos was then under another administration. 
In most African countries democracy seems unstable as a result of military intervention. 
This in no small way affected the development of government policies and physical 
development of the affected nations. Nigeria has experienced several transitions in political 
leadership since independence, but the type of leadership and the governmental policy 
produced from the year 1993- 1999 transitions has been much less innovative.  
Moreover, in the political management of the country, during this period under General 
Gbadamosi Babangida’s regime created a political party arrangement that was hailed not 
only in Nigeria, but in the whole of Africa (Alubo, 2004). For the first time in the Nigerian 
history, Babangida tried to diffuse real political power to local governments and 
deliberately encouraged political enlistment through education and political awareness 
activities (Osoba, 1996). His regime also created the Centre for Democratic Studies to help 
train local government elected officials (Lewis, 2008). Nigeria is basically rural and the 
majority of the people live in the villages with little or no infrastructures like good roads, 
clean water and electricity (Yesufu, 1982); a lot of people were therefore cut off politically 
before this policy (Lewis, 2008). 
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Secondly, farming remained the main occupation and this was carried out by the aged 
farmers as the young ones had left for the cities; this new policy was meant to open up 
these villages (Lewis, 2008). 
The military took over the governance of the country through a very bloody coup led by 
Major Nzeogwu in January 1966. This coup was claimed to end the misrule, ineptness and 
corruption of the preceding five years of the civil rule. The coup lasted for just a couple of 
days; it could not be said to be a total failure as “it sets the agenda of military rule in 
Nigeria as a ‘corrective’ form of governance against corruption and indiscipline and in 
favour of restoration of democracy and justice” (Osoba, 1996, p. 26).  
It is well known that Military institution comprise the Army, the Navy and the Air force. 
And this body of professional men and women who are trained in the use of arms and 
armaments for the protection and security of a state are referred to as military. Their main 
job is to protect and defend the country from the hand of foreign attackers and they are 
expected to be in the barracks, even when they intervened in Nigerian political system, their 
rule is not expected to last long, once the rescue operation is complete, the military should 
return to the barrack where they belonged and leave the governance to the civilian 
politicians. But, in Nigeria, it was not the case; their rule became self-sustaining, whereas, 
their intervention in the political system was to rescue the country from the hands of bad 
politicians and corrupt leadership. Immediately after this aim is achieved, they have to 
return the regime to the civilian government whose primary job is to conduct the nation’s 
economy. But, nowadays, military produced more millionaires than any other professions 
in Nigeria. 
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Therefore, the involvement of military in democracy should be limited to the protection and 
security of geographical areas within its territorial boundaries and this is a vital element of 
sovereignty. 
The people of Nigeria suffered under the control of military rule and are now experiencing 
the recent change to democratically elected government which was put in place via election 
conducted in 1999 which brought General Olusegun Obasanjo to power again as the elected 
president of the federal republic of Nigeria. However, one of the greatest problems in 
examining the background to military rule in Nigeria is figuring out when the seeds of the 
takeover and the tragedy of civil war were sown which brought a lot of untold hardship to 
Nigerians and dealt a huge blow on the economy of the country. 
1.1 What Military Intervention is all about? 
This dissertation aimed at clarifying the implication of military intervention on the 
democratic development of Nigeria especially in a period between 1993 and 1999 as well 
as its historical and general characteristics. In doing this, one needs to examine the military 
institution, its place and what its intervention has brought to the political development of 
Nigeria nation.  
Military intervention is defined as the conscious act of displacing and supplanting an 
existing political order, a government, by soldiers with the objective either of governing or 
influencing the political affairs of the country in particular direction determined largely by 
the interventionists themselves (Fawole 1994)  
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Military intervention can be described in various ways, but mainly it is an intervention that 
was first created by a military in order to rescue the country from the hand of corrupt 
civilians. Military intervention in Nigerian political System from 1993-1999, was a result 
of bad leadership and corruption of the previous government. The academic literature on 
this topic represented by various scholars gives a broad analysis of Nigerian military 
intervention. As one of the foremost Nigerian bureaucrats, Ahmed Joda put it, in most 
African countries, including Nigeria, “military intervention is more of a manifestation of 
self-seeking ambition on the part of the soldiers than anything else” (Ahmed Joda and 
Asiodu P.C (1994). 
In his own words, Prof. Ake Claude, in a symposium in 1995, titled Is Africa 
Democratizing? “The ascendancy military is one of the great tragedies of Africa, but for the 
military it is nothing other than a highly specialized apparatus of violence whose salience 
begins when sociability has become impossible and civilized values no longer apply, ” 
(Ake Claude 1995:244). 
The frequent intervention and disruption of the democratic process by the military under 
the pretext of greed among the politicians, the violence associated with elections and 
electoral process and incapacity of politicians to deal with social and economic problems 
leading to violence and insecurity have proven to be a ruse. Military rule in general is 
antithetical to democracy, not only because the military structure and mode of operation are 
not consistent with democratic norms and procedure but also arising from the fact that the 
frequent intervention of the military in civilian politics disrupts the democratic process and 
prevents the stabilization and institutionalization of democratic culture (Ikpe, 2000).  
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Based on the foregoing, military rule cannot be a welcome substitute to civil rule and 
democracy in view of the enormous damage it does to any nation’s political system. The 
Nigerian military which accused the politicians of corruption, maladministration and 
tribalism ended up becoming more corrupt and sectional than the politicians. The growing 
public disenchantment with the vile practices of the military led to pressure from both the 
national and international community for the military to hand over power to a 
democratically elected civilian government. However, the truncated transition programmes 
under Gen. Babangida and the subsequent annulment of June 12, 1993 elections in spite of 
the fact that the election had been widely regarded to be free and fair, and Abacha’s 
dismissal of the interim government expressly showed the desire of the military to remain 
in power. Obi Cyril (2004) stated accordingly: 
The repression and crisis that followed the annulment had the effect of 
widening the divisions between Nigerians and further militarised the 
political process. The rather complicated transition programme of 
General Sani Abacha, sought to civilianise the position of the military 
Head of State by influencing the five government-sanctioned parties to 
nominate General Abacha as their sole Presidential candidate. Apart from 
the fact that the general was nominated five times over for the same 
position, the trend underscored the reality that the military faction of the 
Nigerian ruling class had moved from determining its civilian successors, 
to self-succession by civilianising the position of the military head of 
state within a democratic framework. It was a legacy that cast democracy 
in the image of the military. 
It is important to note as Obi Cyril (2004) rightly pointed out, that the military in Nigeria is 
a product of Nigerian history and in particular the colonial project as it reflects all the 
contradictions in the society. It is in an attempt to consolidate its hold on power and 
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accumulate resources to become a class for itself that the military elite became politicised, 
and further militarised politics. Although, no country can talk about the complete shielding 
of military influence in the process of governance- which is the basis of civil-military 
relations- however direct involvement in the process of governance is considered unhealthy 
for any democracy.  
In the advanced democracies, for instance, the influence of the military industrial complex 
is well defined unlike in the Third World countries where the military extends its role 
beyond influencing policies to taking over political power, thus involving directly in the 
process of governance. The military industrial complex in the United State of America 
(USA) has contributed tremendously to the growth of democracy in the country, but the 
same cannot be said of Nigeria. In fact, the consequence of military intervention in Nigeria 
is that the military institution that is supposed to strengthen civil authority to enable a 
democratic culture grow has itself become immersed in politics.  
During the first 52 years of Nigeria as an independent nation, it has been ruled by the 
military for 28 years, while democratically elected civilian regime has just lasted for about 
25 years.. In the light of this, therefore, military rule which ought to be the “aberration”, 
became the “norm” while democratic and civilian regimes, which should be the “norm”, 
became relegated to the status of an “aberration.” This paradox explains the obvious 
retardation in Nigeria’s democratic development. This also partly explains the military 
coups in 1966, 1975, 1984, 1985 and 1993 and the many unsuccessful and unreported coup 
attempts in Nigeria’s political history.  
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The task of this research project is to look at the impact of military intervention on 
democratic development in Nigeria. The history of military intervention which is part and 
parcel of the country’s political history has adversely affected democratic development. 
The military succeeded in entrenching the culture of violence and intransigence which is 
antithetical to democratic culture. The civilian equivalent of coups is the rigging or 
annulment of elections, disqualification of candidates, or the high jacking of political 
parties by the government machinery which are all legacies of military intervention in the 
Nigerian political system. In fact, Simpkins (2004) had argued that democratization has 
failed in Nigeria because it has continued to be carried out by the same cast of characters, 
giving the instance of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo who served as Military Head of State from 
1976 to 1979 and then as civilian leader in the Fourth Republic. 
According to Ajagbe (1990),the Nigerian army is the least respected institution in Nigeria; 
this is because most of their members were (and still are) not well educated due to the fact 
that most of them were hurriedly recruited to fight the civil war between 1967 and 1970. 
Ihonvbere (1991) perceived no difference between the military and the civilian 
governments that they had overthrown. Nearly all the former military Heads-of-State 
including the senior and middle-level officers, and the rank and file that rail-road them into 
political office through coup d’état, were aware of their unpopular actions; this was why 
they all promised to hand over power to democratically elected politicians as soon as 
practicable. In some cases, the handover promises were strategy to secure public acceptance 
of their unpopular incursion and a ploy to hang on to power indefinitely. It should be 
emphasised that among all the military governments in Nigeria since 1966 up to 1999, only 
Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (retired) who handed over to Shehu Shagari in 1979 and Gen. 
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Abdulsalami Abubakar who handed over to Olusegun Obasanjo on 29 May, 1999, did so 
successfully (Luckham, 1971); while Generals Gowon, Babagida and Abacha failed to 
hand over power to the civilians. 
 Therefore, if Nigeria must achieve sustainable democracy, there is an urgent need to 
reposition its political culture by identifying and purging all the undemocratic traits 
bequeathed on the political system by the military. 
1.2 How could Nigeria stop Military in Politics? 
The military is concerned with upholding the internal security and external integrity of a 
given society. It is located outside the political arena and it is mobilized only on invitation 
to quell an internal explosive situation that is beyond the control of the civil police, or to 
contain external aggression. When the military ventures into government and politics in 
developing nations, a number of theoretical and practical problems emerge. The fear of the 
military remaining in government is often based on the fear of a praetorians’, in which 
tyranny and a State aimed at protecting the interests of those in power and repressing 
further processes of political development 
According to Huntington (1968), military intervention occurs because of the general 
politicization of social forces and institutions. When every sphere of societal life, from the 
clergy and churches to schools and armies, is politicized, every one of them claims a stake 
in the political process and struggles either to dominate or to control it. For Huntington 
military intervention occurs where there are frequent disagreements on the legitimate 
method of resolving conflicts among the groups competing for political power.  
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Many reasons have been adduced to justify military intervention in the politics of third 
world countries; it is the opinion of some scholars that this is due to external factors. That 
is, the societal and structural weaknesses, institutional fragility, systematic flaws and low 
level of political culture which act as a sort of magnet to pull the armed forces into the 
power and legitimacy vacuum. The reasons for military interventions in Nigeria politics are 
as varied as they are in complexity. They range from personal grievances of civilian 
regimes to the political and economic sabotage of civilian government. Many scholars have 
presented various suggestions and arguments on ways of keeping the armed forces out of 
politics and how to overcome coups in Nigeria politics. However, the futility of such 
legislation cannot be overemphasized. Here, are some ways by which the military may be 
kept out of politics.  
1.2.1 Good Governance 
According to Galtung’s approach to conflict resolution, which emphasizes that for a truly 
“positive peace”, to be established, “structures must be found that removes the causes of 
wars and offer alternatives to war” (1976: 297-299). In any “positive peace,” all conflicts of 
interest and violence have to be resolved; and the society has to be built based on inclusive 
democratic political structures and processes, as well as equity between ethnic groups and 
races. If Nigeria could eradicate military involvement in her policy, the civilian leaders 
should fashion a good political structure for good governance. On the other hands some 
scholars perceive military rule as a corrective regime that stimulates changes for national 
unity and development, opposing perspectives see the military officers as greed and selfish 
persons seeking to grab political power for the purpose to amass wealth through 
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intimidation and oppressive rule. To this group of people, the military has no business in 
governance and cannot facilitate national development and good governance. 
1.2.2 Corruption 
Corruption is the basic problem every civilian government has to fight in order to keep the 
soldiers out of politics. We can observe that corruption among politician is one of the 
factors that have led various coups we have witnessed in Nigeria politics. Take for instance 
the 1985 coup led by General Babangida against the government of General Muhammadu 
Buhari was premised on the ground that, General Buhari regime failed in his mission to 
reverse the decline in the nation’s fortune which necessitate his take over from civilian led 
administration of president Shehu Shagari 1979-1983. Babangida also complained of 
massive fraud in the issuance of import licenses and counter trade agreements. Corruption 
also came up as a major reason for the 1983 Buhari coup, the immediate cause was the high 
level of corruption among public officers. The decision to try the corrupt politicians was 
quite popular. The resultant imprisonment of many politicians who did not steal, but, that 
due process was not followed in dealing with their cases. The nation returned to democratic 
rule in 1999, with president Obasanjo who was a military head of state during Murtala 
Mohammed’s regime. His government took some strides that left Nigeria anti-corruption 
crusade unsurpassed. For one thing, nobody expected Obasanjo to muster the courage to 
cast the first stone at corruption. 
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1.2.3 Political Education 
Another thing to be considered is political education; this is one of the key factors towards 
eradicating military intervention in the country’s democratic process. It is necessary to 
educate the officers and men of the Nigerian military force on the issues and conduct of 
political affairs in the country. Political education may be described as the process of 
educating citizens on their rights, duties and responsibilities to empower and motivate 
them, to identify what areas of the political and governance processes they can effectively 
participate in; what they can do to influence political outcomes and thereby improve the 
quality of governance at both local and national levels. Therefore, political education is 
civic education, the cultivation of the virtues, knowledge and skills necessary for political 
participation. 
 There are two education programs currently in operation in Nigeria now, the Universal 
Basic Education (UBE) and the Mass Literacy Program (MLP). The UBE is for the 
education of school age children from primary to secondary levels while the MLP is aimed 
for adult education. Nigeria has a similar program, the Universal Primary Education, in the 
1970s but the program failed because of corruption and other factors. In order for the 
government to make the current programs succeed, they will need to have teacher training, 
equipped them with modern technology, and make teaching an attractive profession. With 
the help of the government programs, the people of Nigeria, as a whole, will become more 
educated. The results of this education will reduce poverty, provide better health and 
improve the countries development at large. The citizens do not only benefit directly from 
democracy but also important in the survival of democracy 
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Political education is a process of preparing especially the young ones for the socio-
political world in which they grow into, so that they will be useful to themselves and 
contribute meaningfully to the growth and development of the state. If Nigerian translate 
this into practical terms, the agenda are that of getting the people to take part in their 
government, to assume their responsibilities of contributing to the development of the 
society, to make them aware of their rights, to provide them with the encouragement to 
defend their rights without fear and thus struggle against the impositions and domination of 
a few privileged; to harness and tap the latent forces in the people; to make them see 
politics as an essential aspect of the entire social fabric; to make them less vulnerable to 
undue influences in the political process, etc. These are issues immediately communicable 
in the idea of political education in the context of Nigeria. 
Political education in relation to politics is another good way to address this issue, and this 
can be explained as the activities of a political party aimed at keeping the electorate well 
informed of their civic responsibilities and their duties on one hand, and party programmes 
on the other hand. This shows that the task of Political education for the parties is dualistic 
in nature. One of these is that, the parties have the responsibility of arousing the interests of 
people in party politics. This is in view of the fact, that some of them might have probably 
become apathetic due to the prevailing socio-economic and political situations in the 
country. Also, there may be low level of political participation when they are not properly 
educated on their responsibilities. However, the task of arousing people's interest in politics 
is always associated with many problems in predominantly illiterate societies. Therefore, it 
is very important to give political education to the people so as to allow the electorate to 
know there civil responsibilities. 
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 Conclusion 
This chapter explicitly dissect the background of the country Nigeria how it was 
amalgamated, and the major tribes that constitute its nationalities. Also, it deals with the 
belief-system of different tribes that made up Nigeria. In addition, the chapter brings to 
limelight series of military intervention in Nigeria politics and governance and how these 
interventions affect the political landscape of Nigeria.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.0 Conceptual Clarification of Democracy 
The concept of democracy is laden with many meanings. In fact, many scholars agree that 
democracy like every other social science concept is a very loaded concept with the entire 
essence which cannot be captured by a single school of thought. Zoë Scott and Claire 
Mcloughlin (2012) observed that democracy is a highly contestable concept, both in terms 
of its definition and its relationship to development. Whilst some understand it in 
procedural terms – as electoral competition and decision-making – others view it more 
broadly in terms of civil and political rights and the distribution of power within society. 
Either way, a central question is how citizens exercise control and scrutiny over political 
institutions. Democracy, which derives from the Greek word demos, or people, is defined, 
basically, as government in which the supreme power is vested in the people. In some 
forms, democracy can be exercised directly by the people; in large societies, it is by the 
people through their elected representatives. This is perhaps why President Abraham 
Lincoln aptly described democracy as “government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people.” Therefore, a situation whereby election is marred by rigging and corrupt practices 
does not seem to represent a government of the people. Rather, democracy must be an 
avenue through which popular participation of the masses is involved in the selection of 
their representatives (Odeh, 2007). 
Nigeria, since its independence in 1960, has experienced unstable attempts at 
democratization. The country’s attempts at democratisation over time have often collapsed 
due to factors directly related to the diversities and heterogeneity of the country. Most of 
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the ethno-related crises stem from rival contestations for power and resources by factions of 
the civilian elite operating from ethnic platforms whose activities polarized the polity and 
threatened its corporate existence. The Nigerian military came into the fray as a stabilizing 
force to contain and conscript all autochthonous manifestations of ethno-nationalism. As a 
result, the military dominated governance in Nigeria, for the most part of the country’s 
independence between the years 1966-1979 and 1983-1999 repressing these ethno-
nationalist tendencies and maintaining the unity of the country. The military was however 
not immune from the ethno-nationalist syndrome that had crept into every other aspects of 
life in Nigeria. Some sections of society saw the military as serving the interests of the 
North that dominated the officers’ corps of the Nigerian military. This perception, coupled 
with the military administration’s poor management of the economy and its 
institutionalization of corruption, made it seem that the military regime was more a problem 
than a solution. It was in this backdrop and in a post-Cold War environment that helped 
prodemocracy groups, donor countries and development agencies push the country back. 
Given this scenario, the Nigerian military class had no choice, but, to carry through the 
transition programme that eventually paved the way for democracy on 29 May 1999 
towards democracy.  
.However, there are common grounds that serve as basic indicators of democracy upon 
which the concept can be given a meaning. These include set of institutions that enables as 
many people as possible to freely express their opinion on how they are to be governed and 
who are to govern them. This entails the existence of political parties and a free and fair 
periodic election, a mechanism for replacing elected officers found wanton by the 
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electorates as well as the existence of basic freedom and fundamental rights as citizens of 
the state (Abiola and Olaopa, 2006).  
Democracy has also been conceptualized as a technique through which popular 
participation is enjoyed among the civil masses to decide whom their leader is. Hence, 
democracy provides an avenue through which member of the society possesses the right of 
choosing the leadership through elections (Odeh, 2007).To this end, democracy is better 
seen as the institutionalization of freedom. More so, democracy can be representative or 
participatory and establishes a social contract between the citizens and the representatives 
(Igwe, 2010). 
Sergent (1975) further gave some indicators that give credence to any state’s claim of a 
democracy as thus: citizens’ involvement in political decision making; some degree of 
equality among citizens; some degree of liberty, freedom granted or retained by citizenry; a 
system of representation; and an electoral system of majority rule. Conversely, democracy 
entails the existence of equal opportunity for citizens to participate in the processes of 
decision making and its implementation. Farlie (1977, cited in ONU, 1994) stressed the 
importance of voting as the most significant and direct way citizens of a country can affect 
their governance process. For Appadorai (1975) it is a system of government under which 
the people exercise the governing power either directly or through representatives 
periodically elected by them. 
However, it is important to point out that the idea of democracy simply revolves around 
how governance is brought to bear on the masses (people), that is, involvement of the 
people in the running of the affairs of the state. Democracy is thought of simply as the rule 
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of the people, as a system of choosing government through free and fair electoral 
competition at regular intervals, thus governments chosen in this manner are generally 
considered better than those that are not. This is the basis upon which military intervention 
in politics is considered an aberration and unhealthy for democracy. For this reason, 
democratization is considered a good development for every political system. 
Over the years the Nigeria government has failed to harness the vast human and material 
resources at its disposal to break the circle of poverty and autocracy that has characterized 
it since independence in 1960, Thus, the Nigerian state has been constantly struggling 
between the forces of democracy and authoritarianism and characterized by the push for 
development and the pull for underdevelopment, the burden of public corruption and the 
pressure of accountability. 
Democracy is built on the equality of citizens; the freedom of these citizens to associate 
with one another for the realization of their ideals and the defence and promotion of their 
interests; and the freedom of these citizens to choose between the different political 
platforms of various political parties and candidates, and see to the actualization of the 
platforms they have voted for, if their choices win. But in Nigeria, people have effectively 
been disenfranchised by their own circumstances on the one hand, and their leaders’ perfidy 
on the other. As a result, Nigeria is approaching a situation where democracy is being 
practiced without democrats and elections are being conducted with scant regard for the 
electorate. The ballot is not respected by the government and the price of protecting it is too 
high for the people to pay; but the bullet, once universally feared, is now generally out of 
fashion. 
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The biggest blunder of Nigeria’s ruling class has been its failure to build strong and stable 
social system to provide the kind of atmosphere that democracy needs to take root and 
flourish. The ruling elite is also guilty of, as described by Muhammadu Buhari, 
‘deliberately promoting the social fragmentation that creates, feeds and reinforces religious 
and ethnic identities to the exclusion of civic and national identities 
Democracy is built on the equality of citizens; the freedom of these citizens to associate 
with one another for the realization of their ideals and the defence and promotion of their 
interests; and the freedom of these citizens to choose between the different political 
platforms of various political parties and candidates, and see to the actualization of the 
platforms they have voted for, if their choices win. But in Nigeria, people have effectively 
been disenfranchised by their own circumstances on the one hand, and their leaders’ perfidy 
on the other. As a result, Nigeria is approaching a situation where democracy is being 
practiced without democrats and elections are being conducted with scant regard for the 
electorate.  
Osaghae (1994) defined democratization as “the process of moving from an authoritarian 
system to a democratic political system.” Arguing from the standpoint of Seward (1998), 
that “the amount of democracy in a system is importantly a matter of degree, in addition to 
a matter of presence or absence,” democratization therefore involves processes in which 
democratic government is established, confirmed and conform to internationally acclaimed 
barometric gauge of democratizing (cited in Odeh, 2007).In another vein, Onyeoziri (1989) 
argued that democratization can be measured with the following parameters: 
1. The domain of individual and group rights and freedoms; 
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2. The domain of popular and equal participation in collective decision; 
3. The dimensions of accountability of government to mass publics and constituent 
minorities; and 
4. The dimension of the application of the principles of equal citizenship in all spheres of 
life - social, economic and political.  
He further opined that “a system that recognizes more of these rights has democratized 
more than one that recognizes only few of these rights” (Onyeoziri, 1989). Sarabjit (2002) 
also posited that “there should be a balanced development of institutions with each 
institution performing the role specifically assigned to it”. Some of these institutions are the 
judiciary, armed forces, electoral bodies, legislature and executive among others. 
Democracy is seen as the best form of government because it usually offers the best 
prospect for accountable, responsive, peaceful, predictable, good governance. There is a 
relationship between democracy and liberty because countries that hold free elections are 
usually more liberal than those that do not and that the more closely countries meet the 
standards of electoral democracy, the higher their human rights rating. Hence, Sharp (2010: 
22) posited that one characteristic of a democratic society is that there exist independent of 
the state a multitude of nongovernmental groups and institutions which include, for 
example, families, religious organizations, cultural associations, sports clubs, economic 
institutions, trade unions, student associations, political parties, villages, neighbourhood 
associations, gardening clubs, human rights organizations, musical groups, literary 
societies, and others; all of which  have great political significance. 
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2.1 The Attractions of Democracy 
The universal relevance of democracy calls for an understanding of the concept. Yet, no 
political term as Finer (1971:62) points out, has been so subjected to contradictory 
operationalizations as democracy, since it has become fashionable for regimes and states to 
claim to be democratic. Hence, a transparently despotic regime may still claim to be 
democratic. But the popular opinion tend to see democracy from its popular participation 
angle, from which the power to vote and enthrone a government flows.  
Harvey and Harvey (1974:269) opined that democracy means much more than the issue of 
‘’one man one vote.’’ They believe it involves among others, “settling affairs according to 
the rule of government, toleration towards minority views, regulator elections, freedom of 
speech and above all observance of rule of law”, this definition can be categorised into two. 
One, it views democracy as an ideology, and two, as politics. Obasanjo and Mabogunje 
(1992:1-2) make these two assumption clearer. 
Ideologically, they view democracy as the idea of governance which emphasize on the 
basic freedom or fundamental human rights of the citizens, the rule of law, the right to 
property, the free flow of information and the right of choice between alternative political 
positions, while politically, it is concerned with the institutions, processes and procedures 
of governance elicited towards census building. 
These ideological and political views of democracy and the characterisation of its essential 
attributes by Obasanjo and Mabogunje conform to the definition of Larry Diamond (1989: 
XVI), who see democracy as: 
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A system of government that meets three essential Conditions: meaningful 
and extensive competition among individuals and groups, especially 
political Parties, for all effective positions of government power, At regular 
intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political 
participation in the Selection of leaders, at least through regular and Fair 
election, such that no major (adult) social group is Excluded; and a level of 
civil and political liberties: Freedom to form and join organisations- 
sufficient to Ensure the integrity of political competition and participation. 
This definition clearly shows that any claim to democracy by any regime or state must 
definitely embrace popular participation, competitive choice, the enjoyment of civil and 
political liberties by the citizenry in real term terms, and the accountability of the 
leadership. 
Invariably, the window of participatory opportunity opened to the citizenry in the choice 
and selection through periodic elections of credible representatives confers unquantifiable 
avenue for psychological self-satisfaction and self-fulfilment. This is so as the electorates 
who participate in the electoral process that produced the government of the day and the 
political leadership can eventually lay claim to the government as theirs than being an 
imposition. Therefore, the authority to govern sprout from them, and also they act as 
legitimizes of the governmental system, finally, the legitimate of the government will not 
be contested.  
The electorate is also a sound check on the political leaders. Apart from the usual checks 
and balances by the parliament, on the executives, the whole elected personnel of 
government in all the area of government have to present their stewardship at the next polls. 
The desirability of another election to government of the individual political office-seekers 
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and the political party will be based on good performance vis-a-vis the political promises 
made to the people as enshrined in the respective parties’ manifestoes at the earlier election. 
The fulfilment of the political promises to the electorate will surely earn the party in power 
and the political leaders vying for a new mandate the opportunity to return to power. 
Consequently, the fear of rejection at the polls for poor outing and unfulfilled promises will 
definitely make the elected leaders seek to attain a reasonable level of good performance 
when in the saddle of governance, with the hope for another chance. It connotes that, 
whoever takes electorate for granted does so, at his own peril, Continue support of 
electorate can be assured through good governance, in politically. This, circumstances, the 
elected leaders are duly accountable to the electors. Democracies also guarantee the 
citizenry’s open expression of public opinion, the freedom of speech and association. 
Freedom of expression of public opinion is power on its own. Finer (1971:63) believes that 
the free expression of opinion implies some opportunity and machinery for making that 
opinion known and it is a kind of suffrage, some kind of voice or vote. This is not limited to 
individual; it extends to the mass media. The print and the electronic media can also publish 
and air public opinion. Both individual and mass media can evaluate the government and 
express their judgements without repression or clamp-down contrary to dictatorial and 
authoritarian regimes like military regimes autocratic civilian government. The suppression 
of mass media and repression of public opinion can lead to the defeat of the incumbent 
regime. 
Democracy also assures the citizenry’s happiness and the rule of law. The governing 
political party has social welfare programmes embedded in its manifesto which are meant 
to enhance human development and people social’s well-being, unlike the military regime 
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which has no manifesto, and, so no committed agenda for human development and 
happiness. The whole populace in a democratic environment enjoys of opportunities before 
the law. 
2.2 Democracy and Democratic Failure in Nigeria 
It is on record that, the Clifford Constitution of 1922 introduced liberal democracy to 
Nigeria. The constitution’s elective principle, although the franchise were limited to Lagos 
and Calabar and with income and resident qualifications to be met by prospective voters. It 
gave the citizens an opportunity to choose their leaders themselves for the first time under 
apolitical party arrangement. Subsequent constitutions viz: the 1946 Richards Constitution; 
the 1951 Macpherson Constitution, the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution, and 1960 
Independence, improved on the Clifford’s innovations by making the democratic system 
more liberal, open and competitive. 
Unfortunately, as earlier stated, the growth of democracy has remained staunted. 
 This is due to the incursion of military in governance at the earliest stage of the 
country independence. Any meaningful step at unearthing the major problems of 
democracy, democratic practice and democratization with a mind to find solutions must 
first examine the generic source of liberal democracy itself to Nigeria’s political space. 
Claude Ake (1992:5) provided an insight on this when he submitted that liberal democracy 
is a western concept and therefore alien to Africa as a whole. He noted that the democratic 
movement in Africa does not reflect the unique historical origin of the concept, and no 
doubt, the movement is applying the prevailing standards and practice of Western political 
liberation to Africa. The imported democratic principles including wide spread 
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participation, consent of the governed, and public accountability may prevail in many 
political arrangements, but their practice tend to vary according to historical which may 
make them work or to fail (Ake,1991:32-44). 
Going by the submission above it is crystal clear that the political environment of the 
western culture is different from that of Nigeria, hence, the military intervention in the 
political system, which has retarded the growth of the culture.  
2.2.1 Political System 
David Easton (1965) defined a political system as one, which contains all the institutions 
and processes involved in the authoritative allocation of values for society. According to 
Michael Howard (1978), it is an abstract notion of many forces which impinge upon the 
state and the government. Zoë Scott and Claire McLaughlin (2012) defined political system 
as “the formal and informal political processes by which decisions are made concerning the 
use, production and distribution of resources in any given society. Formal political 
institutions can determine the process for electing leaders; the roles and responsibilities of 
the executive and legislature; the organisation of political representation (through political 
parties); and the accountability and oversight of the state. Informal and customary political 
systems, norms and rules can operate within or alongside with the formal political 
institutions, it is the totality of social actions that in any way influence the making of 
binding value allocations for collectivism. For Gabriel Almond, any attempt to 
conceptualise political system must take into account “how institutions and norm affect 
(political) behaviour”, the political system includes groups, interest, values and institutions 
that participate in national development. It includes the private sector, political parties, 
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electorates and institutions that participate in national development, and if this could be 
achieved it would paves way for peace to rain in the country. Moreover, Peace building has 
some linkage with development. Like some have suggested development can help to reduce 
conflict (Clancy and Hamber, 2008: 5). Though the close relationship between peace 
building and development has been described as a restructuring of conflitual relationships 
to create a situation, a society, or community in which individuals are enabled to develop 
and use to the full, their capacities for creativity, service and enjoyment. 
2.2.2 Military Intervention 
The military is publicly recognised as “the institution that defends a nation’s borders,” and 
equipped with the means of coercive power by the state. A military is an organization 
authorized by its greater society to use lethal force, usually includes use of weapons, in 
defending its country by combating actual or perceived threats against the state. The 
military may have additional functions of use to its greater society, such as advancing a 
political agenda e.g. communism during cold war era, supporting or promoting economic 
expansion through imperialism, and as a form of internal social control. It is pertinent to 
note that the term ‘armed forces’ is used interchangeably with terms such as ‘army’ and 
‘the military’. Windham (1957) defined armed forces as “a class of men set apart from the 
general mass of the community trained to particular uses, formed to peculiar notions, 
governed by peculiar laws, marked by peculiar distinctions.” The armed forces primarily 
exist for the purpose of war and for the defence and protection of the state.  
According to Anugwom (2001) the military is ideally concerned with upholding the 
internal security and external integrity of a given society. It is an institution of the state 
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located outside the political arena mobilized only on invitation to quell an internal 
insurrection that is beyond the control of the civil police, or to contain external aggression, 
however, could pose a threat to the political system when it ventures into government and 
politics of the nation. Therefore, military intervention is the act of the armed forces of a 
country operating beyond its traditional function of providing security to take charge of the 
direct administration of the state through a process known as coup d’état. 
According to Obi (1999), a coup d’état is a political act directed at the unauthorized seizure 
of power through the direct use of, or the threat of the use of violent force, often 
clandestine, involving a small band of conspirators plotting in secret and often taking 
advantage of existing social grievances or a vacuum in political power and targeting 
existing office holders either for elimination (assassination) or forceful removal from 
office. Consequently, coup d’état may be described as an attempt (which may be successful 
or not) to illegally seize power or topple the government in power. Coup, especially in 
Nigeria, may be “fathom” or “phony” or even “stage-managed” by the government in 
power to get at some perceived opponents of the government. The word coup and coup 
d’état can be used interchangeably with military intervention (Olugbenga, 2009). Fawole 
(1994) concluded that military intervention is the conscious act of displacing and 
supplanting an existing political order, a government, by soldiers with the objective either 
of governing or influencing the political affairs of the country in particular direction 
determined largely by the interventionists themselves. It is directed at the political system 
of the state or its agents involving the threat or actual use of force to accomplish certain 
predetermined objectives which may be political, economic, social or even military. 
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Although, military intervention is seen as a reality in all society, the only difference being 
the degree of involvement and intervention, in contemporary times however, it is 
considered as political aberration. So many factors account for military intervention ranging 
from corruption, electoral malpractices, and disorderliness orchestrated by a regime; though 
there are cases where the masses have called on the military to intervene to restore sanity in 
the system as during Nigeria’s second republic, where the political system was on the brink 
of collapse and politicians became so irresponsible that the military were called upon to 
assume power (Joseph, I987).The military intervention into Nigerian politics is an 
invention introduced by the military coup of 1966. There are many inventions that were 
originally created by the military but are now used by civilians. Military intervention has 
two categories at which it occurs, which are internal and external, The internal causes of 
military interventions are corruption in the army, political patronage in promotions, low pay 
and poor medical/health services. There are also external factors that cause military 
interventions in politics. These are corruption of civilian government, incompetent leaders 
in the administration, failure of the administration to deliver basic services, widespread of 
poverty, and electoral fraud by ambitious politicians. 
In all these, however, it is important to see military intervention as an act made by active 
members of the military heads, outside the conventions of the military institution with the 
aim of disrupting the political status quo, in the pursuit of their political interest. There are 
two schools of thought on why the military intervene in politics; they are S.E Finer and 
Samuel P. Huntington (1957) who argue that coup d’état is likely to occur in a state lacking 
institutional political culture and which surfer economic hardship and social division. The 
second school of thought concentrates on the organization and character of nation. 
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Huntington and Finer argue that the military need right social political in disorder to seize 
power. Some of these factors could be said to have resulted to military intervention in 
Nigeria politics. Therefore, at the center of arguments on the causes of military intervention 
in politics, particularly in the Third World countries is the issue that Military has not been 
able to internalise the western concept of civil-military relations, which is based on 
subordination to civil authority. This explains the frequent intervention and disruption of 
the democratic process. In his book, ‘From Dictatorship to Democracy,’ Gene Sharp 
discussed how military coups could transform into a culture of violence that would mar 
democratic development, therefore, debunking the military claim of coup d’état as a 
corrective measure in the face of systemic inadequacy. 
A military coup d’état against a dictatorship might appear to be relatively 
one of the easiest and quickest ways to remove a particularly repugnant 
regime. However, there are very serious problems with that technique. 
Most importantly, it leaves in place the existing misdistributions of 
power between the population and the elite in control of the government 
and its military forces. The removal of particular persons and cliques 
from the governing positions most likely will merely make it possible for 
another group to take their place. Theoretically, this group might be 
milder in its behaviour and be open in limited ways to democratic 
reforms. However, the opposite is as likely to be the case. 
After consolidating its position, the new clique may turn out to be more 
ruthless and more ambitious than the old one. Consequently, the new 
clique-in which hopes may have been placed will be human rights. That 
is not an acceptable answer to the problem of dictatorship (Sharp, 2010: 
5). 
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Military intervention often results in a culture of militarism in any political system. 
Militarism has to do with a system whereby the affairs of the state are conducted in military 
fashion. Militarism in the Nigerian democratic setting is evident in the undemocratic norms 
and values displayed in democratic space since 1999, which is a dialectics of the values and 
norms obtained from military rules. The practice of democracy in Nigeria in the last fifteen 
years of which the overt display of ‘militarized political culture’ in the democratic space as 
seen in the political behaviour of the supposed statesmen in a democratic setting which is 
essentially that of ‘active-combative posture’ rather than dialogue, negotiation and 
reconciliation as demanded by democratic tenets has raised considerable issues (Frank and 
Ukpere, 2012).  
2.3 The Military and the Political System in Nigeria 
The military is a central component of every political system. Early political thinkers like 
Plato recognised the importance of the military institution which lies on the primary 
responsibility of the state to provide security. Since the first task of the modern state is the 
provision of law, order and security, the military functions as a key institution of the state 
whose job is to secure its citizens against possible internal and external threat to security, 
law and order. Thus, it can been argued that the military is the guarantor of state power and 
the custodian of national interest in so far as it does not exceed its traditional bounds of 
securing the state. 
Although the military was originally conceived as a neutral political force, its role changes 
as the society changes. While in the western societies a distinction was made between 
political office holders and the military institution, in many pre-colonial African societies, 
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this distinction was not so clear, rather the two were fused together. For example, Luckman 
(1994) observed that most pre-colonial States in Africa depended on the use of military 
force to extract surpluses from direct producers thereby directly involving the institution in 
the social and economic life of the people. And interestingly, the military has been an 
integral part of Nigeria’s political system from its inception as a corporate political entity. 
As Anugwom (2001: 98) rightly stated: 
Colonialism bequeathed Nigeria a standing army that saw itself as a 
distinct social group. The military during the pre-colonial era, whether of 
the professional or volunteer sort, may have acted as the pivot of the 
continued corporate existence of the society…In this the army was the 
State and the State was the army. This may have given rise to the present 
crisis when the peoples of Nigeria attempt to surmount their relationship 
with the military as well as control it. 
This perhaps informs the opinion of scholars that military intervention is a reality in all 
society, except that the only difference is in the degree of involvement and intervention. In 
the United States and western societies, the “military industrial complex” remains a factor 
in influencing public policies including the maintenance of high defence spending and 
budget allocation to the military. 
However, the situation has been different in many third world countries. In these societies, 
the military has become directly involved in the process of governance through the 
overthrown of civilian governments. Thus, Etim and Ukpere (2012) stated that the Nigerian 
political system has been shaped, not by the prescription of the constitutional Assembly but 
through an historical evolution characterized with military interventions. The Nigerian 
military came to power for the first time in Nigerian politics on January 15, 1966, in a coup 
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that was widely described as Igbo master-minded, even though there are other contrary 
opinions (Dudley, 1973; Ademoyega, 1981 and Obasanjo, 1987). The coup-plotters 
adduced majorly the high degree of corruption, ineptitude and repression in Sir Abubakar 
Tarfawa Balewa’s government as the raison d’état for the take-over.  Moreover, law and 
order had broken down in the country, especially in the Western Region, following the 
extensive rigging of the 1965 regional election of that region by the Nigerian National 
Alliance (NNA) government thereby precipitating a salvage mission. For instance, Major 
Nzeogwu in a “broadcast” on the coup day (15th January, 1966) stated unequivocally: 
Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and 
low places that seek bribes and demand ten per cent; those that seek to 
keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as 
minister or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists…(Igbokwe, 1999). 
Obi Cyril (2005) however noted that the involvement of the military in the process of 
governance saw the enthronement of political intolerance, violence and abuse of power in 
public spheres. According to him: 
The transfer of the chain of command from the military to the political 
sphere left no room for opposition politics that was translated to disloyalty. 
The military ruled through decrees, and in the latter years of their rule, 
ouster clauses were introduced to place decrees above the law and the 
constitution that was in most parts suspended. In this context three trends 
emerged: all opposition was seen as enemies to be excluded, punished or 
destroyed, the military rulers were beyond civil law and accountability, 
and public interests were subjected to the will of the military leader and his 
ruling council that was made of officers that were of ranks lower to his. In 
this way the state was “piratized” and those who captured it held the 
people to ransom, deciding when to “give” them democracy, and who they 
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would hand over power to. In this regard, governance slipped into 
dictatorship shaped by an obsession to hold on to power at all cost (Obi, 
2004: 5). 
The above paragraph aptly captures the nature of the damage that military rule does to any 
political system. This is the reason why military seizure of political power and subsequent 
rule is often described as an aberration since it does not fit into the constitutional prescribed 
means of attaining power. Another point to be noted about the nature and form of military 
rule in Nigeria is the autocratic and dictatorial style of governance. Against the background 
of what is perceived as mismanagement by the political class, military rulers start by 
suspending the parliament and political parties. In some instances, politicians and key 
actors of civilian administration are thrown into jail. Thus, they rule with decrees and 
without respect for the rule of law. Or where they claim to preserve the provisions of the 
constitution regarding fundamental rights of citizens, it is more nominal than in practice. 
More so, the structure of the state power often favour unitary centralism which is largely a 
reflection of the military command structure that is hierarchical in nature, with chain of 
command following from the top to the bottom where the commander-in-chief, the most 
powerful is the pivot of power and authority. Although, the various military regimes have 
attempted to create organs and institutions to enhance collective decision-making such as 
the supreme military council (SMC) under General Gowon, the Armed forces Ruling 
Council (AFRC) under General Ibrahim Babangida, and the Provisional ruling 
Council(PRC) under General Abacha, however what obtains in reality is a situation where 
both executive and legislative functions are combined by one person who is the head of 
state. To this end, Ikpe Ukana (2000: 147) argues that Nigeria’s military regimes operate a 
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patrimonial system to a very large extent; a situation whereby military rulers are personal 
rulers who depend, for support, on the distribution of state largesse to favourites and 
kinsmen. In such patrimonial system, state offices are used to generate resources for the 
incumbent officers and their dependents and clients. As the Nigerian army is dominated by 
a particular group in the population, state patronage also favours elites of this group more 
than others. 
Ikpe Ukana (2000) further argued that patrimonialism has three grave consequences for 
democracy which includes: the pursuit of hegemonic politics by a section of the population 
thereby promoting ethno-nationalism and ethnic politics which is unhealthy for democracy, 
the privatization of state offices and obliteration of the dividing line between private and 
public realms thereby raising corruption to the level of a state craft as the state becomes a 
viable source of private accumulation, and therefore political competition to occupy state 
offices, of necessity, becomes norm less, ferocious and stormy. Under such conditions, 
democracy has a tenuous existence as politicians become so intransigent in their disposition 
to politics, thereby robbing democracy of its essential ingredient, compromise. And, lastly, 
there is a sharp decline in the legitimacy of the Nigerian state because sectional dominance 
through military regimes has generated a sense of injustice and alienation among other 
groups. Hence, many groups are today questioning the basis of a united Nigeria, and are 
calling for a sovereign national conference to discuss the future of the Nigerian state. 
Simpkins (2004) similarly posited that the military in their quest to overcome the ethnic, 
religious, and geographical divisions that have marred the Nigerian political system through 
their claim of acting as “a corrective” regime, have prevented the construction of a truly 
unified Nigerian state therefore has fared no better than civilian regimes. 
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In corroborating Ikpe’s viewpoint, Anugwom (2001) submitted that the military in Nigeria 
has come to symbolize a particular class and class interest-that of the military elite clinging 
to power. In this way, the military has acquired a self-perpetuating character in political life 
in Nigeria. Like all class and quasi-class formations, this perpetuation hinges on protecting 
and furthering the interests of a select few, which it achieves through mobilizing its poorly 
positioned “labouring section” against the larger civilian population in a massive wave of 
militarization. In all these, the most important issue is the legacy, which the military leaves 
behind as a result of prolonged stay in governance which is the militarization of 
consciousness arising from the exercise of power without recourse to the law or obeying the 
ruling of the courts of the land. This is indeed the basis of the myriad of problems that has 
continued to plague the Nigerian State. According to Simpkins (2004) Nigerian politics has 
been shaped by ethnic, religious, and geographical conflicts which comprise of a civil war, 
the Niger Delta crisis, and Muslim fundamentalist movement/insurgency in the northern 
part of the country. The result of these ethnic, religious, and geographic tensions have been 
strong authoritarian measures featuring consolidation of power, suppression of fundamental 
freedoms, and military intervention. Against this backdrop, Iduh (2011) argued that 
democracy, which seems to be a dream come true, is fast turning a nightmare due to the 
numerous devastating religious, ethnic, communal and resource conflict that has continued 
to plague Nigeria. 
It is also instructive to note that the military enthroned ethnicity in Nigerian politics which 
continues till date under many guises, such as the zoning system and federal character. In 
fact, Anugwom (2001) argued that ethnicity is a ploy used by the military to perpetuate 
itself in power at the expense of national development. In his view, Nigeria’s inability to 
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foster a sustainable democratic tradition and therefore development is partly due to the 
disruptive influences of ethnicity and militarism. As Ikpe (2000) noted: 
Apart from the six months (January 1966-July 1966) rule by General 
Ironsi and the three and a half years (February 1976-October 1979) rule by 
General Olusegun Obasanjo between 1960 and present day (1998), only 
the Northern civilian or military Heads of State have ruled Nigeria, and 
there have been eight (8) of them. All but two of Army Chiefs of Staff 
have been Northerners (Tell, July 15, 1995 cited in Ikpe, 2000: 159). 
Obi Cyril (2004) further observed that the legacy of the military faction of the ruling elite to 
the political process was the paradoxical authorship of a democracy borne out of a 
dictatorship. The democracy ushered in by the army came with the militarization of social 
life and politics and the alteration of the political system to continually favour the interest 
of the military elites in the post-transition order. Thus, all the social vices that have 
continued to plague the country like the obsession with power, the use of violence in the 
struggle for access to resources and power, and the control of public institutions and 
resources to consolidate control over power, the intolerance of opposition and flagrant 
election rigging are symptoms of a dysfunctional political system created by the military 
oligarchs. It can therefore be said that the military worsened the problem of bad leadership 
that has plagued the country since independence. It has been argued that Nigeria is a nation 
abundantly blessed by nature, but plagued by bad leadership. Thus, Nwolise (2010) argued: 
Nigeria has from inception been blessed all round by nature, enough to engineer national 
development and greatness, free from several natural disasters that have devastated many 
nations, but remains chained down by bad leadership.  
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This view was corroborated by Ekeng Anam-Ndu (1998: 15) who asserted that “the 
commonest diagnosis of the Nigerian sickness is bad leadership”. More so, Nigeria being a 
“petro-state” the military succeeded in creating the nature of state that “fosters a type of 
politics that thrives on the centralisation of power by patrimonial networks of power that 
reproduce themselves by capturing state (oil) power, distributing oil largesse to members, 
while excluding non-members” (Obi, 2004: 6 -7). This underscores the absence of 
governance that is development-oriented and strong institutions to track development which 
is characteristic of Nigeria’s political system. This also explains why instability has risen to 
the scale of becoming a normal way of life in the country as governance has been reduced 
to a hegemonic political and economic project directed at sharing the spoils of oil. To this 
end, Obi (2004) argues thus: 
This type of instability is a cause for concern not just because the state is 
an actor in conflict, but that it is problematic for it to effectively mediate 
conflicting demands because it is captive to one of the actors involved in 
the conflict. For this reason some of the marginalised but contesting forces 
distrust the state, see it as an alien force, and either seek to use the threat or 
the use of force to make demands on it, or to challenge it. The result of this 
is that instability assumes the appearance of permanence in the political 
system leading to the diversion of energies and resources towards 
stabilizing the system, but not without raising fears within and outside the 
country, that the system could collapse (Obi, 2004: 7). 
Based on the foregoing, it is not erroneous to posit that the current state of instability and 
disorderliness that pervade the country is a product of military rule. Moreover, the fact that 
Nigeria’s oil boom coincided with military rule also meant that the Petro-state and its ruling 
elite became militarized, and this has adversely dampened the prospects of democracy. 
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Perhaps, this informed the opinion of Obi Cyril (2004) that while the Nigerian Petro-state 
offers a shell for democracy, it is apparently far from providing it with a home. It is in fact 
difficult, if not impossible to conceive Nigeria’s democratic project outside the confines of 
its ruling class or political elites who enjoy affiliation in one way or the other with the 
military oligarchy. Moreover, there is a continuous integration of the ruling faction of the 
military into the political elite via a process of retirement and civilianization. Most of the 
top level military officers upon their retirement have been able to contest and win elections 
into various political offices at the local, state and national levels across the country.  
More so, the opportunism of the political elite and the ways it has often manipulated 
political structures and processes to promote selfish and narrow ends is purely a culture of 
militarism. Perhaps this informed Obi Cyril’s pertinent question: Is this the kind of elite 
that can practice true democracy, or even fight to uphold the sanctity and autonomy of 
democratic institutions when these are undermined by its own custodians? Election rigging 
constitutes a serious threat to democratic values in any liberal democracy since it is through 
elections that electorates exercise their popular sovereignty to give their consent to a 
particular political office holder to rule. However, Nigeria had problems associated with 
elections which made the Nigerian democracy a mirage among the comity of nations in the 
world. In fact, the principal forms of electoral fraud or irregularities were perfected in the 
elections of 1964, 1965, 1979, 1983, 1999, 2003 and 2007 (Ayo, 2011).  
Furthermore, the dysfunctional impact of military interventions in the Nigerian political 
system underscores the unending debate for a return to “true” federalism or what has been 
termed the National Question, which deals with the ways in which the various diverse 
ethnic, religious and communal groups and class interests can interact and cohere 
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peacefully, with each having a sense of belonging and loyalty to the Nigerian Nation State. 
This, in fact has grown into the clamour for a Sovereign National Conference in which all 
the groups would debate the basis of their membership of the Nigerian federation. 
Beginning with the end of the Nigerian civil war, these agitations heightened with the 
annulment of the 1993 presidential elections widely believed to have been won by Chief 
Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola of the SDP from South West Nigeria by the Military 
Head of State General Babangida from the North.  
According to Olaoye (2007) “that election was believed and adjudged by the 3000 
accredited local and international observers to be fairest and the best in Nigeria’s political 
history.” However, not only that the Federal Military Government headed by General 
Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida annulled the results of the 1993 presidential election, it also 
imprisoned the winning candidate Moshood Abiola who ultimately died behind bars, and 
Nigeria did not return to elected civilian rule until after General Abacha died in office in 
1998. The crises that followed the annulment degenerated into a North-South, and later 
North – South West divide as protests in the South West in spite of the appointment of 
another South westerner Chief Ernest Sonekan to head an Interim National Government 
(ING) after Babangida left office in August 1993, led to General Abacha’s takeover of 
power in November 1993.  
It was against the back drop of the 1993 organised rape on democracy in Nigeria by the 
military that a youth militia emerged in the South West, the Odu’a People’s Congress to 
fight for the interests of the Yoruba ethnic group. Other ethnic youth militia emerged in 
other parts of Nigeria in the context of the militarization of politics and opposition under 
the Abacha regime. Outside of the South West, tension was also high in the Niger Delta 
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where the ethnic minorities were agitating for the control of oil and an end to the pollution 
of their lands by oil multinationals. In other parts of Nigeria, communal tensions as well as 
religious conflicts between Muslims and Christians continued to rise. Thus the National 
Question contributed to the crises of federalism, the politics of revenue allocation and 
social crises.  
Although, the many states were created by the military in Nigeria, it did not solve the 
problem of the ethnic divisions in the country. New majorities and minorities emerged in 
the new states leading to complaints of marginalisation and domination and increased 
rivalry and conflict. There is therefore an urgent need for the national question to be 
addressed if democracy is to be consolidated in Nigeria. In conclusion, Etim and Ukpere 
(2012) asserted that the practice of democracy in Nigeria, which has been characterized by 
the overt display of ‘militarized political culture’ in the democratic space whereby the 
political behaviour of the supposed statesmen in a democratic setting is essentially that of 
‘active-combative posture’ rather than dialogue, negotiation and reconciliation as 
demanded by democratic tenets is as a result of the many years of military rule.  
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
Several theories have been advanced by scholars to explain the phenomenon of military 
intervention in politics. The central argument upheld by almost all the theories is that the 
political structures of the countries concerned and the obvious weakness of regimes in such 
countries account largely for the incidence of military intervention in politics (Adebisi, 
1998). First and foremost, the praetorian theory adduce this state of structural decay in the 
political system as an incentive for military coup d’état.  It maintains that there must be the 
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collapse of the executive power as an excuse for the military to come to the political scene 
either by threat of force or actual use of force. 
Ekeh (1998) observed that the original justification for military rule in Nigeria arose from 
the claim that the country’s civil politics were unruly and required a dose of military 
discipline. Permutter (1981) posited that the explanation for intervention can be found in 
the political, structural and institutional weakness of regimes and states. Permutter further 
stated that the most likely obvious incentive for military intervention is regime illegitimacy 
and inability to secure political support through the available channels. This scenario can be 
illustrated with the case of the Third Republic under the military regime of General Ibrahim 
Babangida which created two political parties, drafted their manifestoes and eventually 
annulled the elections, thereby denying the would-be regime the needed legitimacy, so that 
the military can have an excuse for either holding unto power or intervening in politics. 
Nowa Omoigui in his treatise “Nigeria: The Palace Coup of November 17, 1993,” wrote: 
Based in part on the report of the Political Bureau, which was originally 
set up in 1986, a two-party system (one “a little to the right” and the other 
“a little to the left”) was created in October 1989. They were the National 
Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). 
Both parties were run and financed by the Government, which also 
arrogated to itself the right to write their party constitutions. The 
constitutional context was the 1989 Constitution (Decree #12 of 1989), 
based on work done by a Constitution Review Committee, ratified by the 
Constituent Assembly and amended by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. 
Among the eleven amendments imposed by the AFRC, three were defence 
and security related. One removed the National Assembly’s control over 
national security because, (according to the AFRC), it “exposes the chief 
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executives and the nation to clear impotence in the face of threats to 
security”  
Thus, in the face of this apparent weakness in the political structure of the Nigerian state, 
the Chief Ernest Shonekan led Interim National Government (ING) became very 
susceptible to Brigadier Sani Abacha’s predatory scheming. More so, the ING lacked 
legitimacy which enabled Abacha to go about consolidating and networking within the 
military, probing for weaknesses to oust the regime.  
In further buttressing the position of the praetorian theory, Janowitz (1964) posited that the 
“internal characteristics” of the political system, such as the socio-cultural background of 
military men, skill, career lines, internal social cohesion and professional and political 
ideology could be adduced to explain the military’s intervention in politics. Similarly, 
Huntington (1968) argued that military intervention occurs because of the general 
politicization of social forces and institutions, and often acting as possessing the manifest 
responsibility to restore order among groups competing for political power in the midst 
disagreements on the legitimate method of resolving conflicts. Hence, Permutter (1981) 
adduced that there is a correlation between military interventionism and a nation’s level of 
development. Thus, a country with high level of development is likely to have very 
minimal, if not complete absence of, incidence of military coup d’état. 
.According to Adebisi (1998), the level of development can be measured in terms of the 
level of technological development, political pluralism, democracy, international status and 
respect, human rights records, patterns of distribution of wealth and power, education and 
health development etc. which all constitute vital indicators of political stability. For 
instance, Nigeria’s first military coup occurred at a time the nation was struggling with the 
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task of development after gaining independence from the British colonialists. The incursion 
of the military in the political arena on January 15, 1966 was due largely to the foregoing 
factors of political and institutional instability. The failure of the civilian government to 
effectively manage the political structure of the country which was characterized by 
regional political structures leading to intense ethnic politics created the condition 
necessary for the military to strike.  
Also, the practice of using the military forces for purely civil matters encouraged and even 
hastened the exposure of the Nigerian military to political corruption, and the temptation to 
stage coup d’état and organize a military junta. For instance, the military were used to quell 
the crisis in Western regions, the Tiv Riots, as well as in the military operations in the 
troubled countries overseas, e.g. the Congo crisis of the 1960 among others. Miller and 
Zimmennan (1987) however, have argued that external forces such great power politics and 
globalization could also contribute to intervention of the military in the political system. 
The praetorian theory therefore assumes that the military institution is hegemonic and must 
be completely disconnected from the civilian democratic realm 
On the other hand, the psycho-social theories state that the ultimate explanation of socio-
political phenomenon and personality are to be found in certain kinds of psychological 
processes. These processes are the products of some child-rearing practices which each new 
generation of mankind is subjected to. The type of socialization received by a generation of 
mankind therefore constitutes the real and objective motive in history (Dudley, 1973: 4). 
Therefore, the individual’s behaviour is largely determined by the socialization processes 
undergone.  
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On another token, the modernization theory posits that the military institution can be an 
agent of social change through their intervention in the political process to correct 
anomalies perpetrated by civilian democratic leaders. It argues that some militaries are 
capable of playing a democracy-promoting constitutional role in a post-authoritarian 
society. Such militaries often called “the interdependent military” are capable of providing 
institutional support to a nascent democracy because its institutional self-interests often 
align with the conditions that Madison and others have identified as conducive to the 
genesis of a constitutional democracy: institutional stability, political pluralism, and 
national unity. According to Obi (2004), In the 1960’s there was the feeling in some 
quarters that the military could be a modernizing force given its hierarchical structure, 
national character, its discipline and the educational qualifications of the officer corps.  
However, the attempts by the military to intervene in politics usually fail to bring the 
desired results to the society in terms of development and attainment of democracy, human 
rights, freedom of expression etc. due to their organizational and authority structure. It is 
important to note as Obi (2004) rightly pointed out, that the fact that the military in Nigeria 
is a product of Nigerian history and in particular the colonial project; it reflected all the 
contradictions in the society. In its attempts to consolidate its hold on power and 
accumulate resources to become a class for itself, the military elite became politicised, but 
beyond that it militarised politics. The command structure and the requirement of 
mandatory obedience and loyalty to superior orders are incompatible with the most 
elementary principles of democracy. Therefore, the attempt to apply military discipline and 
tenets to civil issues often backfires and deprives the military regimes of needed legitimacy 
and credibility. Hence, their interventionist activities are denounced as mere pretentions to 
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democratic values. Ekeh (1998) contended that military’s claim of instilling order and 
discipline in the polity is nothing but a mere ruse.  
According to Ekeh, Nigerian military’s meaning of discipline led them into coups was 
completely defective. Overthrowing a government which military officers had sworn to 
protect was in fact an act of indiscipline. Discipline signifies an inner code of behaviour 
that honours important societal principles. Coups d’état have no redeeming values as acts 
of discipline, because they destroy respect for a societal institution of governance. The 
interesting thing about military rule in Nigeria is that it changed the meaning of discipline 
into obedience. Fear-driven obedience, that destroyer of genuine discipline, has been 
abroad during the decades of military rule. It probably reached its height in the twosome 
dictatorship of Buhari and Idiagbon (1983-1985) when Nigerians were harassed with some 
creed called “War on Indiscipline.” Disobedience before military authorities probably 
decreased for a while under this duumvirate. But indiscipline most certainly expanded. In 
the absence of discipline on the part of military rulers, raw violence became a tool of 
governance. Coup plotters who succeeded in overthrowing a government became honoured 
governors while those who failed in their coup attempts were punished with death 
sentences. Innocence had nothing to do with morality. It had everything to do with 
successful violence. Unsuccessful violence was condemned as immoral by rulers who had 
illegally overthrown governments that they swore to protect.  
In these circumstances, loyalty in the armed forces has been hard to come by. Loyalty is no 
longer defined on the basis of institutional principles, but, on the grounds of obedience to 
those who control the implements of most violence. But, those who control the means of 
violence cannot be too trusting of their subordinates. Sadly, this skewed meaning of loyalty 
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has created far more sectionalism (sarcastically referred to as ethnic and regional “mafias”) 
than what could make for a wholesome national military. Indeed, there is probably more 
sectionalism in the Nigerian armed forces today than in the civilian population. The gaping 
differences between the North and South in Nigerians’ perception of the military have been 
created by a military establishment that has a false meaning of loyalty by alienating the 
South in order to win the allegiance of the North.  
In three decades of military rule, the separation between the military and civilians has 
grown deep and nasty. It painfully recalls the invidious distinction between colonizers and 
the colonized in colonial times. The Nigerian experiment with imposing military discipline 
on civil populations has failed woefully and, like other failed political ventures, should be 
retired from contemporary public affairs into history. Nigeria's greatest misfortune flows 
from the inability, or reluctance, of the military leadership and their apologists to accept the 
judgment that, as this flawed experiment drags itself on, much damage is being done to a 
nation that military rule had ostensibly arisen to rescue. All these challenged the very basis 
of the military as a modernizing force (Ekeh, 1998).  
More so, the Nigerian military has intervened severally and failed severally to transit to a 
democratic order, as the infamous annulment of the June 12, 1993 elections demonstrates. 
The failure of General Ibrahim Babagida to hand-over power to a democratically elected 
government and General Sani Abacha’s resolve to become elected President at all costs 
vividly shows the glaring democratic pretentions of the military and highlights the fallacy 
of the modernising soldier. It excuses the basic fact that military rule of civil populations is 
illegitimate and will inevitably bear evil fruits (Ekeh, 1998; Adebisi, 1998). Based on the 
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foregoing, this work adopts the praetorian theory as its theoretical framework while basing 
its findings on the shortfalls of the modernisation theory. 
Conclusion 
This chapter deals with different literatures, authors and authorities on democracy. Also, it 
analyzes some of the problems caused by democratic failures in Nigeria. In addition, it 
provides a general overview of the Nigerian political system and the Nigeria military so as 
to give a better understanding of the topic being researched. 
Going through the literature, it was highly obvious that, all the author and authority on the 
subject matter concurred that, the adventure of Nigeria military in country governance 
created more problems than solutions; which will take several years to solve.       
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Chapter Three: Overview of Military Involvement in Nigerian Politics 
3.0 Background to Nigeria Military 
History has traced the inception of the Nigerian military to between 1862 and 1863. The 
19th century Nigerian military was formed by Lt. John Glover with the sole aim of 
protecting British trade routes around Lagos as against territorial defense (Ukpabi, 1989). 
The then force was made of 18 Nigerian men of Hausa extraction known as the “Glover 
Hausas” who were expected to protect the lives and properties of the British residents in 
and around Lagos (Miners, 1971). The Nigerian army changed from this into the West 
African Frontier Force (WAFF), the Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiment (QONR), the 
Nigerian Military Force (NMF) in 1956 and the Royal Nigerian Army in 1960.  
Its mission was expanded to include imperial defense when dispatched to the Gold Coast 
during the Asante expedition of 1873-74. Enlarged and officially entitled the Hausa 
Constabulary in 1879, this unit performed both police and military duties until 1895, when 
an independent Hausa Force was carved out of the constabulary and given exclusively 
military functions. This demographic recruitment base perpetuated the use of Hausa as the 
lingua franca of command in Ghana and Nigeria, where it persisted into the 1950s. It also 
marked the historical origin of the ethnic imbalance that has characterized the Nigerian 
armed forces to this day. 
In addition to the Hausa Constabulary, the Royal Niger Company Constabulary was raised 
in 1888 to protect British interests in Northern Nigeria. It later provided the nucleus of the 
Northern Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). A third formation, 
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the Oil Rivers Irregulars, was created during 1891-92, later re-designated the Niger Coast 
Constabulary, and formed the basis of the WAFF’s Southern Nigeria Regiment. 
In 1897, WAFF was founded under the command of Colonel Frederick Lugard to resist 
French encroachment from the north. By 1901, West African Frontier Force was an inter-
territorial force composed of the Nigeria and Gold Coast regiments, the Sierra Leone 
Battalion, and the Gambia Company, and was commanded by a small number of British 
army officers and non-commissioned officers seconded to the force. WAFF was under the 
Colonial Office in London, but, each regiment was commanded by an officer responsible 
directly to the local colonial governor. The two regiments were consolidated into the 
Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF when the Northern and Southern Nigeria Protectorates 
were amalgamated on January 1, 1914. These colonial units fought in World War I, in the 
German colonies of Cameroon and Togo, and in German East Africa. In 1928 the WAFF 
became the Royal West African Frontier Force and in 1939, control of the RWAFF shifted 
from the Colonial Office to the War Office. 
In 1930 the Nigeria Regiment had about 3,500 men. During the 1930s, as part of RWAFF 
reorganization, its four battalions were reorganized into six, and the colony was divided 
into northern and southern commands; major units were at Sokoto, Kano, Zaria, Kaduna, 
Maiduguri, Yola, Enugu, and Calabar. Although Hausa and their language dominated the 
infantry and general support units, specialists were recruited mainly from the south. For 
example, the signals company required fluency in English, so Yoruba were recruited for 
that unit  
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In World War II, Nigerians saw action in Kenya and the Italian East Africa and Burma 
campaigns, and Nigeria was the assembly and training site for the two West African 
divisions dispatched to Burma. In 1941 auxiliary groups, consisting 630 porters organized 
into three companies for each infantry brigade, were also formed. After the war, the 
auxiliaries were disbanded, but some locally recruited carriers continued to be employed. In 
the 1950s, expansion to a two-brigade army was undertaken, and specialized combat and 
service units such as light artillery, communications, signals, medical, engineers, and motor 
transport were formed. 
In the post-war years, RWAFF resumed its primary mission of internal security. Nigerian 
units undertook police actions and punitive expeditions to break strikes, to control local 
disturbances, to enforce tax collection, and to support police anticrime operations. They 
also mounted a major internal security operation in the Southern Cameroons Trust Territory 
to counter secessionists rebelling against French colonial authority. 
This force included the armies of Gold Coast (Ghana) Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia.  
At this time, there were eight indigenous Nigerian officers in the entire force, the rest being 
British officers.  The role of an army in a developing country was not fully realized by the 
nationalist leaders struggling for independence, hence, there was no effective pressure on 
the British Government to train Nigerian officers in preparation for independence.  Even at 
this stage, it was clear that the future stability of a nation such as Nigeria depended to a 
large scale on the existence of a reliable army.  One result of this short - sightedness was 
that the first Nigerian to command the Nigerian Army - Major General. J.T.U. Aguiyi 
Ironsi, was not appointed until 1965, nearly five years after independence (Abubakar 1992). 
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In 1956, the Nigeria Regiment was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces, and in April, 
1958, the colonial government of Nigeria took over from the War Office control of the 
Nigerian Military Forces. The indigenization of the officer corps began slowly but 
accelerated through the 1950s. The first Nigerian officer was appointed in 1948 by 
independence in 1960; there were eighty-two Nigerian officers, mostly Ibos from the 
southeast. This ethnic imbalance within the officer corps contrasted with that in the rank 
and file, where northerners dominated. 
3.1 The Nigerian army during and after Independence 
At independence, the Nigerian Army's strength of about 10,500 all ranks was structured 
into four infantry battalions with the combat support units. Two Infantry battalions and two 
artillery batteries were deployed in Northern Nigeria and the other two Infantry battalions 
were deployed in the South.  
The strength of the Nigerian army rose up to 250,000 all ranks at the end of the Nigerian 
Civil war of 1967-1970. By the time the civil war ended in 1970, the Nigerian Army had 
grown to some 200,000 men, among them many untrained recruits. Since then, there have 
been some violent incidents between army troops and civilians and police, mainly in the 
North. There has been vague talk of the need to demobilize, but, the federal leaders are in 
no hurry to do so, and Nigeria seemed likely to have a relatively large standing army for 
some time to come.  
For economic reasons and Nigeria’s threat perception, the strength was later reduced to 
about 150,000 all ranks and structured into three Infantry Divisions and Lagos Garrison 
Organization (LGO). In 1982, there was another structuring of the Nigerian Army. 
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Emphasis was placed on increased mobility and improved firepower. That exercise marked 
the beginning of the concept of mechanization of the Nigerian Army. To make the structure 
effective, the Nigerian Army procured more sophisticated equipment and trained more 
personnel on operational and professional courses locally and overseas. 
The poor economic situation of the 1990s necessitated a review of Nigeria's defence policy 
and the restructuring of the Nigerian Army to match with the economic realities of that 
time. The period coincidentally witnessed more of Nigerian Army's involvement in various 
Internal Security (IS) operations, participation in peacekeeping operations and the 
imbroglio with Cameroon over Bakassi Peninsula. In addition to these, Nigeria was 
apprehensive of possible conflicts with her other neighbours. It would require a well-
structured force with adequate manpower and equipment to meet these challenges. 
By the late 1990s, the Nigerian Army was too large, but to downsize the army requires 
alternative employment for Nigerian soldiers to avoid social unrest. The military in Nigeria 
was very strong and very powerful. The question was not whether that military was going 
to be reduced in strength or effectiveness, but what attitudes will they have once the civilian 
government took place. The military had been the greatest threat to civilian stability in the 
country, and it needed to be trained by an army and a country that understands how a 
military ought to relate to a civilian government. 
The Nigerian Army, the largest of the services, has about 67,000 personnel. Its formations 
include the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division, headquartered in Kaduna in the north-west, 
and 2nd Mechanized Infantry Division (Headquarter Ibadan in the South-West, includes 32 
Artillery Brigade at Abeokuta), 3rd Armoured Division (HQ Rukuba Cantonment, Jos in 
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the North-East, and including 21 Armoured Brigade Maiduguri, 23 Brigade Yola, and 33 
Artillery Brigades), 81st Division (Amphibious) HQ in Lagos, which includes the 9th 
Brigade, based at the Ikeja compound in Lagos, 82nd Division (Airborne and Amphibious) 
HQ in Enugu in the South-East, which includes the 13 Brigade at Calabar and 34 Artillery 
Brigade at Obinze and Owerri, and the Abuja-based Guards Brigade. 3rd Armoured 
Division was responsible in 1983 for the security of areas bordering Chad. Divisions in the 
Nigerian Army were first formed during the Nigerian Civil War, when in August-
September 1967, 1 Area Command at Kaduna was designated 1 Infantry Division, 2 
Division was formed under Colonel Murtala Mohammed, and the then Lagos Garrison 
Organization was renamed 3 Infantry Division, later to become 3 Marine Commando 
Division. 
Lagos and Abuja have garrison commands with the Lagos garrison as large as a division, 
81 Division was the youngest Division in the Nigerian Army. The Division was formed on 
26 May 2002 when the Lagos Garrison Command (as it then was) was upgraded to a full-
fledged Division. The Division therefore inherited the security roles hitherto performed by 
the defunct Lagos Garrison Command. However a later undated article in a Nigerian online 
newspaper says the 81 Division was later again renamed the Lagos Garrison Command. In 
the 1980s, the Army's brigades included the 7th Infantry Brigade in Sokoto. There were 
also Divisional Artillery Brigades, among which are the 32 and 34 Artillery Brigades, 
ordinance corps units as well as Combat Engineer Regiments, and many other service 
support units spread across the country. 
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3.2 Chronicling Military Rule in Nigeria 
The culture of corruption, political intolerance and the arrogance of power have not helped 
the cause of democracy in Nigeria. The wish of every patriotic Nigerian and, indeed, all 
lovers of democracy worldwide, is that the handover of power by the military to a 
democratically elected government on May 29, 1999 marked the end of military 
intervention in Nigeria’s politics. Rather than view the handover as a victory over the 
military, which it was not, the reasonable position is to examine what has made the 
military’s intrusion the easiest of tasks and how not to make bad history repeat itself in the 
future. 
The political history books are there to confirm that the coups, which ousted civilian 
governments in the past were popular and welcomed by public opinion. Although, the 
military tended to extend their “tenure” through counter-coups or palace coups, the two 
points at which democratically elected governments were overthrown were in January 1966 
and December 1983. The first occasion led to 13 years of military rule, the second to 16 
years. 
The first military coup received its immediate justification in the crisis that followed the 
massive rigging of elections in the old Western Region in 1965. The attempt by the 
leadership of the defunct Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) to impose itself on 
the people of the West led to violence in which the killing of Nigerian National Democratic 
Party (NNDP) supporters and the burning of their houses was the order of the day. The 
inability or unwillingness of the Federal Government to restore order provided the platform 
for military intervention. 
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However, the crisis in the West was only the immediate cause of their intervention. The 
remote causes were deep rooted in the nature of Nigeria’s heterogeneity and the politics of 
regionalism in the immediate post-independence era. The hotly disputed census of 1962-63 
was viewed as an attempt by one axis of the country to impose its dominance over the 
other. Similarly, for the disputed federal election of 1964 which more or less pitched the 
North against the South. 
The attempted coup of January 1966 soon led Nigeria into a bloody civil war; as the coup 
planners were southern officers, mostly of Igbo origin and the victims, mostly, were 
venerated politicians and top military officers from the Northern Region. The coup makers’ 
claim to patriotism could, therefore, not be sustained because of the exclusion of Igbo 
politicians from the “cleansing” exercise. 
During the subsequent years of military rule, there were two changes which would later 
make an impact on party politics: the creation of states and the replacement of 
parliamentary democracy with a presidential system of government patterned on the 
American presidential/congressional system. 
The issue of state creation predated Nigeria’s independence in 1960. There was agitation, 
sometimes violent, by the minority ethnic groups, especially those of the Middle Best in the 
north and the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers areas in the Eastern Region. The British colonial 
masters indicated, following the recommendations of the Willink Commission on the 
minority ethnic groups in 1958, that, if new states were to be created, independence would 
have to be delayed for two years in order to allow the new states time to settle down. 
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Because the nationalist politicians were in a hurry for independence, they could not agree to 
that idea. 
After independence, because of the advantages of size in Nigeria’s politics of regionalism, 
the only new region that was created by the politicians was the Mid-Western Region – 
more as a way of curtailing the influence of the Yoruba-dominated Western Region (out of 
which it was carved), whose authentic leadership was at loggerheads with the ruling 
coalition of the Northern People Congress (NPC) and the (Igbo dominated) National 
Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). 
First, under General Yakubu Gowon in 1967, later under Generals Murtala Muhammed, 
Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha, the military split the former four regions into 36 
states. Professor A.E. Afigbo, an eminent historian, described the contributions of Gowon’s 
administration to the Nigerian federation in these flowing words: “....it enabled the 
fundamental character of the Nigerian federation that is its multi-ethnic character, to 
emerge full and defiant, as well as naked, repulsive and challenging. Hitherto it had tended 
to be obscured by British-generated cleavages between mere geographical expressions such 
as between, first, North and South and then among North, East and West” (Federal 
Character and federalism in Nigeria, 1989: 13). 
The second major change, the introduction of presidential politics as a way of fostering 
greater political interaction among Nigeria’s diverse groups, has also been significant. 
Because Nigeria’s political parties were mostly ethnic-based, the “government” and 
“opposition” attributes of the erstwhile parliamentary system had merely resulted in one 
ethnic group allying itself against the other. Under the presidential system, whoever seeks 
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to become president is required to win a majority of popular votes and meet certain 
requirements of geographical spread. The ugly feature of parliamentary politics as practiced 
in Nigeria’s First Republic (1960-66) was that the most powerful party, the National Party 
of Nigeria (NPC), did not even extend its membership to the southern regions and yet 
presided over the affairs of the federation. 
The military handed over the reins of power to a democratically elected government 
on October 1, 1979. The election of the president was not without controversy. However, 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari, the flag bearer of the National Party of Nigeria became Nigeria’s 
first directly elected President. 
The elected representatives in the National Assembly, it must be said, would appear to have 
deliberately refused to comprehend the rudiments of presidential politics. Under the 
guidance of their political parties, those who voted in support of bills sponsored by a 
member of another party were accused of “anti-party” behaviour. The politics of “rub my 
back, I rub yours” was conducted in monetary terms. 
The corruption that ensued in the Shagari era, especially among members of the National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN), was on a scale unprecedented in the history of Nigeria. In the face 
of general poverty in society, those at the top echelons of the party were busy flying their 
private jets all over the globe, conducting one business after another. General Olusegun 
Obasanjo who handed over power to Shagari summed up the extravagance of the National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN)-controlled executive when, in a keynote address, he hinted that the 
Shagari administration had spent over $50 billion -a colossal sum in those days— in less 
than four years with nothing to show for it. 
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The demise of the Second Republic (1979-83) came with the politics of re-election. Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari, whose performance in office had been unimpressive, was re-elected in what 
his supporters celebrated as a “landslide” victory. However, the National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN’s) incursion into opposition territory was soon to spark a major crisis, especially in 
Ondo State where the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) governor-elect had to flee the state 
in the face of violence directed against National Party of Nigeria (NPN) supporters. The 
courts of law assumed the role of electoral officials as they overturned one victory after the 
other. 
The overthrown of the Epicurean politicians was greeted with nationwide jubilation, not 
least among students, journalists and ordinary Nigerians. It must be said that members of 
opposition parties had actually called on the military opportunists to overthrow the Shagari 
government, not knowing that the hurricane would sweep away all democratic institutions 
nationwide. 
What followed the Shagari presidency was 16 years of military rule, featuring such corrupt 
dictators as Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha. Their misrule, and annulment of a 
presidential election on June 12, 1993, which need not be dwelt upon here, should provide 
Nigerians with a lesson in the importance of “self-rule” as opposed to military dictatorship. 
There are two sides to a stable democracy; the constitutional aspect, which provides the 
rules and nature of power relations in written form (except in Britain where the constitution 
is unwritten) and the human factor, which has to do with the behaviour of political elites 
and their supporters. Both the constitutional framework and the elements of human 
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behaviour must be appropriate and complementary for democracy to survive in any given 
society. 
The constitutional framework agreed to by Nigeria’s founding fathers is the federal one. 
When the first military ruler, Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, reversed it to install a 
unitary system via the Unification Decree No. 34 on May 24, 1966, it sparked off an 
immediate anti-Igbo “revolt” in the North where his action was suspected to be an attempt 
to impose his own group’s domination over the rest of Nigeria and especially over the 
North, which was behind the other regions in Western education and commerce. Lt-Col 
Yakubu Gowon (as he then was) returned the nation to the federal status quo following the 
counter-coup of July 29, 1966. 
However, many years of military rule have eroded the tradition of federalism in Nigeria. 
Today Nigeria is federal only in name. Many informed commentators on Nigerian politics 
have argued vociferously for Nigeria to return to a true federalism. The issue of Sharia, 
which has disturbing implicit dangers for the nation’s fragile democracy, is a federal issue, 
which should be resolved constitutionally or by legal interpretation in the courts of law, 
instead of resort to violence. Most of the ideas that are today incorporated into the 
constitutions and political arrangements of developing nations emerged from constitutional 
or legal resolution of issues that were once contested somewhere else in the past. Records 
show that there has been five successful, two aborted, one attempted and three alleged 
coups in Nigeria. In all 12 lives were lost each in the first and second coup of 1966. 
On January 15, 1966, Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu led the first ever-military coup in 
Nigeria that led to the death of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of 
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Northern Nigeria, Chief S.I. Akintola, the Premier of Western Region, Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, Federal Minister of 
Finance and other military officers. The coup was poorly carried out in certain parts of the 
country and there was a strong accusation of tribalism. The Northern People accused 
Chukwuma as well as his fellow coup plotters of staging an Igbo coup. This is because 
most of the officers killed during the coup were those from other part of the country. The 
then general officer commanding the Nigerian army, Major-General Johnson Thomas 
Ununakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi was sworn-in as the Military Head of State of Nigeria.  
On 29 July, 1966, six months after the first coup plot, three young military officers of 
Northern background led by Lieutenant Colonel Murtala Muhammed staged a counter coup 
to even the score. This led to the death of Major-General J.T.U. Aguyi-Ironsi, Head of 
State, Col. Francis Adekunle Fajuyi Military Governor, Western region and other military 
officers. General Yakubu Gowon was then sworn-in as the Military Head of State. 
In July 1975, a group of Colonel sacked the government of General Yakubu Gowon in a 
bloodless coup. General Murtala Muhammed also masterminded this coup. In this coup, no 
live were lost. General Murtala Muhammed assumed power in July 1975. 
On 13 February 1976, six months later, Lieutenant-colonel Bukur Suka Dimka with his 
loyalist stage an abortive coup which claimed the lives of three officers; General Murtala 
Muhammed, Head of State, Col. Ibrahim Taiwo, Governor of Kwara State and Lt. 
Akintunde Akinsehinwa, ADC to Muhammed. This led to their arrest and subsequent 
execution of one civilian and 38 soldiers, including Major-General IllyaBisalla, five 
Colonels, four majors and other officers for their role in the failed coup. Civilians involved 
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in the coup include Abdulkareem Zakari, a staff of Radio Nigeria, Lagos and Helen 
Gomwalk, sister-in-law of Joseph Gomwalk, were tried by military tribunal and punished. 
Zakari was executed for his involvement in the coup while Helen Gomwalk bagged a life 
sentence. She was later given amnesty by the Shehu Shagari administration. 
On 31st December 1983, General Buhari Muhammad upstaged a coup which sacked the 
Shehu Shagari’s administration. This coup led to the death of a loyal officer to the 
government, Brigadier Ibrahim Bako. On 27 August 1985, Babangida led a palace coup 
which terminated the Buhari’s twenty months reign. In 1986, Major-General Mamman 
Vatsa led an abortive coup to over throw the government of President Babangida. That 
same year, he could not succeed and he was executed with other 10 military officers in 
March 1986. 
On 22 April 1990, Gideon Orka staged an abortive coup to unseat the government of 
Ibrahim Babangida. The coup attempt has been described as one of the bloodiest coup and 
it was the largest execution of coup plotters in the nation’s history. This led to the death of 
nine loyal Soldiers. 69 soldiers of various ranks were accused of treason and they were 
killed by firing squad. The second in command and Chief of general staff, Vice-admiral 
Augustus Aikhomu, revealed that at least three of the plotters of the April 22 coup were 
arrested, cautioned and released in 1987 over an alleged coup plot to overthrow the 
government. They were G.T. Nyiam, a Lieutenant Colonel, S.D. Mukoro and Gideon 
Orkar, both majors. They were later released. Aikhomu also said that the officers regrouped 
once again in January to overthrow the government and had intended to kill not only the 
president, but also, the AFRC members and military governors, all civilian members of the 
council of ministers and senior military and police officers. The suspects were later tried by 
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the treason and other offences special military tribunal headed by Ike Nwachukwu, Major-
General and general officer commanding the mechanised division of the Nigerian Army, 
Kaduna. After the trial, 42 persons were found guilty and condemned to death by firing 
squad. This was the largest execution of coup plotters in Nigeria’s history breaking the 
record of the 1976 coup led by Buka Suka Dimka in which 32 officers and men were 
executed. 
On October 2, 1993, there was a coup attempt by Lieutenant-Colonel Abubakar Umar, an 
army Colonel and Commandant of the elite Amoured corps centre and school.  
On November 17, 1993, General Sani Abacha staged a palace coup to unseat the Interim 
National Government led by Chief Ernest Shonekan. In 1995, there was an alleged coup 
plot which involved General Obasanjo (retired), former head of state; Major General Shehu 
Musa Yar’Adua (retired) and other prominent Nigerians majority of whom were soldiers. 
The civilians among them include: Beko Ransome-Kuti, chairman of the Campaign for 
Democracy (CD), and his deputy, Shehu Uba Sani and four other Journalists. General 
Obasanjo and General Yar’Adua were jailed 15 and 25 years respectively. Yar’Adua died 
on Monday, December 8 1997 at Abakaliki prison, where he was serving his term while 
Obasanjo was released in 1998 by the then Head of State, General Abubakar. 
In December 1996, some top military officers were accused by General Abacha of an 
alleged coup plot. The Chief of defence staff, General Abdulsalam Abubakar announced 
this on television. In his statement, he announced the arrest of 12 people who were planning 
to overthrow the federal government. They were: Lieutenant-General Oladipo Diya, Chief 
of general staff and vice-chairman of the provisional Ruling Council ( PRC), Major-
General Abdulkareem Adisa, former housing minister, Tajudeen Olanrewaju, former 
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minister of communications, Colonels Daniel Akintonde, former military administrator in 
Ogun State, Edwin Jando, artillery brigade-commender, Abeokuta, Emmanuel Shoda, 
military assistant to Diya, Femi Peters, National War College, Abuja; Lieutenant-Colonel 
Olu Akiode, former military assistant to Olanrewaju; Major Biliaminu Mohammed, 
administrative officer in the presidency; Major Oluseun Fadipe, Chief security officer to 
Diya; K.A. Yusuf Ishiyaku, Artillery Department, Abuja; and Professor Femi Odekunle 
political adviser to Diya. General Abacha to set up a 12-man committee to determine if 
indeed there was a coup plots (Francis 2009).  
3.3 Factors Responsible for Military Rules in Nigeria 
Yesufu (as cited in George, Shadare, & Owoyemi, 2012) opined that the intervention of 
military in the political scene of Nigeria was not totally a surprise to most political 
observers and thinkers; this was because nearly all the pre-colonial ethnic groups in the 
country were ruled by traditional rulers who were more or less dictators. For instance, the 
Oba’s ruled in the South West of Nigeria, the Emir’s in the Northern Nigeria and the Obi’s 
in the South Eastern Nigeria were monarchical dictators who were never democratically 
elected (Nordlinger, 1977; Janowitz and van Doorn, 1972; Feit, 1968). These traditional 
rulers were seen as divine representatives of God on earth, unquestionable and untouchable; 
in short, they were absolute rulers and they ruled for life to the extent that some of them 
were even worshipped (Vaughan, 1991). According to Kennedy (1975), rulership was 
hereditary before the coming of the British. 
Military dictatorship is nearer to the civilian dictatorship which the pre-colonial institutions 
of Obaship, Obiship, and Emirship represented than the Parliamentary democratic system 
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introduced by the British colonial masters which was far too distance from the institutions 
of Obaship, Obiship and the Emirship (Yesufu, 1982). Both the military and the institutions 
of Obaship, Emirship and Obiship did not recognize opposition; oppositions were seen as 
enemies that must be eliminated at all cost (Kennedy, 1975). This is unlike the British 
democratic parliamentary system that recognizes opposition, with a fixed tenure of office 
for elected representatives, respect for the rule of law and freedom of speech (Bailey, 
1978). The nearest to the former pre-colonial system was the military in which case the 
military ruler had absolute power and authority derived from the use of brute force (Osoba, 
1996). So, when the military first intervened in January 1966, it was celebrated by the 
people (Onimode, 1981). 
The practice of democracy in Nigeria and its attendant issues has considerably attracted the 
attention of scholars and analysts. Among such issues include the intervention and 
dominance of the military in running the affairs of government. The infamous military 
incursion into governance in Nigerian politics reduced the good expectations for a better 
and greater nation. Military intervention into Nigerian politics is an invention and 
subsequently a culture brought about by the military coup of 1966. This introduced ethnic 
and religious tensions over economic and educational development between the south 
(especially the south east). Ezenwa (as cited in Ugorji 1994) opined that one of the political 
events of the first republic was the military intervention, takeover into political affairs and 
civil war in the country within the period of 1966 and 1970.  Tafawa Balewa’s government 
was overthrown by junior army officers notably Igbo’s. Mostly the northern and western 
prominent personnel’s such as Sir Ahmadu Bello who was the Prime Minister of the 
Northern Region, Chief Akintola, the Prime Minister of the Western Region and Chief 
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Festus Okotie-Eboh, the federal finance minister were killed in the coup d’état. And this 
prompted the massacres of the Igbo’s living in the Northern Nigeria. The major focus of 
this section is to reveal the reasons or factor responsible for military intervention and how 
Nigeria as a political entity can prevent future military interventions in the polity. Military 
intervention is advancement by active members of the military heads, unusual of the 
conventions of the military institution with the aim of destabilizing and disrupting the 
political set up, in order to promote and protect their political interest. The original 
justification for military rule in Nigeria arose from the claim that the country's civil politics 
were unruly and required a dose of military discipline. This naive assumption overlooked 
the universal historical fact that since the invention of the nation-state some five centuries 
ago, its civil politics have been disorderly.  
Order and discipline were the military's twin mantras. But the Nigerian military's meaning 
of discipline was completely defective. Overthrowing a government which military officers 
had sworn to protect was in fact an act of indiscipline. Discipline signifies an inner code of 
behaviour that honours important societal principles. Coups d'etat have no redeeming 
values as acts of discipline, because they destroy respect for a societal institution of 
governance.  
The interesting thing about military rule in Nigeria is that it changed the meaning of 
discipline into obedience. Fear-driven obedience, that destroyer of genuine discipline, has 
been abroad during the decades of military rule. It probably reached its height in the 
twosome dictatorship of Buhari and Idiagbon (1983-1985) when Nigerians were harassed 
with some creed called "War on Indiscipline." Disobedience before military authorities 
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probably decreased for a while under this duumvirate. But, indiscipline most certainly 
expanded.  
In the absence of discipline on the part of military rulers, raw violence became a tool of 
governance. Coup plotters who succeeded in overthrowing a government became honoured 
governors while those who failed in their coup attempts were punished with death 
sentences. Innocence had nothing to do with morality. It had everything to do with 
successful violence. Unsuccessful violence was condemned as immoral by rulers who had 
illegally overthrown governments that they swore to protect. 
In these circumstances, loyalty in the armed forces has been hard to come by. Loyalty is no 
longer defined on the basis of institutional principles, but, on the grounds of obedience to 
those who control the implements of most violence. But those who control the means of 
violence cannot be too trusting of their subordinates. Sadly, this skewed meaning of loyalty 
has created far more sectionalism (sarcastically referred to as ethnic and regional "mafias") 
than what could make for a wholesome national military. Indeed, there is probably more 
sectionalism in the Nigerian armed forces today than in the civilian population. The gaping 
differences between the North and South in Nigerians' perception of the military have been 
created by a military establishment that has a false meaning of loyalty by alienating the 
South in order to win the allegiance of the North. In three decades of military rule, the 
separation between the military and civilians has grown deep and nasty. It painfully recalls 
the invidious distinction between colonizers and the colonized in colonial times.  
The Nigerian experiment with imposing military discipline on civil populations has failed 
woefully and, like other failed political ventures, should be retired from contemporary 
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public affairs into history. Nigeria's greatest misfortune flows from the inability, or 
reluctance, of the military leadership and their apologists to accept the judgment that, as 
this flawed experiment drags itself on, much damage is being done to a nation that military 
rule had ostensibly arisen to rescue.  
Some or all of these factors could be said to have lead to military intervention in Nigeria 
politics. Ugorji (1994) observed that for this country to fully eradicate military involvement 
in her policy, the civilian leaders should fashion a good political structure for good 
governance. On the other hands, some scholars perceive military rule as a corrective regime 
that stimulates changes for national unity and development, opposing perspective see the 
military officers as greed and selfish persons seeking to grab political power for the purpose 
to amass wealth through intimidation and oppressive rule. To this group of people, the 
military has no business in governance and cannot facilitate national development and good 
governance.  
Corruption is a basic problem every civilian government has to fight in order to keep the 
soldiers out of politics. We can observe that corruption among politicians is one of the 
factors that have led to various coups that we have witnessed in Nigeria politics. Take for 
instance, the 1985 coup of Babangida, General Babangida accused Buhari led 
administration of failing to revamp the nation economy that had declined during the civilian 
led administration of president Shehu Shagari 1979-1983. Babangida also complained of 
massive fraud in the issuance of import licenses and counter trade agreements. Corruption 
also came up as a major reason for 1983 Buhari coup (Ohwofasa 2007) of which the 
immediate cause was the high level of corruption among public officers. The decision to try 
the corrupt politicians was quite popular. The resultant imprisonment of many politicians 
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who did not steal, but, for the fact that duo process was not followed in dealing with their 
cases, as the nation returned to democratic rule in 1999, with president Obasanjo who was a 
military head of state during Murtala Mohammed’s regime. His government took some 
strides that left Nigeria anti-corruption crusade unsurpassed. For one thing nobody expected 
Obasanjo to muster the courage to cast the first stone at corruption. Shortly into new 
administration report started floating about some billions of naira that was withdrawn from 
the central bank and was not accounted for. We have had numerous cases. This is just to 
mention but a few, because every military intervention in a civilian government in this 
country has an element of corruption. We have had numerous issue of economic sabotage. 
In these current republic the case of Ibori, Alamesieaya, Bankole and others, which anti-
corruption agency could not conduct a thorough investigation on, and the resent corruption 
probe rocking the Nigeria national Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the house of 
representative ($620,000 bribery of Farouk Lanwam).The civilian government needs to 
tackle the issue of corruption seriously with all the various agency established such as the 
independent corrupt practice commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial crime 
commission (EFCC). The agencies should be well equipped and trained and be given free 
hand to carry out their functions diligently without any interference. Not what is obtained 
now in the country, take a look at the case of Ibori. Ibori was sentenced to jail by a London 
court for same charges which he was tried and sent free in this country. These go a long 
way to show how corrupt a civilian rule is in Nigeria. They should be well funded to 
prevent them from being venerable to bribery and corruption. 
In addition, an outright condemnation of military rule by all individuals/citizens, national 
bodies and international organization will go a long way in cubing military takeover of 
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government from civilian rule. International organizations such as the United Nations 
(UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and others 
should promulgate a law that will prohibit military government and declare them null-
avoid.. Also, national bodies and individuals should adjudicate for a democratic system of 
government and protest against military rule, especially through coup process. Take a look 
at what is happening in Libya and Egypt where the interim military government tried 
delaying the conduct of election, but, the actions interest nationals and citizen led to them 
adopting a faster transition program.  
Some writers have come to criticize the un-engagement of the military personal on 
productive venture and cap it as one of the reasons why they plot and execute coup. Cyril 
Ndoh (1997) argued that if Gowon’s regime could last for nine years because of the pre-
occupation of the military in the execution of the war and reconstruction immediately after 
the war, this shows that if the military is engaged in other activities during peace time, they 
will not have the time to arrange a coup. Nigeria should try to engage its soldiers in a 
productive activities such as agriculture, technological development, education etc. this 
could help in reduction activities of coup plotters in our political system. 
The issue of transparency and accountability are other measures of keeping the military out 
of national political system. If we study the previous military coup in the country we will 
know that lack of transparent and accountable government contribute to the factor by which 
those coups occur. The present civilian government especially it agencies such as civil and 
public servant has the duty to operate a transparent administration and be accountable to its 
citizen. The mass need to know what goes on within system of power. Political education is 
one of the key factors towards eradicating military intervention in the country’s democratic 
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process. It is necessary to educate the officers and men of the Nigerian military force on the 
issues and conduct of political affairs in the country, because it can be sufficient 
desideration to eradicate coups in our political system.   
Balance fire power of police with the military has been suggested as one way of reducing 
military coup in the country. However, in the estimation of many scholars, this 
consideration fall low down in the hierarchy of reasons that inspire military intervention at 
any given time, and that military coup will become a phenomenon of the past if and  when 
the fire-power of the police and military, which under present disposition weighs 
enormously in favour of the  Nigeria military is balanced. The palpable futility of outlawing 
coups has generated a number of suggestions towards keeping the military within their 
barracks. It is suggested that one way a civilian government can prevent intervention of the 
soldier is to increase allocation of resource to the arm forces for better pay and improved 
conditions of service for the rank and file of the military, particularity those at the upper 
cadre. The junior officers should not be neglected because they can also manoeuvre their 
superiors and plot a coup d’état. 
A rather extremist position along this viewpoint calls for the outright demilitarization of the 
country that is, the Nigerian military should be disbanded particularly as Nigeria is 
relatively free from belligerent neighbours. Switzerland, for example, has no standing army 
and yet it is stable. This proposition, to all intent and purposes, is worse than useless. 
Firstly, de-militarization in the twenty-first century is grotesque. If done, the neighbouring 
countries with standing militaries would take their turn to dismember the Nigerian nation. 
The activities of the Cameroonian gendarmes, in the disputed Bakassi area give support to 
this point. Nigeria is bound to face formidable threat from rival countries like South Africa, 
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Libya etc. within the Africa sub-region. Nigerian need to embark on nuclear among others 
to contend such imminent external aggressions rather than proscribing its armed forces. 
Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to showcase the history of Nigeria Military up to date and how its 
consistent involvement in the governance of Nigeria that brought about a history of coups 
and counter coups. This has consequently leaded to the death of many officers of the 
Nigeria army and collapse of several sectors of the country’s economy which the country is 
still grappling with till today. This history has been fostered by the lack of allegiance to the 
government by the army officers making them vulnerable to go against the regime of the 
day that does not suit their preferences. 
Another disclaimer is the lack of trust of civilian government by the population as well as 
the military. As exemplified by Ugorji, the corruption within many civilian governments 
has resulted to lack of credibility and confidence amongst the masses leading to military 
coups to be more rampant as the revolters have a reason to foster regime change 
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Chapter Four: The Impact of Military Rule on Nigerian Democracy 
4.0 Origin of the History 
The practice of democracy in Nigeria from 1966 has brought to fore issues of concern, one 
of which is the ‘militarization’ of the Nigerian polity. Frank & Ukpere (2012) observed that 
the political behaviour of the supposed statesmen in a democratic setting essentially is that 
of ‘active combative posture’ rather than dialogue, negotiation and reconciliation as 
demanded by democratic tenets, that politicians, some of whom had never been in the 
military, act in the democratic space as garrison commanders at the same time, that politics 
is pursued as if it is warfare. The purpose of this chapter is to offer both an explanation for 
the behaviour of the political actors in the democratic era, and to set the conditions 
necessary for change if any. This chapter, however, posits that the current behaviour by 
political leaders and that of the followers at the national, state, local governments’ levels 
respectively, are accounted for by the militarization of the civic political culture through 
political osmotic processes.  
Following, upon the long years of military governance, the obvious outcome would be 
militarized political culture, manifested in the political behaviours of the dramatis personae 
in the democratic arena. The Nigerian civic culture was eroded and militarized culture 
imbibed. Thus, the rule of operation became that of order, combat rather than dialogue, 
disregard of court orders and violation of human rights became the tenets of militarized 
civic culture in a democratic dispensation. These values and norms are unknown to 
democracy. Democratic values include spiritual or moral principles, ideals or qualities of 
life that people favour for their own sake. Democracy is rooted in several key values, or 
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norms. These values supply democracy’s moral content and give its institutions and 
procedures their normative purpose, as Sodaro (2008) said, these include; freedom, 
inclusion, equality, equity, welfare, negotiation and compromise. The absence of these 
values in the Nigerian democracy was captured in the cases discussed in the next section of 
the paper. 
The military as an organization has its values and norms, which has made it a unique 
organization. These values and norms are transferred to the larger society during military 
governance. The adoption of these values and norms within a democratic setup is hereby 
referred to the dialectics of military governance (Frank & Ukpere 2012). They further noted 
that the education and training, which soldiers receive, make them professional men. It is 
also assumed that such acquired values or attributes are transferable into situations or 
occupational roles, which may not be entirely military. According to Odetola (1982) a 
fundamental assumption is that in the process of governing a civilian society, these military 
values are transmitted to the rest of the society in a way that regulates societal behaviour 
and consequently changes such societies. The point to note here is that, the long years of 
military rule, made the boundaries between the barracks and the civil society so permeable 
that the ethos of the military affected the entire society. The resultant effect is that, at the 
entry of the civil regime, politicians had adapted to the command and the administrative 
system of the military, which they have experienced and subjected to over a long time.  
Frank and Ukpere argued that the militarization of governance engenders a militarized civic 
culture the outcome of which is militarized psyche. They also stated that there is a 
significant incongruence between the internalized military culture, character, and the 
demands of democratic process. As a result, the democratic arena is seen as an extension of 
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the barrack. This point is given credence to with the dominance of ex- military men as 
politicians who are yet to be re- civilianized.  This explicates the behaviour of politicians 
since 1999. The behaviours are the direct correlates of the dialectics of military governance. 
For example, Sometimes between April and July 2002, the President decided to amend the 
capital provisions of the 2002 Appropriation Act by reducing the capital budget to 44%. 
This was done with impunity; hence the bill was not forwarded to the national Assembly 
for passage in thereby violating section 80(4) of the 1999, constitution that act amounts to 
gross misconduct.   
Again, in the month of July 2002, a Presidential order was issued purporting same to 
constitute an amendment to the revenue allocation Act which action amounted to the 
violation of section 162(1) and (2) section 315 of the 1999 constitution, which is equal to a 
gross misconduct, and a violation of the constitution as amended. From 1999 to 2002 the 
government had consistently indulged in extra budgetary expenses contrary to section 
80(2), (3) and (4) of the 1999 constitution which is a clear violation of the constitution 
which is going through the due process; with the expenditure on the national stadium in 
excess of appropriated sum, excess expenditure on the national identity card from N5.9 
billion to N9.5 billion above the sum approved in the 2001 and 2002 Appropriation Acts 
respectively. The authorization of the purchase of 63 houses and their furnishing for 
Ministers in the year 2002 to the tune of N3, 019,153,178.06 without any budgetary 
provisions in the 2002 appropriation Act; this was when the National Assembly was not on 
recess. In the year 2000, he authorized the deployment of military troops to ‘Odi’ Bayelsa 
State  to massacre innocent citizens without recourse to the National Assembly contrary to 
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section 217 (2)C of the 1999 constitution which requires first  for some conditions to be 
prescribed by an Act of  the National Assembly for the use of the military in that regard.  
In the year 2001, the President without lawful ‘authority authorized the deployment of 
military troops to ‘ZakiBiam’ (Benue State) which occasioned the murder of innocent 
citizens and the destruction of properties, contrary to section 217(2)C of the 1999 
constitution as amended which requires firstly for some conditions to be prescribed by an 
Act of the National Assembly for the use of military in this regard’ (Djeba 2002). Military 
rule inadvertently leads to the formations of military social classes (military and civilian). 
As the military be- come the dormant social groups in the society, they allocate economic 
advantages derived in Nigeria from contracts and allocation of oil blocks to them- 
selves/colleagues. In and out of the military, this social group possesses enormous wealth 
from these sources to influence the course of politics in democratic dispensation. The 
military acquire their prejudices and ideas ingrained in the minds of the dominant social 
classes, the civil servant and the business classes. A class is thereby formed to hold on, for 
them to drop the military uniform.   
The implication is that in the nearest future the ex-military men will continue to be those 
with enormous resources in politics than their civilian counterpart. This is the 
‘embourgement’ of the military class (Professor Ali Mazrui 1977). The politicians have 
serious contempt for the principle of separation of power. This explains why from the 
President to the least of the politicians, they basked in the adaptation of authoritarian 
measure to the resolution of issues, which requires democratic dialogue and negotiations. 
This is why they see politics as ‘War which is a continuation of politics’ in the words of 
Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. Another dimension of the militarized culture appeared in the 
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making of the Constitution, where all the wide, arbitrary and dictatorial powers hitherto 
exercised by the former military officers are conferred on the President, Governors. These 
are not only subject to abuse but are subversive of the people’s will. An illustration of the 
militarized civic culture was aptly demonstrated during the cases of impeachments recently.  
The Federal government raised the allegations, substantiated and adjudicated it. It consisted 
in the main of: raise the allegations, pretend not to know what the constitution prescribed in 
such matters, invite the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) to substantiate 
the allegation no matter how vague, pick up some officials of the state legislature to sign 
impeachment notices, or throw them into jail, create a semblance of insecurity in the place, 
set the place ready for emergency rule, sponsor protests against the governor, hold-up state 
fiscal allocation, sponsor some indigene of the state often those with political ambition to 
speak against the governor, take away some members of the legislature, indoctrinate them 
and bring them to the assembly under arm escort to effect the impeachment. This was the 
scenario used against DSP Alamesieaya, former Governor of Bayelsa and Plateau states 
respectively. The explanation of the above situation is derived from the level of political 
culture which Nigeria belong, characterized by low level of political secularization in 
which ethnicity rather than issues determine the course of action.  Politics is not about an 
alternative view point of how to resolve issues, but, on where it comes from; in this system, 
the end justified the means used, no matter how unlawful the action deployed; Military rule 
receives great reception with the civil society because they are weakly organized to pose 
any opposition to it.  In this socio-political setting, the military institution is looked upon as 
an alternative political party. 
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Subjecting civil public affairs in Nigeria to military rule has provoked negative and 
destructive consequences for a host of institutions, extending from universities to the 
Nigeria Police Force and from traditional rulership to the justice system. There is virtually 
no longer any credible system of law in the country, with the security forces frequently 
disregarding court rulings. Ironically, the military itself has suffered more than any other 
institution from the absence of trust, loyalty and discipline in its organization. For instance, 
it is an open secret among Nigerians that since the 1980s, Nigeria's military heads of state 
cannot rely on their own forces for protection, leading to the shameful employment of 
mercenary foreign security forces for their more secure protection. The inevitable 
conclusion is that military rule has generated a far greater amount of disorganization and 
indiscipline than the ills which it sets out to correct. Military rule has not only maimed civil 
life in Nigeria; it has also endangered the corporate existence of the Nigerian armed forces 
(Ekeh 1998). The shame of military rule is that it has systematically dismantled Nigeria’s 
federal arrangements. The challenge for the future is to reconstitute Nigerian federalism in 
a manner that respects the country's diversity and that will tap its potentials in forms that 
will allow its regions to gain from their human and natural endowments. This is a task that 
the military cannot undertake because it is against its intrinsic nature. Whether Nigeria's 
military establishment will ever allow civilians to repair the damages that military rule has 
inflicted on the country's federal arrangements should be the central political question of 
the moment.  
The primary purpose of national independence from Great Britain in 1960 was (a) to attain 
freedom for Nigerians and (b) to increase the scope of self-rule for the governments of the 
federation and for various communities in the country. Almost four decades after national 
 90 
 
independence, with three of these under military rule, Nigerians experience a lesser amount 
of individual freedom today than in 1960. Similarly, self-rule by the states, local 
governments, and communities has virtually disappeared, with their autonomy daily 
threatened by decrees and fiats from an overbearing Federal Government.  
Ekeh (1998) further argued that loss of individual freedom by Nigerians and of self-
government for their state and local governments, as well as their communities, has been 
possible because of oppressive structures of governance that military rule has erected for its 
own convenience. In the three decades in which military rule have been dominant in 
Nigerian public affairs, many structures of governance that threatened individuals' 
freedoms have been installed. Such structures as the State Security Service, Nigeria’s 
dreaded secret police with the ominous acronym of SSS, are the artefacts of a military rule 
that unnecessarily threatened individuals’ freedoms.  
Similarly, self-rule and autonomy of state and local governments and their communities 
have been besmirched by the military’s centralization of all governmental functions and 
structures. It is utterly naive to imagine that civilian governments taking over from a 
military regime, and operating the structures of governance left behind by military rule, will 
be different from military governments. The first task of any civilian regime should be to 
preside over the reform of governance in Nigeria. This is why General Abu-Bakr’s proposal 
to install a civilian regime on the military's own terms is dangerous for Nigeria's future. A 
central goal of any new civil rule should be to disband any structures of governance that are 
unnecessary for a federal system of government, while reforming others that are 
overburdened by over-centralization. This should entail a thorough review of the structures 
of governance constructed by military rule. A central role of any new civil rule should be to 
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design structures of governance that will permit a new partnership between the Federal and 
State governments. 
One troubling aspect of military rule is its disrespect for the Constitution. This is so in two 
forms. First, all military regimes in Nigeria have suspended sections of the Constitution that 
may restrain their powers, while retaining those portions of the Constitution that they find 
helpful. In the place of the Constitution, the military have ruled by decrees which are 
usually so broad in scope that they override the authorities of the law courts. In addition, 
they have in several instances disregarded unfavourable court rulings that apply the logic of 
the military’s own decrees. In effect, Nigerian military rule has operated outside the law.  
Second, in a game that Nigerians are by now familiar with, military rulers, who control 
Nigerians without the benefit of the Constitution, have constructed Constitutions for civil 
regimes that will succeed them. There are three of these military-supervised Constitutions: 
those of 1979, 1988, and 1995. Each of them was constructed with instructions not to go 
into certain zones dear to the military (so-called “no-go” areas), such as attempts to ban 
military coups d’état. Each of them is so centralized that the powers of the Regions (now 
called states) in the original 1963 Constitution, which the military want to replace, have 
been significantly diminished. In effect, the military-supervised Constitutions effectively 
got Nigerian federalism. The original 1963 Constitution contained constitutional laws from 
the constituent regions (that is, states) of the Federation. The military-supervised 
constitutions have ignored the need for state constitutions. Obviously, they have been 
crafted in the image of the military.  
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One of the most troubling proposals by General Abubakar for the new transition program, 
which he insisted the military should supervised, was his decision to impose the 1995 
"draft" Constitution on a new civilian regime. Apart from the fact that it was immoral and 
offensive for Nigeria's Constitution to be “approved” by the military's Provisional Ruling 
Council, the 1995 "draft" Constitution was so flawed in its construction that it could be 
redeemed in the manner suggested in General Abubakar's speech.  
Any party canvassing for votes from Nigerians must pledge to reform Nigeria's 
Constitution by at least including considerations of state constitutions. This is crucial in the 
area of revenue allocation where the military-supervised Constitutions have departed in 
major ways from the formula agreed to in the 1960s as an appropriate way of running the 
affairs of Nigeria as a federation, not as a de facto unitary state that military rule has 
imposed on us all. It is important that the Federation Account is fully respected as an 
agency for fair allocation of constitutionally allocated funds. Sadly, under military rule, the 
Federation Account has been abused badly. Meanwhile, it will help General Abubakar's 
image of being a flexible leader, a new-style military ruler, if he were to redress the portion 
of his transition program dealing with the Constitution.  
In 1963 the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, successfully pressed the 
Security Council to allocate the responsibility of training the disorganized civilian police of 
the Republic of the Congo to the Nigeria Police Force. That was seen then as one major 
step of re-establishing order in the Congo. At that time the Nigeria Police Force was 
disciplined and had an exemplary organization that was regarded with respect by other 
African nations and the international community.  
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Today, after three decades of abuse from military rule which has militarized the Nigerian 
Police Force (NPF), the Nigeria Police Force is disgraced in the view of Nigerians and the 
international community. It is judged to be corrupt, inefficient, and oppressive. The 
Nigerian military establishment is not celebrated for accepting responsibility for its actions. 
But, this is one case where military rule cannot escape blame. The decay of the Nigeria 
Police Force has occurred under its watch and as a result of its inexorable policies of 
centralization.  
The question of police formations was a topic that was hotly debated as a constitutional 
matter in the 1950s. While the North, the West, and even the majority Ibos of the East, 
wanted to establish regional police forces, the minorities were able to block these regional 
police formations for fear that they might be oppressive. At that time minorities looked to 
the Federal Government for protection, which of course is not the case anymore. As a 
compromise, the Nigeria Police Force in the Regions was to be partially controlled by the 
Regional Governments. Local governments in the North and the West still retained their 
police formations. Military rule abolished all compromises for the control of the Nigeria 
Police Force. It also abolished local government police formations. Instead, we have one 
mammoth Nigeria Police Force that is responsible for meeting the policing needs of the 
federal, state, and local governments.  
If there is one area where constitutional reform is urgently needed in Nigeria, it is in the 
police formations. Each state deserves to have its own police formation. Those local 
governments that can afford them should also be constitutionally empowered to have their 
own police formations. If there are states that are satisfied with the Nigeria Police Force, 
they may retain it on special arrangements. But, there should be clear demarcation among 
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federal, state, and local government policing functions. It is silly that a petty marital dispute 
resulting in a fight between husband and wife must go to the Nigeria Police Force for 
settlement. That is a policing function that states and local governments can undertake.  
However, this is not how our military rulers see this important matter. All three military-
supervised Constitutions decree that there shall be no police formations other than the one 
Nigeria Police Force. Is this a constitutional matter that can be reconsidered among those 
that General Abubakar has promised to review? It is not certain. Having multiple police 
formations does not suit the centralization policies of the military. If this matter is not 
revisited by the military, then, we will urge that Nigerians should not entertain voting for 
any parties that will not promise to look into this vital area of security.  
Given the unstable political tradition prevalent in Nigeria, Frank and Ukpere has asserted 
that Nigeria is neither a democratic nor a great country. They further opined that Nigeria is 
one of the most disorderly nations in the world, the most corrupt, insensitive and 
insufficiently placed under the sun. According to him, some of the changes in the political 
plans do not either conform or proceed from the rules governing organizational changes as 
a result of military interventions. That the military has affected the development of the 
political culture in Nigeria in many ways cannot be over emphasized. Having been 
independent for over fifty two years ago, and the military longer grip on the ruler ship of 
the country, it is necessary that the military has impacted much on the country’s political 
culture, as most of the political programmes for civilian rule have been influenced by the 
military. During the period, the military applied different approaches to the task of nation 
building from which the democratic political culture envisaged and the foundation made. 
Indeed, some of the programmes were short-lived without any thing to offer in terms of 
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pushing the nation towards the direction of developing an indigenous political culture, 
whereas, others such as the military government of Olusegun Obasanjo, Ibrahim Bahangida 
and Abdusalam Abubakar actually did give the Nigerian people some direction. Indeed, it 
is pertinent to note that intermittent military involvement in governance had brought 
changes and disruptions on the path of democratic development. They made damages to the 
progress of the Nigerian Nation. Upon assumption of political office, the military had 
always presented themselves as the much awaited messiah. Based on the above, they go a 
long way to win the people’s mind and support. But, very often this same military fall into 
the same crimes for which they sacked the civilian government. Military regimes are never 
democratic.  
However, even though their policies and programmes appear to be so, it is assumed that 
they appear so to seek legitimacy which they never had. For instance, the suspension of the 
constitution, and the promulgation of rush and hasty decrees are quite incompatible with 
democratic order. Again, under the military, the masses are always coerced instead of 
coaxed to obey rules or decrees. The military apply rule of men rather than rule of law. In 
most cases, the press is not allowed to exercise freedom in practical terms, while carrying 
out their duties. The military discourage political education and scares the mass from 
political participation through the use of decrees and abuse of fundamental human rights, 
thereby denying the masses the opportunity to partake in resources allocation and values 
development in Nigeria. These vices were developed by the military in Nigerian politics 
and passed on to Nigerian political system as a tradition or value system, thereby affecting 
negatively Nigerian democratic culture. 
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Ekeh (1998) observed that one of the major events of Nnamdi Azikiwe’s career as Premier 
of Eastern Nigeria was his trip to the United States to explore resources for establishing a 
university that his government could build. That was how the University of Nigeria at 
Nsukka was established. Ahmadu Bello University at Zaria, owned and operated by the 
Northern Regional Government, and the University of Ife, owned and operated by the 
Western Region, quickly followed in the footsteps of Nsukka. The ownership and control 
of universities by states of the federation continued well into military rule of Nigeria. The 
University of Benin was built as a state university by the Mid-West Government during 
Yakubu Gowon's era of military rule.  
The centralization bug bit into Nigerian universities under the military government of 
General Obasanjo. Among the many bad things for which the Muhammed and Obasanjo 
regime were historically responsible, none has been as devastating as the take-over of state 
universities and the centralization of university administration under the Nigerian 
Universities Commission. Flushed with oil revenues and a philosophy that the central 
government can do anything and everything, Obasanjo's government virtually took over 
university education without adequate machinery for conducting their affairs. In fact, the 
Nigerian Universities Commission has become an agency that is supervising the decay of 
Nigerian universities, rather than a Commission interested in seeing Ibadan or Lagos, or 
any other university for that matter, as a world-class university.  
 The pattern of university education of the 1960s should be reversed for speedy socio 
political and economic development of Nigeria. The states should be made to take back 
their universities. A new revenue allocation formula should take into account the 
responsibilities of the states for higher education. The Universities of Ibadan and Lagos 
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were always regarded as national institutions. If for the sake of balance, there is a need to 
add Nsukka and Ahmadu Bello as national institutions that is fine. A corporation can be set 
up to manage their affairs. But, the universities do not need the Nigerian Universities 
Commission, at least not in its present form and powers. This issue should form the basis 
for political ideologies and manifestoes as this will in no doubt captivate the attention of the 
Nigerian voter. 
4.1 Issues in Democracy and Democratization in Nigeria 
Nigeria is being referred to as giant of Africa due to its large population and economy. The 
practice of democracy has been in existence since Nigeria got her independence in 1960, 
the country has experience a lot of conflict regarding the issue of democracy. A lot of 
conflict arises during election period in Nigeria; as result of this a lot of life and properties 
has been claimed. This happens because of the bad system introduced by the corrupt 
politician that gave opportunity to the hooligans and thurgery to have their way out. 
4.2 Corruption and Lack of Good Governance 
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary sees corruption as a dishonest or illegal 
behaviour especially of people in authority. According to Nye (1967) corruption is a 
deviation from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, 
close family, private clique) pecuniary exercise of certain types of private regarding 
influence. This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgment 
of a person in position of trust); nepotism (appointment by reason of abstractive 
relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public 
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resources for private regarding uses).Similarly, Samuel P. Huntington defined corruption as 
behaviour of public officials, which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private 
end (Huntington, 1968). On the other hand, according to the World Bank, corruption is “the 
abuse of public office through the instrumentality of private agents, who actively offer 
bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. 
Beyond bribery, public office can also be abused for personal benefit through patronage 
and nepotism, for example the theft of state assets or the diversion of state revenues (Wolrd 
Bank, 2005). 
Above all, Otite (1986) defined corruption as the perversion of integrity or state of affairs 
through bribery, favour or moral depravity. Corruption can be classified according to how it 
is carried out in relation to established rules in administration. There are two types of 
corruption in this regard. The first is done “according to the rule” where an official receives 
private gain for doing what he or she is paid to do. The second is done “against the rule” 
where an official is paid bribe to give services that he/she is prohibited from providing. 
Otite also classified corruption into five groups: Political corruption, Economic Corruption, 
Bureaucratic corruption, judicial corruption and moral corruption. He noted that political 
corruption is manifested in activities connected with election and succession, and the 
manipulation of people and institutions in order to retain power and office. Economic 
corruption occurs when business people use corrupt means to pervert the normal 
institutional regulations, hasten or shorten procedures and get undue advantage or value for 
goods and services. Bureaucratic corruption involves buying favours from bureaucrats, who 
formulate and administer government economic and political policies including foreign 
exchange, privatization exercises, import licenses, taxes etc. Judicial corruption occurs 
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when law enforcement agencies and the courts pervert the administration of justice. Moral 
corruption occurs when people engage in practices that are morally reprehensible.  
According to  the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and 
Related Offences acts in Article 4 of July 11, 2003 which stated that; 
(a) the solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a public official 
or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such 
as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another 
person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of 
his or her public functions; 
(b) the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official or any 
other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a 
gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or herself or for another 
person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of 
his or her public functions; 
(c) any act or omission in the discharge of his or her duties by a public 
official or any other person for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for 
himself or herself or for a third party; 
  (d) the diversion by a public official or any other  person, for purposes   
 unrelated to  those for which they  were intended, for his or her own 
benefit or that of a  third party, of any property belonging to the State or  its 
agencies, to an independent agency, or to an   individual, that such official 
has received by virtue of  his or her position; 
(e) the offering or giving, promising, solicitation or acceptance, directly or 
indirectly, of any undue advantage to or by any person who directs or 
works for, in any capacity, a private sector entity, for himself or herself or 
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for anyone else, for him or her to act, or refrain from acting, in breach of 
his or her duties; 
(f) the offering, giving, solicitation or acceptance directly or indirectly, or 
promising of any undue advantage to or by any person who asserts or 
confirms that he or she is able to exert any improper influence over the 
decision making of any person performing functions in the public or 
private sector in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for 
himself or herself or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the 
acceptance of the offer or the promise of such an advantage, in 
consideration of that influence, whether or not the influence is exerted or 
whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended result; 
(g) illicit enrichment; 
(h) the use or concealment of proceeds derived from any of the acts 
referred to in this Article; and 
(i) participation as a principal, co-principal, agent, instigator, accomplice or 
accessory after the fact, or on any other manner in the commission or 
attempted commission of, in any collaboration or conspiracy to commit, 
any of the acts referred to in this article. 
All these manifestations of corruption have become prevalent in Nigeria since the time of 
colonization as a result of the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 
1914. Hence, leadership struggles have continued to surface from time to time and 
threatening the establishment of democracy vis-a-vis its consolidation. This has given rise 
to the problem of good governance, corruption, ethnicity, religious bigotry, political 
violence, regionalism, travesty of justice, lack of political will and intolerance, insecurity, 
nepotism and arson among others. The military did a lot to accentuate this problem, thus 
good governance has for many years remained elusive in Nigeria’s political terrains even 
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after the long occupation of the political arena by the military, Nigeria is now on the path of 
transforming civil rule into full democratization. Rather, despotic and corrupt leaders 
mostly in uniform have always found their ways into the polity as leaders. The military that 
have always been a threat to the growth of democracy have always retorted that the cause 
of their intervention is corruption, violence, arson and political assassination among other 
things. However, several instances in the past show that the military too were even more 
grievously guilty of similar allegations. 
The military identified corruption of the politicians as one of the reasons for taking over. 
The military ruled Nigeria from 1966-1979 and handed over power to Alhaji Shehu Shagari 
administration in 1979. But barely four years later, was the Shagari’s administration 
overthrown by the Buhari and Idiagbon regime. The Buhari and Idiagbon regime launched 
a war against corruption, tried and jailed many politicians and dismissed many civil 
servants. But, when the Ibrahim Babangida regime overthrew the Buhari regime, it released 
many of the politicians that were jailed by the Buhari regime, and reduced the sentences of 
others. In fact, it has been argued that “Babangida’s government was unique in its 
unconcern about corruption within its ranks and among public servants generally; it was as 
if the government existed so that corruption might thrive” (Gboyega, 1996).Corruption 
reached unprecedented levels in incidence and magnitude during General Ibrahim 
Babangida’s regime. It is ironic that the regime also had its own re-orientation and anti-
corruption programme, christened Mass Mobilization for Self Reliance, Social Justice, and 
Economic Recovery (MAMSER)By the time President Olusegun Obasanjo came back to 
power as a civilian President in 1999, corruption had reached unprecedented proportion that 
it formed a major portion of his inaugural speech. 
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Corruption and lack of good governance continued to manifest in various forms. In fact, the 
fundraising for presidential library project of President Obasanjo exposed how leaders used 
state funds to settle personal political homage and scores. In addition to this was the 
withholding of the statutory allocation of local governments in Lagos state by the Obasanjo 
federal government. On several occasions, the apex court had ruled in favour of Lagos State 
but, the president insisted that Lagos State should revert from 37 to the old 20 local 
governments as the criteria for the release of the statutory allocation. Thus, corruption has 
eroded efficiency and professionalism of patriotic services to the Nigerian federation. The 
severity of like situations made the Paris Club to demand the prosecution of corrupt 
officials by the Nigerian government as a condition for debt relief (Odeh, 2007).The 
response by the Paris Club is in consonance with the fact that they have records of how 
Nigeria’s treasury is looted which was confirmed by the action of the former governor of 
Plateau state, Joshua Dariye, who was caught in London in possession of large sums of 
hard-currency. However, up till now, most corrupt officials are still free men, unprosecuted. 
There are lots of amazing facts on corruption, which had been publicly known of, and of 
which nothing has been done about it. Truly as it is, corruption is no doubt an endemic 
problem that has thoroughly affected the development of the Nigerian economy. This in 
turn has clearly enhanced poverty, unemployment, prostitution, armed robbery, and many 
social ills that endanger the lives of millions of Nigerians by exposing them to a high level 
of insecurity within the polity. 
Since the return to democratic governance under the 1999 Constitution, how to effectively 
combat the menace of corruption has been a main policy thrust of successive 
administrations, though, the approaches and operational tactics may have differed. 
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However, the government’s anti-corruption strategies have been grossly inefficient in 
arresting the menace. Although, anti-graft legislations and enforcement agencies have 
always existed in one form or the other right from colonial times, it was Obasanjo’s second 
coming in 1999 that ushered in the present all-out war against corruption and abuse of 
office. Upon assumption of office as civilian president, Obasanjo declared it was not going 
to be “business as usual”. 
Certain factors were responsible for Obasanjo’s anti-corruption posture. First was the 
brigandage and rapacious looting that characterized successive military administration 
culminating in Abacha’s money stashed in foreign banks. The second was the need for the 
country to redeem its image and extricate itself from the pariah status which corruption had 
earned it in the committee of nations; the third was the need to secure a measure of debt 
forgiveness from the Paris Club. The Fourth was the consistent ranking as one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world by Transparency. These forces were to be later joined by the 
global war against terror spearheaded by the United States of America. The anti-corruption 
war under Obasanjo commenced with the process of recovery of looted funds from foreign 
banks, setting up of ad-hoc panels of inquiry to investigate and report allegations of corrupt 
practices especially failed contracts, establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission (ICPC) and subsequently the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) for investigation and prosecution of persons implicated in corrupt practices and 
economic crimes, initiation of reform of the public sector through privatization and 
commercialization of government business ventures; monetization of benefits of public 
servants, guaranteeing pensions and retirement benefits, signing of international anti- 
corruption instruments such as the United nations (UN) Conventions, the African Union 
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(AU) convention, the Economic Community of West Africa State (ECOWAS) protocol, 
and reaffirmation of zero tolerance for corruption and the need for ethical and value 
reorientation. 
However, the war against corruption under Obasanjo was a failure. In fact, the Independent 
Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPCC) and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) could not solve Nigeria’s corruption problem, the agencies were overwhelmed by 
the problem, and thus the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) was seen as a 
toothless bulldog, while the Economic and Financial Crimes commission (EFCC) was an 
Alsatian readily turned loose on political opponents. Similarly, Yar’dua vowed to continue 
with war against corruption, but insisted that it was not going to a “no holds barred” war as 
it was degenerating to under Obasanjo. Yar’Adua’s zero tolerance for corruption was going 
to be within the context of respect for rule of law and human rights. However, it was 
observed that the change of approach resulted in a “slow- down” of the war and its 
persistence till the Jonathan administration (Enweremadu, 2012). 
This eventually gives room for corruption to fight back fiercely; this was explicitly 
captured in an article on viewpoint page in one of the national daily: The Punch, Monday 
July 28, 2008 by Adebolu Arowolo which goes thus: “The so-called giant of Africa is 
terribly sick and dying with wounds and life threatening injuries inflicted by its rapacious 
leaders, the nation under the watch of president Umaru Yardua, is now prostate and gasping 
for breath. Experts who have diagnosed the ailing giant says its health is not better than that 
of other rapidly collapsing and war ravaged states such as Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, and 
Afghanistan. In the ward of twenty countries now at risk of becoming failed states, Nigeria 
has been bed number eighteen; They say it may eventually die if it is not quickly wheeled 
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into the theatre of good governance radical reforms. Writhing in terminal distress its leaders 
are busy gang-raping its oil till (see 2008 Foreign Policy Failed States Index). 
Bewildered Nigerians do not need any foreign report to tell them that things are swiftly 
falling apart. Public schools have been closed for four weeks because the teachers are on 
strike. Petroleum worker who have just returned from a warning strike are planning to go 
another indefinite one. Roads are bad and the rail system prostrate. With increasingly 
erratic supply of electricity and skyrocketing price of diesel the collapse of the energy 
sector is almost total. 
An inflationary pressure has intensified and has now hit double digits. The real sector is 
going further into the woods, as manufacturers complain of harsh operating environment 
and crushing cost of doing business. The shrinking real sector has now compounded the 
crisis of poverty, and unemployment; leaving teeming population frustrated, angry and 
prone to crime. The government reckons that about fifty million youths jobless. The Niger 
Delta insurgency that is threatening to deteriorate into full-blown war has cut the nation 
daily production of crude by one million barrels. The sustained bearish trend at the nation’s 
stock exchange market is largely an indication that capital is furiously relocation from 
Nigeria to saner and more politically stables climes. 
As the nation sinks deeper into economic chaos and socio-political, our political leaders 
appear very happy because the anarchic environment is conducive to plunder and predation. 
More than ever before, members of the ruling class are swimming in obscene wealth. 
Looters are having a field day. Those who have stolen keep coming back to the office to 
steal more. They keep flaunting their ill-gotten wealth. Politicians have created a paradise 
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for themselves at the expense of the average citizen. Democracy is not delivering its 
dividends because its checks and balances have been effectively crippled by corruption. 
Many legislators are in pockets of governors. They have compromised their oversight 
duties by taking crumbs from the Executive’s table. It all looks like grand conspiracy by the 
ruling elite against the people.  
The anti-graft agencies have been overwhelmed because official graft has since become 
accepted as the dominant means of distributing the nation’s wealth among public office 
holders. Just like what we have witnessed in the past, the countless probes going on may 
only end up enriching many of the panellists. State institutions have been crippled and 
rendered ineffective by those who should run them for the benefit of the people. How can 
you fight graft effectively when those who control state power are entrenched in 
corruption? 
In all this, Yardua appears to be clueless. Instead of looking for ways of cutting down the 
cost of running his government, he was busy extending patronage by rolling back the 
modest gain of past reforms. The President appears too tentative on many burning issues 
that require urgent action. He has embraced ‘Adam Smith in reverse,’ and the consequences 
of big and wasteful government are bound to become more severe and dire in the months 
ahead. By taking government back into business, Yardua has only succeeded in creating 
more avenue for people to loot. 
To save the nation from descending further into misery and chaos, the people must organise 
to make certain demands from government .We must ask our senators to immediately 
prescribe the conditions for accessing the asset forms of all office public holders as 
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submitted to the Code of Conduct Bureau. The Third Schedule 3c of the 1999 Constitution 
states that the Bureau shall retain custody of  all asset forms and make them available for 
inspection by any citizens of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as the National 
Assembly may prescribe. 
I suspect that the National Assembly has for more than nine years, failed to prescribed 
those conditions because it pays the ruling class to keep the orgy of primitive accumulation 
going on out of public domain, It is for the same reason that the Freedom of Information 
Law may never be enacted if the people do not rise up to put pressure on the legislators. By 
denying the people a law, the legislators are flouting section 39(1) of the constitution, 
which states that; “every person shall entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impact ideas and information without interference.’ 
Nobody is deceived when our lawmakers give flimsy excuses for not passing the law. We 
know that what is hated is the regime of transparency that will follow the passage of the 
law. We must rise to save to save the country to overcome this difficulties period. The 
poverty level is unacceptable. At ward and council levels the people should learn to hold 
their leaders to account. We must form pressure groups to demand audited account of 
public financial transaction. Statutory allocations should be published regularly. 
Efforts should be made to translate the allocations to local languages for the benefits of 
rural communities. We must use all peaceful means to compel public account committee in 
the legislative arm of the various tier of government to perform their oversight functions on 
on all public financial transactions. Nigeria will continue on the path of perdition if the dark 
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environment that favours corruption and poor governance is not open up to public 
scrutiny’’ 
As earlier said, the above article is a eye opener to what is obtained in the system after nine 
years the military has retuned to the barrack which has not abated till now because the seed 
of this rot were sew by the military during their adventure into the system and it has grown 
to a malignant cancer which is now difficult to care. In 2008 the country was placed on 
number eighteen on the index of failed state in the journal of foreign policy failed index; 
the country has climbed to number sixteen by 2013 record.  
Corruption has a lot of negative impact on every sphere of societal development: social and 
political. Some of the impact of corruption include: the erosion of the moral fabric of 
society, violation of the social and economic rights of the poor and vulnerable, undermining 
of democracy, subversion of the rule of law, retardation of development and denial of 
society, particularly the poor, of the benefits of free and open competition. Belloh-Imam 
(2004), on the other hand outlined the negative consequences of corruption to include:  
(i). Retardation of Economic Growth: Corruption lowers investment and retards economic 
growth.  
(ii). Misallocation of Talent: Where rent seeking proves more lucrative than productive 
work, talent will be misallocated. People will be lured to rent seeking rather than productive 
work.  
(iii). Limitation of Aid Flows: Where corruption is rampant, donor agencies are unwilling 
to put in their money.  
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(iv). Loss of Tax Revenue: Revenue is lost through tax evasion or claiming improper tax 
exemptions.  
(v). Adverse Budgetary Consequences: When corruption is rampant budgeted amounts will 
not deliver the required services.  
(vi). Negative Impact on Quality of Infrastructure and Public Services: When public 
contracts are procured through a corrupt system, it results in lower quality of infrastructure 
and public services.  
(vii). Negative Composition of Government Expenditure: Corruption often tempts 
government officials to choose government projects less on the basis of public welfare than 
on the opportunity they provide for extorting bribes. Under such a situation, large projects, 
whose exact value and benefit are difficult to monitor, usually present lucrative 
opportunities for corruption while returns on teachers’ salaries and textbooks could be zero 
for the same set of officials. All these have greatly undermined Nigeria’s democratic 
development.  
4.3 Ethnic Sentiments 
Ethnicity can be conceptualized as a set of ascribed and acquired characteristics that derive 
principally from an individual’s birth and upbringing, although physical appearance may be 
relevant, it is in essence, composed of psychological elements that are not only self-
perceptions, but also other groups’ perceptions. These elements cannot be shed or 
significantly altered as easily as purely acquired or adopted characteristics such as 
occupation. The individual is forever stigmatized by his or her group of origin, and if ethnic 
and political divisions coincide, the switching of ethno political affiliations is a rare 
occurrence. Thus, political divisions based on ethnic identities can be argued, qualitatively 
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different from those based on individuals socioeconomic characteristics or adopted 
ideology. Therefore, ethnic politics typically does not concern “material interest,” but 
symbolic claims, which often are not amenable to compromise (Tijjani, 2012).  
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with a population of over 160 million people 
and consists of multiethnic groups, religious diversities, and also a multicultural society. 
There were various kingdoms and empires such as the Yoruba kingdom, the Benin 
kingdom, the Fulani emirate, the Igbo traditional system, the Urhobo gerontocratic system 
etc. All these changed with the conquest of Lagos in 1861 by the British and the subsequent 
amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914. As a result of a lot of struggle, 
Nigeria gained independence in 1960. The First Republic headed by Prime Minister, Sir 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa ruled for six years as a parliamentary system of government the 
military regime took over authoritative control through a bloody coup in 1966. This regime 
experienced counter coup among the military leaders, spending up to thirteen years with 
four different heads of state from January 1966 to July 1966 General J.T. Aguiyi Ironsi, 
Yakubu Gowon took over from July 1966 to July, 1975; while General Murtala Ramat 
Muhammad headed from July, 1975 to February, 1976 and finally General Olusegun 
Obasanjo, from February, 1976 to October, 1979 and handed over the administration in the 
year 1979 to elected government. 
The Second Republic headed by Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari with a Presidential 
system of Government lasted for only one regime (four years) and the military took over 
again in 1983. The military ruled for another sixteen years under four military rulers (Gen 
Muhammadu Buhari: 1984-1985, Ibrahim Babangida: 1985-1993, Sanni Abacha: 1994- 
1998 and Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar: 1998-1999) and an illegal contraption called 
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Interim National Government headed by Ernest Shonekan. The military handed over power 
on 29th May, 1999 to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo who was a military ruler from 1976-1979. 
Thus out of the 53 years of post-independence Nigeria, the military has ruled for 29 years 
(Tijjani, 2012).  
Ethnicity, from independence, has remained an impediment in the process of nation 
building in Nigeria. Right from the “divide and rule” tactics introduced into the polity by 
the British, it has led to the emergency of regional and ethnic leaders and this led to a 
situation whereby parties at the time of independence were ethnically based. The Action 
Croup (AG) dominated the West and led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, NFC in the North 
was led by Sir Ahmadu Bello and the National Council of Nigerians Citizens (NCNC) 
controlled the East and led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Sklar, 1983). It can then be said that 
regional leaders employed ethnic affiliations for selfish reasons. This has brought about 
political instability as a result of the fact that Nigeria is an heterogeneous society with a 
high population running into over 140 million people, whereby inter-ethnic rivalry have 
always heated the polity. It has been argued that the first military coup of 1966 were 
ethnically calculated to affect a particular region and among the reasons alluded to this was 
the fact that the majority of those that were assassinated were Northerners (Osaghae, 1998). 
Among the various groups in Nigeria, the presence of hostility is rampant and this has 
constantly created instability in the polity as a result of nepotism (Nnoli, 1995). Merit and 
efficiency are sacrificed on the altar of ethnic Chauvinism. Hence, conflict between groups 
seems to be the order of the day in the polity rather than the development of a cooperative 
spirit. The competitive nature among Nigerian ethnic groups has till date made census 
figures questionable, because right from the first population census crisis of 1954, to that of 
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1962, the Southern ethnic groups have repeatedly challenged the return of high figures for 
the North. To resolve the contention, ethnicity and religion were expunged from the last 
census exercise in 2006. Ethnicity is therefore a plague that is prevailing over democratic 
consolidation in Nigeria as there were calls by the Christian and other socio-cultural 
groupings in the polity threatening to boycott the census if ethnicity and religion were 
omitted from the list of questions. This is as a result of the fact that census figures have 
been a backbone for the hegemonic disposition of a particular group in the Nigerian 
federation over the rest, so in the contest for the control of state power and resources, ethnic 
sentiments have always been employed by both minority and majority ethnic groups in the 
pursuit of national resources. The increased ethnic tension that this has brought, has 
affected economic development as the climate is considered not investment friendly. 
That Military rule is antithetical to democracy went a long way in reinforcing and 
entrenching ethnic sentiments in the Nigerian polity. In fact, one of the most debilitating 
consequences of prolonged military rule is the permeation of ethnic and regional, feelings 
and loyalty into the Nigeria military. Prior to the intervention, the military remained the 
symbol of national unity and loyalty. However, all this changed as a result of involvement 
in the business of government. Elaigwu (1998) noted that the ethnic feelings generated by 
the patterns of killing following the January 1968 abortive coup created ethnic and regional 
suspicions. As a matter of fact, the July 1966 coup, which toppled the Government of 
General Ironsi, was perceived as a revenge action by those officers involved against the 
January 15 group. Therefore, the Nigeria military today is far from being a representative 
institution, but one divided along ethnic lines as sectionals motivated coup as in the 
abortive attempt led by Major Gideon Orka in April 1990, claiming to be championing the 
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course of the Middle Belt and other ethnic minorities has further shown. Babangida’s 
annulment of the June 12 Presidential election which gave Chief Moshood Kashimawo 
Olawale Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), a Southerner, an undisputed lead, 
forcefully demonstrates this ethnic commitment of the Nigerian military. Every available 
evidence indicate that any power shift from the North to the South was unacceptable to the 
Northern military, by Babangida, and political elites who have dominated power since 1960 
(Ikpe, 2000).  
When Nigeria’s socio-political and economic failure is examined, one would discover that 
ethnicity is central to its current under developmental syndrome. Ethnic sentiments have 
also led to the growth and spread of ethnic militias. Ethnic militias in Nigeria exist in all the 
geopolitical zones. Some of these include: 
Arewa People’s Congress (APC) was formed not because of perceived marginalization but 
just to have a structure on ground if need be, to counter the activities of other ethnic 
militias. More importantly, the APC was formed to protect the interest of the North and 
Islam.  
Odua People’s Congress (OPC) emerged because the Yoruba People felt denied, deprived, 
cheated and marginalized as a result of the June 12, 1993 an election which was annulled 
by the Hausa/Fulani oligarchy to remain at the helm of affairs perpetually at the expense of 
other ethnic nationalities. Bakassi boys-This was formed as a result of the perceived 
marginalization of the people of Igbo stock since the advent of the Nigerian civil war. Since 
the end of the civil war, nobody from Igbo extraction had got the opportunity of getting to 
the Presidency.  
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The Egbesu Boys - This was formed as a result of the perceived marginalization of people 
of Ijaw extraction and the agitation for resource control. The Onshore/off shore dichotomy 
further aggravated the restiveness of these people. 
Based on the foregoing, the consolidation of democracy is on shaky grounds as long as the 
problem of ethnic nationalism remains in place. Ethnicity no doubt in its negative form 
negates all forms of development. It becomes a powerful force that leads to socio-political 
instability that in turn defies the realization of a country’s resources. Once the state is 
controlled by one or more ethnic groups, upward social mobility becomes a preserve of 
such groups, who use the state machinery for group interest as opposed to ethnic integration 
and national development. 
4.4 Insecurity and Political Violence 
Insecurity and political violence is another phenomenon in our political terrain and the 
outcomes have most times been disastrous to democratic development in Nigeria. It has 
brought about the death of innocent people and a great loss of properties. Political violence 
has been a disruptive and destructive tool in Nigeria through its use as a means of 
contesting for power and recognition between individuals and groups in the society.  
In the case of Boko Haram, the sect began its ferocious activities in 2002 in Maidugiri in 
the northern part of the country. However, the sect achieved notoriety in 2009 following its 
25 July, 2009 all-night attack on Dutsen-Tanshi police station in Bauchi State. Nigerian 
security forces retaliated with a heavy five-day crackdown on the group that resulted in the 
death of about 800 people and several hundreds injured. At the end, the founding leader of 
the fundamentalist sect Mohammed Yusuf was captured and killed in an extra-judicial 
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manner. His death triggered an unprecedented horror that climaxed in 2011 as the Boko 
Haram terrorist group rearmed for the worst, bombing public places and maiming innocent 
citizens. Boko Haram has been described as a product of the ‘Maitatsine’ doctrine 
introduced to northern Nigeria in 1945, which particularly led to the Islamic zealots and 
fundamentalists riots of the 1980s and its consequent religious/ethnic tensions in the late 
1990s. Besides the religious affiliations of the Boko Haram sect, it has been described as a 
political tool utilized by some disgruntled politicians in the Northern part of the country to 
destabilize the polity (Iwu and Oko, 2013). 
Before 2009, the Boko Haram sect did not aim to overthrow the government violently but 
its founding leader Mohammed Yusuf often criticized the northern Nigerian Muslims for 
participating in what he perceived as an illegitimate, non-Islamic state and preached a 
doctrine of return to Islam. After the killing of Yusuf on 30 July, 2009 by the Nigerian 
security forces while in custody in the wake of the sect’s uprising following the motor-bike 
helmet law, a splinter group of Boko Haram called “Yusuffiya” began to carry out massive 
terrorist activities in various parts of northern Nigeria. First, the group struck in Dala 
Alemderi ward in Maiduguri, Borno State killing four people. On September 7, 2010, the 
sect attacked a prison in Bauchi State and freed over 700 inmates alleged to be some 
members of the sect; a market bombing in December 2010 was also blamed on the group; 
and on January 28, 2011, a gubernatorial candidate was assassinated, along with his brother 
and four police officers allegedly by the group. Furthermore, the sect caused serious unrest 
during the 2011 elections. On March 29, 2011, police thwarted a plot by the sect to bomb 
an election rally of the All Nigerian Peoples’ Party (ANPP) in Maiduguri, Borno State. 
Also, on April 1, 2011 suspected Boko Haram members attacked a police station in Bauchi. 
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On April 9, 2011 polling center in Maiduguri was bombed. On April 15, 2011 the 
Maiduguri office of the Independent National Electoral Commission was bombed, and 
several people were shot in a separate incident on the same day. On April 20, 2011 Boko 
Haram killed a Muslim cleric and ambushed several police officers in Maiduguri. On April 
22, 2011 Boko Haram freed 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State. And 
ultimately, a series of bombings in northern Nigeria on May 29, 2011 that left 15 dead was 
blame on the Boko Haram sect. More so, the sect orchestrated the bombing of Nigeria 
Police Force Headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011 and the United Nations house in 
Abuja on August 26, 2011 which went a long way in “publicizing the group and its intent 
internationally” (Iwu and Oko, 2013). The terrorist activities of the sect in the Northern part 
of the country has greatly undermined national security, caused severe humanitarian 
disaster and smeared the nation’s image within the international community. This situation 
has left the nation tottering on the brink of disintegration and collapse as the memories of 
the civil war resonates among the ethnic groups, especially the Igbos who has been 
adversely affected by the suicide bombings and assassinations all over the northern parts of 
the country (Iwu and Oko, 2013).  
4.5 The Role of the Military in a Democratic Nigeria 
The question of the role the Nigeria military in a democratic setting will entail probing into 
the fundamentals of civil-military relations capable of guaranteeing the survival of 
democracy. Civil-military relations cover the entire sphere of the relationships between the 
armed forces on one hand and the civil society on the other (Malifa and Gonda, 1992). In 
the views of Samuel Huntington (1957) the real issue in civil military relations is how to 
maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values, and this include a 
 117 
 
complex balancing of power and attitudes among civilian and military groups. Civil-
military relations encompasses the complex of behaviour in which civilian and military 
interaction takes place which may include political, economic, social and cultural 
interaction. It is basically about relationship, but tends to be dominated by the question of 
civilian political control of the military.  
Traditional civil-military relations presume civil supremacy and guidance, in other words, 
full democratic control of the military in its role and responsibility to society as the ultimate 
guarantor of national security. This implies the military is a servant of society which 
exercises its monopoly over the most violent means of violence in the interest of its citizens 
in response to popular will and consent. To exercise this role, however, the military must 
have unique expertise within a corporate structure guided by a strong sense of ethical and 
moral responsibility. Civil society on the other hand must have strong institutions through 
which the will and consent of the citizenry are projected. On the other end of the spectrum 
is the situation in which a Military regime subordinates civil society and civilian branches 
of government. In between both extremes, the military may act behind the scenes as the 
sponsor, guide, protector and supporter of a civilian government, and thus retain the ability 
to influence it in many areas within and outside the defence and security spheres. In this 
situation the civilian government has no influence over military, defence and perhaps even 
foreign policy but maintains an appearance of control. Gradual subordination of the 
military involves a process of continuously chipping away at the military’s exclusive 
control over these areas of state activity, first by removing its influence over policy matters 
outside defence and security, and then limiting its influence or policy control to defence per 
se. The final stage of subordination is said to have occurred when the civilian government 
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has total control of all policy areas, including national defence. In this situation, however, 
the military still partakes in policy formulation and debate but ultimate decisions are made 
by the legitimate civilian government, presumably acting in trust as it exercises the will of 
larger society.  
From the foregoing, it would seem that overt intervention in domestic politics by the 
conventional state organized and funded military is the worst kind of civil-military 
relationship. However, on the other end, defining the corporate role of the Armed Forces in 
formulating and implementing defence and foreign policy under supervision of 
constitutional authority, while simultaneously respecting the space of the military, remains 
a challenge to democratically elected governments. It should be recognized, though, that 
dysfunctional civil-military relations may be expressed in other ways, such as the misuse of 
the military for civilian directed repression and even genocide, emergence of child soldiers 
and ethnic militia warlords, illegal weapons proliferation, commercialization of security 
and other expressions of militarization. In Nigeria, whether civil society is supreme and has 
the capacity, will, responsibility, authority and power to guide the military is open to 
debate.  
Military seizure of political power and subsequent rule has been described as an aberration. 
This is so as far as such seizure of power does not fit into the constitutional prescribed 
means of attaining power. Nigeria is one of the best illustration of the form and nature of 
military rule given the numerous cases of coups and counter coups, which had been brought 
on the stage; military rules have exhibited different forms of authority. In Nigeria’s post 
independent experience in which the military coups, counter coups and attempted plots can 
be counted, while seven military heads of state have ruled at different time. The most 
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important issue is the legacy, which the military left behind as a result of prolonged stay in 
governance. And this has to do with the militarization of consciousness, which derives from 
the exercise of power without recourse to the law or obeying the ruling of the courts of the 
land. Thus, following long period of military rule, arbitrariness and use of brute force has 
come to dominate civil life. 
Be that as it may, discussion of the role of the military in a democratic setting implies the 
search for a viable civil military relation. There seems to be a consensus that the role of the 
military in a democratic setting should be restricted to the traditional role of preserving law 
and order and defending the sovereignty of the nation. But this should not include direct 
takeover of the political process, as has been the case for much of Nigeria’s post-
independence history. In other words, the military must be subordinated to the control of 
civilian authority. What is not generally agreed upon is the modality for achieving this. For 
Elaigwu (1998) the liberal model of civil military relation on the ground that it is not 
suitable to the peculiar circumstances of Africa given the praetorian character of the 
military and prolong stay in power. The liberal model of civil military relation emphasizes 
the separation of politics and the military as in most European countries. This model of 
civil-military relations is predicated on assumption that the military has no power of its 
own. Its legitimacy is based on the consent of the society. The supreme authority in the 
state is reposed in the elected government which then defines clearly the goals of the 
military; therefore the military can withdraw to the barracks and stay there. However, 
Elaigwu argued that instead some form of accommodation in which the military should 
have some visible role to play in democratic process should be adopted. It has also been 
 120 
 
suggested that to keep the military relevant and busy in peacetime, there is need to integrate 
it into the development process. 
It is expected that given the size or professionals in the Nigerian military, personnel in 
engineers, signals, finance, medical, electrical and mechanical engineering corps can put 
their enormous technical and professional expertise at the service of the society to promote 
development. In this way, it can contribute to the industrial development and generate 
additional resources outside the budget. This will also keep them up to date in their 
specialized fields and also enhance their effectiveness during military operations. There is 
also the need to carry out a thorough political education conscientisation of the military so 
that the rank and file can appreciate the values of democracy as well as re-orientate the 
personnel with regard to the traditional obligation of the military. This is necessary because 
the present generation of officers and soldiers have witnessed long years of military 
governance, and probably admired certain attractions, perhaps even benefited. Military 
personnel should be made to realize through seminars, training sessions and durbars that 
military intervention erodes professionalism discipline and destroy the fabric of the 
military. They must be reoriented to accept the fact that, a professional military is one that 
does not even contemplate direct involvement in governance, whatever the challenges. 
Also, the point should be made clear that the time has come to pay attention to the reform 
of the armed forces.  
The primary objective of military professionalism according Huntington (1957) is to reduce 
the excessive power of the military and lessen its danger to society. He also posits that 
officership is a profession. The process, which led to the professionalization of the military, 
was informed by the need to take the assignment away from military amateurs into the 
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hands of professionals. The professional soldiers should have corporateness, expertise and 
responsibility. Huntington further states that professionalism forced the armed forces to get 
immersed in their technical tasks, with less time for any diversion. The professional stays 
within the laid down policy by his political leaders, irrespective of its political and moral 
basis. While advising the legislature and the executive about defence matters, the 
professional is also obedient and loyal to the state and to legitimate authority, and dedicated 
to providing defence and security.  
Based on the foregoing, civil-military relations reflect larger society.  Therefore, merely 
asking civilians to replace soldiers in high political positions, dissolving special military 
governing bodies and limiting political involvement of the military elite, without 
addressing deep underlying structural distortions will not necessarily lead to the 
consolidation of democracy.  The ‘rubber meets the road’ when norms are accepted, 
common objectives of the civilian and military elite are served, the negative professional 
experience of the military in power acts as a source of self-restraint, and politicians come to 
understand the self-defeating costs of inviting military intervention by acts of omission or 
commission.  
Challenges include decreasing the risk of coups, reducing the residual influence of a strong 
military that has withdrawn from direct rule, redefining new roles and missions, while at 
the same reducing military isolation.  The importance of economic development as an 
enabling factor for successful democratization needs to be recognized.  But whether such 
democratization then leads to a decreased risk of coups or an increase in violence is a 
different matter, particularly when social forces long suppressed by a strong dictator like 
General Sani Abacha are unleashed in tandem with the professional degradation of the 
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National Police.  The emergence of ethnic militia and apparent increased frequency of 
ethnic clashes in Nigeria come to mind.  
Since the promulgation of the 1999 Constitution, successive administration in the fourth 
republic has strived to diminish the role of the military in the political sphere. Upon taking 
office, President Obasanjo articulated a comprehensive plan for bringing the military under 
the control of a civilian government. Constitutionally, the role of the military is stated in 
Section 217, thus: 
(1) There shall be armed forces for the Federation which shall consist of an army, a navy, 
an Air Force and such other branches of the armed forces of the Federation as may be 
established by an Act of the National Assembly.  
(2) The Federation shall, subject to an Act of the National Assembly made in that behalf 
equip and maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for the 
following purpose: 
(a) Defending Nigeria from external aggression;  
(b) Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, 
or air;  
(c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when 
called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed 
by an Act of the National Assembly; and  
(d) Performance of such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National 
Assembly.  
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(3) The composition of the officer corps and other ranks of the armed forces of the 
Federation shall reflect the federal character of Nigeria. 
To ensure that the command of the military was brought under civilian control but also that 
it would exist only to serve purposes defined by civilian, elected officials, Section 218 vests 
ultimate control of the military in a civilian leader, thus:  
(a) The powers of the President as the Commissioner-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the 
Federation shall include power to determine the operational use of the armed forces of the 
Federation.  
(b) The powers conferred on the President by subsection (1) of this section shall include 
power to appoint the Chief of Defence staff, the Chief of Army Staff, the Chief of Naval 
Staff, the Chief of Air Staff and heads of any other branches of the armed forces of the 
Federation as may be established by an Act of the National Assembly. 
(c) The President may, by directions in writing and subject to such conditions as he think 
fit, delegate to any member of the armed forces of the Federation his powers relating to the 
operational use of the Armed Forces of the Federation.  
(4) The National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the regulation of -  
(a) The powers exercisable by the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
of the Federation; and  
(b) The appointment, promotion and disciplinary control of members of the armed forces of 
the Federation. 
Furthermore, one of the high points in efforts to democratize Nigeria was the willingness of 
the Obasanjo administration to investigate human rights abuses under past military 
regimes.  In 1999, exercising the powers conferred on the President by the Tribunal of 
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Inquiry Act, 1966 Cap. 447, it established the Human Rights Violation Investigation 
Commission (HRVIC) under Justice Chukwudifu Oputa.  Terms of reference included: 
(a) Establishing or ascertaining the causes, nature and extent of human rights violations or 
abuses in Nigeria between 1966 and 1999; 
(b) Identifying the person or persons, authorities, institutions that may be held accountable 
for human rights abuses and determines the motives of the violations; 
(c) Determining whether such abuses or violations were deliberate state policies or acts of 
state officials or acts of any political organisations, liberation movements or other groups or 
individuals; and 
(d). Recommending measures which may be taken whether judicial, administrative, 
legislative or institutional to redress the injustices of the past and prevent a recurrence in 
the future. 
The panel received thousands of petitions regarding assassinations, genocide, torture and 
other abuses by security forces.  A few petitions were related to inter-communal 
violence.  Other high profile petitions revolved around the question of how Nigeria's ethnic 
nationalities want to coexist and be governed.   However, surviving pivots of the recent 
military past, Generals Abdulsalami Abubakar, Ibrahim Babangida, and Muhammad Buhari 
refused to appear before the panel, which has no arrest or prosecutory powers. Their 
attorneys argued in court that under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(1999) the National Assembly is conferred with the power to make law with respect to 
matters specifically mentioned in Section 4 (2) and 4 of the said constitution. They claim 
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that the tribunal decree creating the Oputa panel was originally promulgated in the context 
of the suspension of the previous Constitution by the Army. At the end of military regime 
in Nigeria in May 1999, therefore, the Tribunals of Inquiry Decree 1966 No 41 was only an 
existing law within parameters defined by Section 315 of the 1999 constitution.  Since no 
modifications were made to bring the said Act into conformity with the 1999 Constitution 
as a law of the federation, its validity was thrown into question. When it gets the final 
report, how the government deals with this and some of the more troubling revelations 
made before the panel by former head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), 
Brigadier-General Ibrahim Sabo (retired.) will determine its place in history. 
The Army has also been used for internal security duties in Kaduna, Jos, Oshogbo, Ago-
Iwoye, and Lagos, Warri, Yenagoa and others.  This emerging relationship between the 
military, the executive and the populace via the flagrant and repeated use of military power 
is dangerous - amplified as it is on one hand by restiveness in the barracks about conditions 
of living, salaries and emoluments and on the other by concern in certain parts of the 
country that ethnic militia excesses which have resulted in horrendous bloodshed have not 
been addressed firmly and fairly.  Commentators from the core-North, for example, often 
understandably express frustration and deep anger about the restraint shown in deploying 
the Army during one or two orgies of ethnic blood-letting in the Lagos area.  At the same 
time, soldiers who are left on the streets to perform internal security duties for too long 
soon begin to settle into non-regimental routines for extorting money from motorists. 
The National Assembly, therefore, ought to pay more attention to military welfare, make 
laws that guide the fair and consistent use of the military by the executive for such purposes 
and address the problem of excessive use of force by their commanders which is often due 
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to poor training, equipment, orientation and command failure.  There is a danger that civil 
society can be antagonized and hyper-militarized, while professional military effectiveness 
is compromised, with danger of ensuing rupture of the polity. Underlying contributing 
issues of poor training and tactical leadership in the military have not been the focus of 
sufficient public comment.  
The civilian political elite should and must relate with the professional military in defining 
threats and then establishing  constitutional and institutional defence policies on size and 
complexity, recruitment, training, career planning, retention, retirement, budgets and 
acquisitions, force deployment and power projection, rules of engagement and human 
rights protection.  Other important areas include: defence diplomacy, the relationship of the 
military to the international community, peace operations and regional security 
issues.  Such discussions should clarify the boundaries of acceptable involvement of the 
armed forces in national and international politics, its relationship with the media, NGOs, 
nascent environmental pressure groups and other new non-state actors.  
The proposed dialogue between the military and civil society on civil-military issues can be 
greatly assisted by the media if they are appropriately trained on how it should be 
constructively achieved without the usual complicating Nigerian factors of ethnicity, 
religion, inaccuracy and plain mischief.  There have certainly been many situations in the 
past where opinions expressed in the media have affected military morale and even 
operations. One very disturbing trend in Nigeria is the tendency for some news outlets to 
publish obvious falsehoods.  
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Lastly, sustained commitment of external actors to the democratization process can be very 
important, assuming that the frequent tendency on the part of international actors to focus 
on individuals rather than systems and institutions can be checked. Often, aside from the 
domestic military, it is the only alternative check and balance to irresponsible behaviour on 
the part of the political class. It also has ways of exerting leverage and enforcing 
international normative assumptions in the thinking and attitude of the military to civilian 
supremacy. 
Based on the foregoing, therefore, the Nigerian government has succeeded in laying down 
the legal framework that will engender healthy civil-military relations as these 
constitutional provisions unequivocally articulate the principle of military subordination to 
civilian governmental authority, thereby reducing, if not removing the proclivity of military 
intervention. Therefore, the 1999 Constitution has reduced direct military involvement in 
civic life and, as a consequence, fostered a nascent culture of civilian governance. 
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Conclusion 
In the introduction of this study, I propose to explore the impact of military intervention on 
Nigeria’s political system, particularly, how it affected democratic process in the country. 
The military refers to institutions of the state traditionally established to maintain internal 
security and defence against external aggression. It is “the institution that defends a nation’s 
borders,” and they are equipped with the means of coercive power by the state. A military 
is an organization authorized by its greater society to use lethal force, usually includes use 
of weapons, in defending its country by combating actual or perceived threats against the 
state.  
However, in most developing societies, the military have been found to abandon its 
constitutional functions to intervene in the political administration of the state. Military 
intervention is the act of the armed forces of a country operating beyond its traditional 
function of providing security to take charge of the direct administration of the state 
through a process known as coup d’état. Therefore, a coup d’état could be described as a 
political act directed at the unauthorized seizure of power through the direct use of, or the 
threat of the use of violent force, often clandestine, involving a small band of conspirators 
plotting in secret and often taking advantage of existing social grievances or a vacuum in 
political power and targeting existing office holders either for elimination (assassination) or 
forceful removal from office. 
Many countries have experienced military intervention; however, the difference is that 
Nigeria has experience military intervention in many times covering a period of about thirty 
eight years. In my opinion, the incessant military interference in Nigerian politics is 
 129 
 
aberration of democracy. So many factors account for military intervention ranging from 
corruption, electoral malpractices, and disorderliness orchestrated by an incumbent regime. 
The military long has played a prominent role in Nigerian politics. In fact, since gaining 
independence in 1960, Nigeria has spent a longer period under military rule than civilian 
rule. The military had abandoned its traditional role by intervening in government through 
their seizure of power from the civilian regime under the headship of Alhaji Tafawa Balewa 
on January 15th 1966, barely six years after independence and democratic experiment, in 
what they described as a corrective measure for the excesses or lack of competence of the 
civilian administrators. 
However, having tasted power the military refused to relinquish power to civilians, 
plunging the nation into many years of dictatorship: 1966 – 1979, 1983, and 1993 – 1999. 
The Nigeria Military has ruled for nearly 40 years since independence. Although, it cannot 
be said that the years were entirely wasted by the military as they made certain remarkable 
improvements on the nation’s body politic, especially in the areas of a new presidential 
constitution, a very dynamic foreign policy that made Africa the centre piece of Nigeria’s 
foreign policy, the creation of new states and more institutions of higher learning, the 
reform of the local government system, huge investment in infrastructure such as roads, 
dams, industries and others. however, it remains a truism that the military succeeded in 
compounding the problems it hitherto came to solve. This study has analysed the strategies 
employed by the military to seize power, abuse power and perpetuate themselves in power. 
It adduced that the truncated transition programmes under Gen. Babangida and the 
subsequent annulment of June 12, 1993 elections in spite of the fact that the election had 
been widely regarded to be free and fair, and Abacha’s dismissal of the interim government 
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was the height of the military’s assault on democracy in the nation’s political history. It is 
in fact in an attempt to consolidate its hold on power and accumulate resources to become a 
class for itself that the military elite became politicised, and further militarised politics. In 
Nigeria’s 53 years as an independent nation, it has been ruled by the military for 28 years, 
while democratically elected civilian regime has just lasted for about 25 years. In the light 
of this, military rule which ought to be the “aberration”, became the “norm” while 
democratic/civilian regimes, which should be the “norm”, became relegated to the status of 
an “aberration.” It argued that the history of military intervention which is part and parcel 
of the country’s political history has adversely affected democratic development. The 
military succeeded in entrenching the culture of violence and intransigence which is 
antithetical to democratic culture. The civilian equivalent of coups is the rigging or 
annulment of elections, disqualification of candidates, or the high jacking of political 
parties by the government machinery which are all legacies of military intervention in the 
Nigerian political system. Therefore, military rule cannot be a welcome substitute to civil 
rule and democracy in view of the enormous damage it does to any nation’s political 
system.  
Chapter one attempted to clarify the basic concepts employed in this study, such as 
democracy, political system and military intervention. The thesis observed that democracy 
is a highly contested concept, both in terms of its definition and its relationship to 
development. Democracy, which derives from the Greek word demos, or people, is defined, 
basically, as government in which the supreme power is vested in the people. In some 
forms, democracy can be exercised directly by the people; in large societies, it is by the 
people through their elected representatives. This is perhaps why President Abraham 
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Lincoln aptly described democracy as “government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people.” A democratic system entails the existence of a set of institutions that enables as 
many people as possible to freely express their opinion on how they are to be governed and 
who are to govern them, such as political parties and a free and fair periodic election, a 
mechanism for replacing elected officers found wanton by the electorates as well as the 
existence of basic freedom and fundamental rights as citizens of the state. However, it is 
important to point out that the idea of democracy simply revolves around how governance 
is brought to bear on the masses (people), that is, involvement of the people in the running 
of the affairs of the state.  
On the other hand, the concept of political system represents all the institutions and 
processes involved in the authoritative allocation of values for society. It is the formal and 
informal political processes by which decisions are made concerning the use, production 
and distribution of resources in any given society. Formal political institutions can 
determine the process for electing leaders; the roles and responsibilities of the executive 
and legislature; the organisation of political representation (through political parties); and 
the accountability and oversight of the state. Informal and customary political systems, 
norms and rules can operate within or alongside these formal political institutions. 
Therefore, when we talk about the Nigerian political system, it comprises groups, interest, 
values and institutions that participate in national development, as well as the private 
sector, political parties and electorates. Furthermore, the chapter examined the concept of 
military intervention as an act made by active members of the military heads, outside the 
conventions of the military institution with the aim of disrupting the political status quo, in 
the pursuit of their political interest. As a result of the enormous havoc caused by the 
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military to the political system, since the promulgation of the 1999 Constitution, successive 
administration in the fourth republic has strived to diminish the role of the military in the 
political sphere. Therefore, the Nigerian government has succeeded in laying down the 
legal framework that will engender healthy civil-military relations as these constitutional 
provisions unequivocally articulate the principle of military subordination to civilian 
governmental authority, thereby reducing, if not removing the proclivity of military 
intervention.  
Furthermore, the panoply of literature on the military and its activities hitherto in the 
Nigerian political system were reviewed. The literature revealed that the military is a 
central component of every political system. It also highlighted that the practice of civil-
military relations has been fully operationalized in developing countries leading to the 
recurrent military interventions. In these societies, the military has become directly 
involved in the process of governance through the overthrow of civilian governments. 
 It points to the fact that the Nigerian military is a product of colonialism designed to 
control the social and economic life of the people in the interest of the colonialists. Hence, 
the nature and form of military rule in Nigeria is the autocratic and dictatorial style of 
governance. More so, military regimes operate a patrimonial system to a very large extent; 
a situation whereby military rulers are personal rulers who depend, for support, on the 
distribution of state largesse to favourites and kinsmen. Under such conditions, democracy 
has a tenuous existence as politicians become so intransigent in their disposition to politics, 
thereby robbing democracy of its essential ingredient, compromise. And, there is a sharp 
decline in the legitimacy of the Nigerian state because sectional dominance through 
military regimes has generated a sense of injustice and alienation among other groups. 
 133 
 
Nigerian politics has been shaped by ethnic, religious, and geographical conflicts which 
comprise of a civil war, the Niger Delta crisis, and Muslim fundamentalist 
movement/insurgency in the northern part of the country. The result of these ethnic, 
religious, and geographic tensions have been strong authoritarian measures featuring 
consolidation of power, suppression of fundamental freedoms, and military intervention. 
Therefore, it is not erroneous to posit that the current state of instability and disorderliness 
that pervade the country is only a product of military rule.  
Chapter two explored various theories that explain the phenomenon of military 
intervention. Among such theories are the praetorian theory, the psycho-social theories and 
the modernization theory; all of which share the view that the political structures of the 
countries concerned and the obvious weakness of regimes in such countries account largely 
for the incidence of military intervention in politics. The praetorian theory adduce this state 
of structural decay in the political system as an incentive for military coup d’état.  It 
maintains that there must be the collapse of the executive power as an excuse for the 
military to come to the political scene either by threat of force or actual use of force. It 
posits that the explanation for intervention can be found in the political, structural and 
institutional weakness of regimes and state; that the most likely obvious incentive for 
military intervention is regime illegitimacy and inability to secure political support through 
the available channels.  
It also hypothesizes that the “internal characteristics” of the political system, such as the 
socio-cultural background of military men, skill, career lines, internal social cohesion and 
professional and political ideology could be adduced to explain the military’s intervention 
in politics. The theory also adduces a correlation between military interventionism and a 
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nation’s level of development. Thus, a country with high level of development is likely to 
have very minimal, if not complete absence of, incidence of military coup d’état. 
On the other hand, the psycho-social theories state that the ultimate explanation of socio-
political phenomenon and personality are to be found in certain kinds of psychological 
processes. These processes are the products of some child-rearing practices which each new 
generation of mankind is subjected to. On the other hand, the modernization theory posit 
that the military institution can be an agent of social change through their intervention in 
the political process to correct anomalies perpetrated by civilian democratic leaders. It 
argues that some militaries are capable of playing a democracy-promoting constitutional 
role in a post-authoritarian society. Such militaries often called “The interdependent 
military” is capable of providing institutional support to a nascent democracy because its 
institutional self-interests often align with the conditions that Madison and others have 
identified as conducive to the genesis of a constitutional democracy: institutional stability, 
political pluralism, and national unity. However, the attempt by the military to intervene in 
politics usually fails to bring the desired results to the society in terms of development and 
attainment of democracy, human rights, freedom of expression etc. due to their 
organizational, authority structure and orientation. Lastly, the study adopted the praetorian 
theory as its theoretical framework while basing its findings on the shortfalls of the 
modernisation theory.  
Chapter three provided a historical overview of military in Nigerian politics. It traced the 
inception of the Nigerian military to between 1862 and 1863. The 19th century Nigerian 
military was formed by Lt. John Glover with the sole aim of protecting British trade routes 
around Lagos as against territorial defence. The known as the “Glover Hausas” and later 
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the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), the Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiment (QONR), 
the Nigerian Military Force (NMF) in 1956 and the Royal Nigerian Army in 1960. By 
1897, WAFF was founded under the command of Colonel Frederick Lugard to resist 
French encroachment from the north. By 1901, West African Frontier Force was an inter-
territorial force composed of the Nigeria and Gold Coast regiments, the Sierra Leone 
Battalion, and the Gambia Company, and was commanded by a small number of British 
army officers and non-commissioned officers seconded to the force.  
In 1928 the WAFF became the Royal West African Frontier Force and in 1939, control of 
the RWAFF shifted from the Colonial Office to the War Office. In 1956, the Nigeria 
Regiment was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces, and in April, 1958, the colonial 
government of Nigeria took over from the War Office control of the Nigerian Military 
Forces. The indigenization of the officer corps began slowly but accelerated through the 
1950s. The first Nigerian officer was appointed in 1948 by independence in 1960; there 
were eighty-two Nigerian officers, mostly Ibos from the southeast. This ethnic imbalance 
within the officer corps contrasted with that in the rank and file, where northerners 
dominated. 
On January 15, 1966, Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu led the first ever-military coup in 
Nigeria that led to the death of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of 
Northern Nigeria, Chief S.I. Akintola, the Premier of Western Region, Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, Federal Minister of 
Finance and other military officers. On 29 July, 1966, six months after the first coup plot, 
three young military officers of Northern background led by Lieutenant Colonel Murtala 
Muhammed staged a counter coup in retaliation of the coup led by Nzeogwu. This led to 
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the death of Major-General J.T.U. Aguyi-Ironsi, Head of State, Col. Francis Adekunle 
Fajuyi Military Governor, Western region and other military officers. General Yakubu 
Gowon was then sworn-in as the Military Head of State.  
In July 1975, a group of Colonel sacked the government of General Yakubu Gowon in a 
bloodless coup. General Murtala Muhammed also masterminded this coup. In this coup, no 
live were lost. General Murtala Muhammed assumed power in July 1975. On 13 February 
1976, six months later, Lieutenant-colonel Bukur Suka Dimka with his loyalist stage an 
abortive coup which claimed the lives of three officers; General Murtala Muhammed, Head 
of State, Col. Ibrahim Taiwo, Governor of Kwara State and Lt. Akintunde Akinsehinwa, 
ADC to Muhammed.   
On 31 December 1983, General Buhari Muhammad upstaged a coup that sacked the Shehu 
Shagari’s administration. This coup led to the death of a loyal officer to the government, 
Brigadier Ibrahim Bako. On 27 August 1985, Babangida led a palace coup which 
terminated the Buhari’s Twenty months reign. In 1986, Major-General Mamman Vatsa led 
an abortive coup to over thrown the government of President Babangida. That same year, 
he and other 10 military officers were tried and were executed in March 1986.  
On 22 April 1990, Gideon Orka staged an abortive coup to unseat the government of 
Ibrahim Babangida. The coup attempt has been described as one of the bloodiest coup and 
it was the largest execution of coup plotters in the nation’s history. On October 2, 1993, 
there was a coup attempt by Lieutenant-Colonel Abubakar Umar, an army Colonel and 
Commandant of the elite Amoured corps center and school. On November 17, 1993, 
General Sani Abacha staged a coup to unseat the Interim National Government led by Chief 
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Ernest Shonekan. In 1995, there was an alleged coup plot which involve General Obasanjo 
(retired), former head of state; Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (retired) and other 
prominent Nigerians majority of whom were soldiers. 
Also, the factors that accounted for military intervention in politics in Nigeria were 
examined in the chapter. These factors include corruption: incompetent leaders in the 
administration, failure of the administration to deliver basic services, widespread poverty, 
and electoral fraud by ambitious politicians etc. Some scholars perceive military rule as a 
corrective regime that stimulates changes for national unity and development, while others 
see the military officers as greed and selfish persons seeking to grab political power for the 
purpose to amass wealth through intimidation and oppressive rule. To this group of people, 
the military has no business in governance and cannot facilitate national development and 
good governance. Furthermore, it pointed to the fact that Military intervention into Nigerian 
politics is an invention and subsequently a culture brought about by the military coup of 
1966. This introduced ethnic and religious tensions over economic and educational 
development between the south (especially the south east). The chapter however 
recommended inter alia, political education as one of the key factors towards eradicating 
military intervention in the country’s democratic process. 
Chapter four concluded that military intervention had a devastating effect on the nation’s 
political system and democratic development. It explained that the political behaviour of 
the supposed statesmen in a democratic setting essentially is that of ‘active combative 
posture’ rather than dialogue, negotiation and reconciliation as demanded by democratic 
tenets, that politicians, some of whom had never been in the military, act in the democratic 
space as garrison commanders, hence, a militarized political culture manifest in the political 
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behaviours of the dramatis personae in the democratic arena whereby politics is pursued as 
if it is warfare. All of which are consequences of the many years of military rule. More so, 
the continuous civilianization of retired military officers would lead to a situation where in 
the nearest future the ex-military men will dominate the politics than their civilian 
counterpart. 
Lastly, the study concluded that certain developments during the years of military rule can 
be adduced as having tremendously affected Nigeria’s democratic development. These 
include: the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election; the emergence of the 
military strongman, General Sani Abacha on November 17, 1993, and the decision of 
General Abacha to succeed, General Abdulsalam Abubakar who assumed power also 
demonstrated the conspiracy of the military to continually press and protect their interest 
even in the post-democratic set-up by the way the elections that ushered in the Fourth 
Republic was conducted. General Abubakar would have allowed Nigerians to embark on a 
fundamental restructuring through a National Conference, but that was not the case.  
Rather, he proceeded with a military staged hand over where the manner of the emergence 
of the Presidential candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the way the 
election was conducted simply gave the game away that the transition program was in 
furtherance of the interest of the armed forces. Of course, this forms the background of the 
military’s continuous influence on the nation’s democracy. The research recommends that 
the democratically elected governments should reserve the corporate role of the Armed 
Forces in formulating and implementing defence and foreign policy under supervision of 
constitutional authority, while simultaneously respecting the space of the military. The 
political leaders must enhance civil-military relations as it is expected that given the size or 
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professionals in the Nigerian military, personnel in engineers, signals, finance, medical, 
electrical and mechanical engineering corps can put their enormous technical and 
professional expertise at the service of the society to promote development. The National 
Assembly, therefore, ought to pay more attention to military welfare, make laws that guide 
the fair and consistent use of the military by the executive for such purposes and address 
the problem of excessive use of force by their commanders which is often due to poor 
training, equipment, orientation and command failure.  Lastly, sustained commitment of 
external actors to the democratization process can be very important, assuming that the 
frequent tendency on the part of international actors to focus on individuals rather than 
systems and institutions can be checked.  
The military have left their footprints in all the managerial spheres of Nigeria. The former 
President of the country- Chief Olusegun Obasanjo- was a retired Army General and 
military Head of State. He then became a civilian President between 1999 and 2007; the 
present Senate President -Senator David Mark was a retired army officer; the present Sultan 
of Sokoto and the head of the Supreme Muslim Council is a retired Army official and the 
present Olubadan of Ibadan, Oyo State is a retired Army officer. Some of the best private 
secondary schools and universities are financed by the retired military officers; the boards 
of directors of most functional companies in Nigeria today are dominated by retired 
military officers. The reason is not farfetched; the military was in control of the economy 
for a very long time and have developed themselves educationally by going to good schools 
and therefore able to combine brain power with economic and financial power which they 
acquired while in charge of the management of the country’s economy for over thirty years.  
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However, in general, Nigerians are moral, honest, hardworking people and this is an asset 
to Nigerian and Nigerians. The past failures of the country with respect to military 
interventions and mismanagement of the country's resources do not mean that Nigeria can't 
make it but it simply means that the country has another better opportunity to try harder. 
Nigeria should see all past failures as a stepping stone towards a successful future. As S.E 
Finer and Samuel P. Huntington notes, the reason for military intervention in politics (coup 
d’état) is lack of institutional political culture which leads to economic hardship and social 
division. Therefore, it is time for Nigerians to raise their heads up high and fight corruption, 
economic mismanagement and ethnic divisions. Nigerians must continue to push for a 
reverse in their moral and political misfortunes resulting from military interventions in 
politics. Having been described as a people with courage and great perseverance, the 
question in the mind of every Nigerian should be: how can Nigeria sustain its democracy 
and improve its economy for the benefit of Nigerians? In my opinion, socio-economic 
development and political institutionalization is the key to avoid future military 
intervention. This is because socio-economic development increases the prospects for 
civilian rule, and the institutionalization ensures and protect civilian rule 
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Future Research 
I propose to analyse the impact of the involvement of ex-military dictators in Nigerian 
democracy from 1999 to present. The objective will seek to examine the contribution (if 
any) of what a once military minded leader could make to a democratic dispensation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 142 
 
Bibliography 
ABIOLA, A. G AND OlAOPA, O. R (2006): “Economic Development and Democratic 
Sustenance” in Ojo, E.O (2006) (Eds): Challenges of Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria. 
Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Limited. 
ADEBISI, M. A.  (1998): “The Military and Democratic Transition in Nigeria,” in Rotimi 
A., Olu A., & Yemi A., (eds.) Multi-disciplinary Perspectives in Nigerian Studies. 
(Nathadex Publishers) 
ADEMOYEGA, A. (1981): Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup. Ibadan: 
Evans Brothers (Nigerian Publishers) Ltd. 
AJAGBE, A. (1990a): We the People. African Concord (Lagos), 28 may 1990 p-24. 
___________ (1990b): Freedom of the Press and Party Politics in Nigeria: Precepts, 
Retrospect and Prospects. African Affairs, 89(355), 205-206 
AKE, CLAUDE. (1995): “Is Africa Democratising” in N. O. Mimiko (ed) Crises and 
Contradiction in Nigeria’s Democratization Programme, 1986-1993, Akure, Stebak 
Publisher 
ALEXANDRA, HRITULEAC. (2011): The Effects of Colonialism on African Economic 
Development: A comparative analysis between Ethiopia, Senegal and Uganda MSc 
Dissertation in International Economic Consulting Aarhus University, Business and Social 
Sciences, December. 
 143 
 
ALUBO, O. (2004): Citizenship and Nation Making in Nigeria: “New Challenges and 
Contestations”. Journal of Identity, Culture and Politics, 5(1&2): 135:161. 
ANUGWOM, E (2001): “The military, ethnicity and democracy in Nigeria” Journal of 
Social Development in Africa, Vol 16 No 2 July, p. 93-114 
APPADORAI,  S. (1975): The substance of politics, 11th Edition, Oxford: University Press 
AYO, AWOPEJU (2011): “Election Rigging And The Problems Of Electoral Act In 
Nigeria,” Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 2, No. 2.4 Quarter. 
BAILEY, S. D.  (1978): ‘British Parliamentary Democracy,’ Greenwood Publishing Group. 
BELLO-IMAM,   I. B. (2004): Corruption and National Development in Bello-Imam, I. B. 
and Obadan, M. I. (Eds), Democratic Governance and Development Management in 
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic 1999-2003. Ibadan, Centre for Local Government and Rural 
Development Studies. 
BUTTS, K. H. AND METZ, S. (1996) ‘Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: lessons 
from South Africa’, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). 
CLANCY, MARY A. AND BRANDON HAMBER (2008); Trauma, Peace building, And 
Development: An Overview of key Positions and Critical questions: Paper Presented at the 
Trauma Development and Peace building Conference, New Delhi, University of Ulster, 
International Conflict Research Institute 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
 144 
 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING CORRUPTION; African Union, Maputo, 11, July, 
2003  
DIPO, K. (1998): Issues in Nigerian Government and Politics, Ibadan, Dekaal Publishers 
DJEBA, O. (2002): Impeachment Charges: My Reply by Obasanjo. THISDAY 12 
September, 2011. 
DUDLEY, B. J. (1973): Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria. 
Ibadan, Ibadan University Press. 
Easton D. (1965): A Framework of Political Analysis, Englewood Clif: HJ Prentice - Hall, 
p. 52-55. 
EKEH, PETER (1998): “Theory and Curse of Military Rule and the Transition Program,” 
Association of Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue, August 1. 
.................... (1998): Theory and Curse of military rule and the transition Program: Colonial 
rule and military rule as twin historical nightmares, State university of New York, at 
Buffalo.www.waado.org/nigerian_scholars/archive/opinion/theory.html (26/10/13) 
EKENG, ANAMNDU. (1998): The Leadership Question in Nigeria: A Prescriptive 
Exploration, Geo-Ken Associates Ltd, Lagos. 
EKONG, E (1979): ‘Management Styles in Nigerian Universities Under Military Rule And 
The Challenges of Democracy: How Democratic Can University Management Be?’ Paper 
based on Research Funded by the Study Programme on Higher Education Management in 
Africa, a Special project of the Association of African University (AAU). 
 145 
 
ELAIGWU, I.J. (1998): “The management of Defence in a Democratic set up: The Nigeria 
case” Being a lecture delivered to the participants of National War Col1ege, Abuja on 19 
January. p. 6 
ENWEREMADU, D. (2012): Anti-corruption campaign in Nigeria (1999-2007): The 
politics of a failed reform, African Studies Centre, Leiden. 
ETIM, O AND UKPEREI, I (2012): “The Impact of Military Rule on Democracy in 
Nigeria,” Journal of Social Science, 33(3): 285-292 
FAWOLE, W. A (1994): The Military and the future of Democracy in Africa in Omo-
Omoruyi, Dirk Berg–Schlossen, Adesina Sambo, Ada Okwuosa (1994) Ed. 
Democratization in Africa, African Perspective Vol. 2. Benin City Hima & Hima Ltd. 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA, (1998): Federal Character and federalism in 
Nigeria pp 13 
FEIT, E. (1968): ‘Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana 
and Nigeria’ World Politics,.20(2) :179-193. 
FRANCIS, JAMES. (2009): History Of Coup Detat In Nigeriainfo-
naija.blogspot.com/2009/03/history-of-coup-detat-in-nigeria.(18/10/13) 
FRANK, ETIM AND UKPERE WILFRED, I. (2012):”The Impact of Military Rule on 
Democracy in Nigeria” journal of social sciences 33(3) 285-292 
GABBRIEL, ALMOND (1956): ‘Comparative Political Systems,’ Journal of Politics, 
Princeton University, vol. 18: 391-409 
 146 
 
JANOWITZM, M AND VANDOOM, J.A (1972): ‘On Military Intervention,’ Rotterdam 
University Press. 
JANOWITZ, M.  (1964): The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: a 
Comparative Analysis. Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
JOSEPH, R. A. (1987): Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: the Rise and Fall of 
the Second Republic, Cambridge, The University Press 
GALTUNG; JOHAN (1976): Peace, War, and Defence: Essays in Peace Research, Vol.2: 
Oslo, International Peace Research Institute, pp. 276-299 
GBOYEGA, A..  (1996): (Ed), Corruption and Democratisation in Nigeria, Ibadan, 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation & Agbo-Areo Publishers. 
GENE, SHARP (2010): From Dictatorship to Democracy. Fourth U.S. Edition,  The Albert 
Einstein Institution, East Boston USA. 
HUNTINGTON, P (1957): The Soldier and the State. Cambridge, Harvard Universities, pp. 
155 – 156 
________________(1968): Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale 
University Press 
IDISE, G. E (1985): Military rule in Nigeria, in A. O Ikelegbe (1985) Politics and 
Government, An Introductory and Comparative Perspective, Uri publishers Benin City, pp. 
215-216 
 147 
 
IDUH, SUNDAY (2011): “The key challenges to peace in Nigeria” International Journal 
of Vocational and Technical Education Vol. 3(8), pp. 121-134, November 
IGBOKWE, J (1999): Heroes of Democracy. Lagos: Clear Vision. 
IGWE, L. E (2010): “Democracy and Development in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges,” 
International Journal of Economic Development Research and Investment”, Vol. 1 Nos. 2 
& 3, p. 116-122 
IHONVBERE, J. (1991): A Critical Evaluation of the Failed 1990 Coup in Nigeria. The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 29, 601-626. 
IKPE, U. (2000): “Patrimonialism and Military Regimes in Nigeria,” African Journal of 
political science, Vol. 5 No. 1, p. 146-162 
IWU, H. N AND OKO, C. O (2013): “Amnesty and the Question of National Security: The 
Case Study of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” in Ayodele et al. (Eds) Nigeria’s Socio-Economic 
and Political Dilemmas: The Challenges and the Way Out. Achievers National Conference 
on Public Policy, Intanitina GIM Publishers 
KENNEDY, , G (1975): ´The Military in the Third World,’ Macmillan  
LEDERACH, JOHN PAUL (2005): The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building 
Peace, Oxford, MA: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 148 
 
LEWIS, P. M. (1994): Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition. 
African Review (1994), 93, pp 323-340. 
LUCKHAM, R. (1971). The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and 
Revolt, 1960-1967. African Studies Series, p-4 
______________(1994): “The military, militarization and democratization in Africa: a 
survey of literature and issues.” African Studies Review, 37 2 September 13-75 
MAILAFIA, O. AND GONDA, G. (1992): “Armed Forces and Society: Towards Balanced 
Civil-: Military Relations in Nigeria” In B J Takaya (eds) Security Administration in 
Nigeria (Jos: Center for Development Studies, p.289 
MAZRUI, A. (1977): Soldiers as traditionalizers: Military rule and the Re-Africanization 
Africa. In:  A. A Mazrui Leiden (Ed.): The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa. 
Netherlands: E. J. Brill 
MICHAEL, HOWAR (1978): Soldier and Government: Nine Studies in Civil Military 
Relations, West Port Greenwood Press, p. 5 
MINER, N (1971): ‘The Nigerian Army, 1956-1966,’ Methuen. 
MULLER, E N AND ZIMMENNANN, E (1987): United States military aid and coups 
d’état in the Third World. In: Boswell, T. and Bergesen A. America’s Changing Role in the 
World System, New York, Praeger 
NICOLSON, I.F. (1969): ‘The Administration of Nigeria, Men, Women and Myths’.  
Cambridge University Press 
 149 
 
NNOLI, O (1995): Ethnicity & Development in Nigeria, Avebury, UK. 
NORDLINGER, E A (1977): ‘Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments’, 
Prentice Hall. 
NOWA, OMOIGUL (2013a): Operation Aure: The Northern Military Counter-Rebellion of 
July 1966, http://www.africamasterweb.com/CounterCoup.html, Assessed, 22-10-13. 
___________ (2013b): Nigeria: The Palace Coup of November 17, 1993 
http://www.dawodu.com/omoigui20.htm,   Assessed, 23-10-13. 
NWOLISE, OBE (2010): “National Security in the Federal Government’s Agenda: An 
Expectation-Based Blueprint” in Mohammed Dan Yusuf (2010) (ed.) The Military, The 
Media and Nigeria’s National Security, Gold Press Limited, Ibadan, p. 153-175 
NYEM, J. S. (1967): Corruption and Political Development: A Cost Benefit Analysis in the 
American Political Science Review. Vol.LXI (61), No. 2000. 
OBASANJO, O (1987) Nzeogwu. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. 
OBI, C. I. (1999): Political and Social Change. In: R Anifowoshe, F Enemuo (Eds.): 
Elements of Politics. Lagos: Malthouse, pp.126-140. 
OBI, Cyril, 2004): “Nigeria: Democracy On Trial “Text of Lecture organised by the 
Swedish Development Forum, Stockholm, Tuesday, September 14. 
ODEH, L. E. (2007): “Analysis of Factors Inhibiting Democracy and Democratisation in 
Nigeria, 1999-2007,” in Talla N. S. and Terhemba W. (Eds.) The Fourth Republic In 
 150 
 
Nigeria: A Decade Of Democratisation Reviewed, Department of History and Archaeology 
IBB University, Lapai, Aboki Publishers, Makurdi-Abuja-Ibadan, p. 133-142 
ODETOLA, O (1982): Military Regimes and Development-A Comparative Analysis in 
African Societies.London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 
OLAWOYE, E. O. (2004). “Vote-Buying and Election Rigging in Nigerian Politics”, in 
Femi Omotoso (ed), Readings in Political Behaviour, Ibadan: John homof Printers Ltd. 
OLUBENGA, J. K (2009): “The Press, Military Coups, and the Nigerian Polity: A 
Historical Perspective,” Journal of Social Sciences, 19(1): 75-81 
ONIMODE, B (1981): ‘Imperialism and Nigerian Development,’ Zed Books 
ONU, C. (1994): “Democracy and Trust: The Case of Nigeria” in Omoruyi O. et al (ed) 
Democratization in Africa: Nigerian Perspective, Vol. one. Hima & Hima Ltd, Benin City, 
Nigeria, p. 35 
ONYEOZIRI, I (1989): "Operationalizing Democratization: A Multi- Dimensional and 
Configurative Approach". 16th Annual Conference of the Nigerian Political Science 
Association, Held at University of Calabar, June 1989. 
OSAGAE, E. E. (1998): Cripple Giant: Nigeria since Independent. C. Husrst & Co. Ltd. 
U.K. 
OSAGAE, M. (1994): “Sustainable Democracy,” in Omoruyi O. et al (ed) Democratization 
in Africa: Nigerian Perspective, Vol. one. Hima & Hima Ltd, Benin City, Nigeria, p. 45 
 151 
 
OSOBA, S. O. (1996): Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives. Review of African 
Political Economy, 69, 371-386. 
OTITE, O (1986): “Sociological Study of Corruption” in Odekunle, F. (Ed), Nigeria: 
Corruption in Development. Ibadan University Press 
PERMUTTER, A (1981): Political Roles and Military Rulers, Frank Cass. Newttaver and 
London, Yale University Press.  
RAY, EKPU (2010): “Media Practitioners and military Operators as Patriots and 
Practitioners in Progress” in Mohammed Dan Yusuf (2010) (ed.) The Military, The Media 
and Nigeria’s National Security, Gold Press Limited, Ibadan, p. 29-40 
SARABIIT, K (2000): Challenges of Democratic Sustenance in Nigeria. Center for 
Democracy and Development, Lagos, July 2002. 
SERGENT, L. T. (1975): Contemporary Political Ideologies. The Dorsey Press, 
Homeward Illinois 
SHADARE, G.O AND OWOYEMI OLUWAKEMI (2012): “Military Interventions in 
Nigerian politics: ‘A timed bomb’ waiting to Explode? The vowel of new management 
elites.  International journal of business, humanities and Technology vol. 2 (5) 
SIMKINS, John (2004): “The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization: 
Case Study Nigeria” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA), and Democracy-building & Conflict Management (DCM), Strömsborg, S-103 34 
Stockholm, SWEDEN. 
 152 
 
SKLAR, R. C (1983): Nigeria Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation.Nok 
Pub. International New York 
SODARO, M. J (2008): Comparative Politics-A Global Introduction. New York: McGraw 
Hill. 
THE PUNCH (2008): “Pre-dators Paradise”. Nigerian Daily News Paper, July, 28. Pp-96 
TIJANI, H (2012): “Ethnicity and political violence in Nigeria: Challenges of democratic 
governance,” Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development (ISSN: 2251-0036) 
Vol. 2(4) pp. 89-94 April 2012, available online@ http://www.interesjournals.org/JRPGD 
UGORI, Johnson (1994): causes of military Intervention and Prevention in Nigeria, 
Consultate,htt//www.chrisdonasco.blogspot.com/.../causes-of-military-intervention-
and.html 19-10-13 
UKPABI, S. C. (1989): ‘Mercantile Soldiers in Nigerian History’, (A History of Royal 
Niger Company Army (1886-1900),’ Gaskiya Corporation Ltd. Zaria Nigeria. 
VAUGHAN, O (1991): ‘Chieftaincy Politics and Social Reforms in Nigeria,’ Common 
wealth and Comparative Politics, 29(3): 308-326. 
WINDHAM, I (1957): “The Armed Force”, in M Howard (ed). Soldier and Government: 
Nine Studies in Civil-Military Relations: Westport, Conn: Greenwood. 
WORLD BANK HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: Washington DC, 
USA. Quoted in Bello-Imam, I. B. (2005):  The War against Corruption in Nigeria: 
Problems and Prospects. Ibadan, College Press and Publishers Ltd 
 153 
 
YESUF, T. M (1982): The Dynamics of Industrial Relations (The Nigerian Experience), 
University Press Ltd Ibadan, Nigeria. 
ZOE, SCOTT AND CLAIRE, MCLOUGHLIN (2012): Topic Guide on Political Systems. 
Governance and Social Development Resource Center. 
 
